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I. INTRODUCTION 
Utilitarian penology treats punishment as a costly instrument of public 
policy, permissible only when its benefits in reducing future crime outweigh 
the pain, fear, and public expense it imposes. According to utilitarian 
penology, therefore, the aim of maximizing welfare both justifies and limits 
the institution of punishment. While utilitarian penology has traditionally 
emphasized deterrence, reform and incapacitation as mechanisms by which 
punishment might reduce crime, it values any crime-inhibiting effect of 
punishment. Utilitarian penology also compares punishment to other 
policies which might achieve greater crime reductions at less social cost. 
Deterrence, for example might be most cost-effectively achieved by 
increasing the availability and benefits of lawful employment, or by 
technologies of law enforcement and urban design that increase the certainty 
of apprehension. Likewise, character reform might be better achieved by 
early education and by drug rehabilitation than by incarceration. 
Utilitarian penology has a distinguished history. Utilitarians such as 
Beccaria and Bentham championed such key reforms as the development of 
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police forces, comprehensive penal codes and penitentiaries, the 
abandonment of torture and corporal punishment, and reduced reliance upon 
capital punishment. Nevertheless, utilitarian penology has recently lost its 
luster, at least in the United States. The 1970's witnessed an explosion of 
retributivist thought among philosophers, legal scholars and publicists. 
Retributivists held that beneficial consequences provided neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient reason to punish, and that bad consequences provided 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason to refrain from punishing. 
Punishment could only be justified-and limited-by the moral desert of 
offenders. 
Retributivists participated in public debates over criminal justice policy, 
attacking probation, parole, indeterminate sentencing, rehabilitative 
programs, and determinist accounts of crime, whether invoked to excuse 
2individuals I or to justify ameliorative social programs. Retributivists 
promoted determinate sentencing and thereby contributed to the passage of 
the harsh federal sentencing guidelines. 3 Retribution was invoked by the 
Supreme Court as a constitutionally legitimate purpose of punishment in 
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty.4 
Retributivist attacks on utilitarian penology resonated with some sectors 
of the American public: retributive punishment bore witness to the 
inviolability and inflexibility of certain moral standards during an era of 
social change and cultural conflict. Increasing pessimism about the efficacy 
of government policy-particularly in influencing the behavior and life-
chances of the poor-decreased public confidence that a combination of 
penal and social welfare measures could control crime. Popular perception 
painted urban centers as dangerous jungles in which anonymous offenders 
confronted little meaningful risk of apprehension, and were pathologically 
resistant to rational incentives. 
In the face of these public attitudes, criminal legislation seemed to shift 
from the domain of public policy to that of symbolic politics. 5 Rather than 
1. Michael Moore, Causationandthe Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985). 
2. Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology:A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247 (1976). 
3. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND 
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY 
AND DESERT (1979); THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, 
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS (1976). 
4. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
5. Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. 
REV. 689 (1995); Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat 
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serving as part of a public crime control policy, punishment became a 
medium for expressing hatred of criminals. Retributivism reassured 
decisionmakers and voters that it was unnecessary-and indeed 
unprincipled-to ask whether punishment would reduce crime or enhance 
social welfare. It sufficed that an offender deserved it. In short, the public 
effect of retributivist rhetoric was to erode the utilitarian scruple against 
unnecessary punishment. 
Ironically, while the public effect of retributivist rhetoric was to increase 
punishment, the retributivist arguments that were most influential among 
philosophers and legal scholars asserted that utilitarianism could lead to 
excessive rather than insufficient punishment. Retributivists evoked the 
libertarian sensibilities of academics by warning that utilitarianism could 
justify punishment that transgressed the retributivist prohibition against 
undeserved punishment. Thus, indeterminate sentencing could lead to 
lengthy terms for minor offenses, based on discretionary and perhaps 
prejudicial predictions of dangerousness, or assessments of progress toward 
rehabilitation. 6 Harsh punishment of a few hapless individuals might 
effectively deter millions from committing minor offenses. Worst of all, 
deterrence might be served, public fear might be dissipated, and vigilante 
violence forestalled, by framing and punishing innocent persons. A related 
argument, against utility as a limitation on punishment, contended that the 
benefits of punishing the guilty could be achieved at less cost by merely 
pretending to punish them. 7 These claims about the unfair practices 
endorsed by utilitarianism depend on the image of a deceitful official, 
scheming to maximize utility by manipulating the public. 
This paper is a defense of utilitarian penology, against the familiar 
retributivist charge that it promotes framing the innocent, and other charges 
similarly depending on the notion that utilitarianism encourages officials to 
deceive the public. Our defense proceeds from the striking fact that 
utilitarianism's critics do not cite textual evidence that the originators of 
utilitarian penology in fact endorsed punishing the innocent or deceiving the 
public. Instead, critics claim that these unsavory policies follow logically 
from the premises of utilitarianism. Our argument, in brief, is that the charge 
of framing the innocent rests on a misunderstanding of utilitarian penology 
Offenders; "A Critique of California'sHabitual CriminalStatute," 43 STAN. L. REV. 193 
(1990). 
6. Francis A. Allen, CriminalJustice, Legal Values, and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in 
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT: THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS 193-96 (Leonard Orland 
ed., 1973). 
7. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 233-43 (1984). 
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as an application of an "act-utilitarian" ethic governing individual behavior. 
We contend that utilitarianism began as a normative theory of law and legal 
process aiming not just at happiness in general, but also at security in 
particular, and that this theory was methodologically committed to publicity, 
regularity and representativeness of legal decisionmaking. We argue further 
that utilitarian penology was the original and paradigmatic application of 
this theory of law and legal process, and should be so understood. When 
understood in this way, utilitarian penology cannot endorse punishment of 
the innocent, which violates either the security aim, or the publicity 
condition, or both. Indeed, utilitarian penology cannot endorse any program 
of official manipulation of the public that restricts information to a 
putatively utilitarian elite.8 It is simply not true that eschewing unnecessary 
punishment of the guilty logically entails willingness to punish the innocent. 
A further implication of our argument is that the enterprise of "act-
utilitarian ethics" bears little relation to the original project of utilitarianism. 
Other contemporary off-spring of utilitarianism are more deserving heirs of 
utilitarianism's legacy of accomplishment. These contemporary variants of 
utilitarianism emphasize its role as a public philosophy concerned with 
public policy, legal process and institutional design.9 By contrast, act-
utilitarian ethics miscasts utilitarianism in the pastoral role of giving 
individuals advice about how to manage their moral obligations. Nor does it 
do justice to utilitarianism's status as a normative philosophy of law to 
redefine it as a "rule-utilitarian ethics" that urges individuals to follow rules 
that would maximize utility if followed universally. Rule-utilitarianism is 
the wrong answer because it answers the wrong question. The right question 
is not "what ethical standard for individual acts advances utility while still 
avoiding punishment of the innocent?" The right question is "what practice 
of philosophy helps us identify and administer the kind of institutional 
processes that will best secure happiness?" 
Thus beyond the question of the nature of utilitarianism lie deeper 
questions of method in normative philosophy. What does it mean to have a 
theory of a practice like punishment? What does it mean to understand a 
8. See Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism,in UTILITARIANISM, FOR AND 
AGAINST 138-40 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, eds.); Robert E. Goodin, Government 
House Utilitarianism,in THE UTILITARIAN RESPONSE 140-60 (Lincoln Allison ed., 1970). 
9. See JAMES WOOD BAILEY, UTILITARIANISM, INSTITUTIONS AND JUSTICE (1997); 
ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1995); RUSSELL HARDIN, 
MORALITY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON (1988); DONOLD H. REGAN, UTILITARIANISM AND 
COOPERATION (1980). 
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school of thought like utilitarianism? 10 The debate over utilitarian penology 
has been distorted by procrustean assumptions about the nature of normative 
philosophy. As a result, the critics of the utilitarian theory of punishment 
have attacked what they assume such a theory must be, rather than actually 
reading and attempting to understand utilitarian works about punishment. 
Critics of utilitarianism have presumed a foundationalist model of 
justification in value theory. According to this model, normative theorizing 
must begin with a general conception of value, correct for all contexts, 
which must then be applied as an ethical criterion for evaluating all human 
acts. Since political and institutional decisions are made by means of human 
acts, political and legal theory are only applications of ethical theory which, 
in turn, is an application of the general standard of value. According to this 
model, the proper domain of any theory of value is universal, and the 
restriction of any normative standard to a particular context is an apparent 
inconsistency requiring explanation and defense. 
Thus, if it is good for governments to seek to establish utility-
maximizing institutions and policies it must be good for individuals to seek 
to perform utility-maximizing acts. According to this way of thinking, all 
good things must share some quality in common, some essence of the good, 
which it is the task of philosophy to discover. Thus all normative theories 
must be founded on claims about the essence of value, if they are to count as 
philosophical theories. And such theories can be refuted if they are shown to 
rest on no foundational view about the nature of value, or a poor one. This is 
how critics of utilitarian penology can ascribe to it ethical claims about the 
obligations of individual actors to bear false witness without quoting or 
citing any such claims. And this is why they see efforts to clear 
utilitarianism of the charge of punishing the innocent as disingenuous 
attempts to artificially "restrict" utilitarianism. 
We offer here a very different strategy for reading Bentham and other 
utilitarian writers on punishment. We do not assume that a normative theory 
about an institutional practice like punishment in particular, or about 
government more generally, must be tied to a theory about individual ethics. 
Nor do we assume that practices must rest on a universally applicable 
standard of value. The foundationalist model of justification inspiring these 
assumptions is unpragmatic: that a practice cannot be linked to some general 
account of value does not by itself give us a good reason to abandon that 
practice.11 Unless people are self-consciously engaged in a certain brand of 
10. For a very useful meditation on this problem, see William Twining, Maccabean 
Lecture in Jurisprudence:Reading Bentham, 75 PRoc. BRrr. Ac. 97 (1989). 
11. On the distinction between foundationalist and pragmatic or contextualist 
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moral philosophy they don't ordinarily justify practices by reference to 
foundational conceptions of value. Instead, they commonly invoke the 
purposes the practice serves in some practical context. And so we need to be 
very sure that utilitarian penology was part of a practice of foundationalist 
philosophizing before we go ascribing foundationalist views to it. If we wish 
to understand utilitarian writings, we need to understand utilitarianism as a 
practice. We need to ask: What recommended utilitarianism to its original 
proponents? What features of their social context made it meaningful to 
them? How did they make use of it? What problems did utilitarianism 
address? What alternative views did it compete with? 
We read Bentham and his colleagues as practical reformers and 
rhetoricians, developing a new discourse of value and a new method of 
analysis for use in an emerging context of democratically accountable 
legislation aiId administration. This new discourse of law and politics was 
not an application, let alone a "restriction" of some utilitarian ethical 
philosophy that existed apart from it. This new discourse of law and politics 
was utiliarianism itself. Indeed, a key to understanding Bentham is to bear in 
mind that his training and his interests were in law, not in philosophy, and 
certainly not in the academic discipline of "ethics." The "utilitarianism" to 
which modern penal institutions owe their inspiration is a legal theory and a 
rhetorical practice, not an ethical philosophy. 
This Article is divided into seven sections. Section II explicates the 
charge that utilitarianism requires punishing the innocent, and the related 
charge that it requires the fictitious punishment of the guilty. It also 
examines five responses to these charges offered by contemporary 
utilitarians: acceptance, definitional evasion, minimization, comparison and 
restriction. This discussion will show that the charge of punishing the 
innocent depends on the premise that utilitarianism dictates public 
deception. Section III examines Bentham's actual statements on punishing 
the innocent and fictitiously punishing the guilty. It concludes that while 
Bentham permitted some exaggeration of the rigors of punishment, he 
opposed outright deception of the public and emphatically opposed 
approaches to normative justification see DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: 
JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY (1985) and Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: 
Law as Practiceand Narrative, in WrITGENSTEIN AND LEGAL THEORY (Dennis M. Patterson 
ed., 1992). Examples of works in ethics and political theory proceeding by contextualist 
argument include JAMES GOUINLOCK, REDISCOVERING THE MORAL LIFE: PHILOSOPHY AND 
HUMAN PRACTICE 110 (1993); EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, QUANDARIES AND VIRTUES: AGAINST 
REDUCTIVISM IN ETHICS (1986); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
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deliberately punishing the innocent. He did recognize that some inadvertent 
punishment of the innocent was an inevitable cost of punishing the guilty, a 
cost that should discourage us from freely resorting to the punitive sanction. 
If the-founder of utilitarianism explicitly opposed framing the innocent, 
how can critics ascribe this practice to utilitarianism? They must argue that 
Bentham was confused about his own commitments and that framing the 
innocent is logically entailed by his premises and purposes. Thus, they 
assume that Bentham is committed to endorsing all acts that enhance utility 
in any conceivable world, including framing the innocent. But just as 
Bentham's particular views on punishing the innocent cannot be identified 
without reading him, neither can his premises and purposes. Accordingly, 
Sections IV and V examine these purposes and premises. Section IV shows 
that Bentham' s theory of punishment did not derive from any general ethical 
theory. Bentham, like his chief forebears Hume, Helvetius aid Beccaria, 
thought of public utility as a standard of value for public action, such as 
legislation. He assumed that private action was ruled by private utility (i.e. 
self-interest) so that there was little point in directing arguments about the 
general welfare to individual ethical actors. Section V shows that in 
assessing public action, Bentham was far less concerned about consequences 
than has generally been supposed and far more concerned about process. He 
identified utility with security of expectations and the rule of law. As a 
result, he endorsed public actions that could be seen to have emerged from a 
rational and well-informed debate about their consequences for the public 
welfare. Utility was not a definition of the good or a guide to conscience, but 
a standard designed for use in public, deliberative debate. And, 
utilitarianism was not so much a philosophical theory as a rhetorical 
practice, a transparent language of analysis and argument for use in political 
deliberation. 
Section VI further elaborates the procedural conditions presupposed by 
utilitarian discourse. Section VI begins by demonstrating Bentham's 
commitment to a conception of legality, involving legislative promulgation 
of formal rules, faithfully and applied by rigidly constrained bureaucrats and 
judges. Next, it demonstrates Bentham's commitment to democratic 
representation of the public in devising legislation. Finally, it demonstrates 
Bentham's commitment to publicity in government decisionmaking. 
Utilitarian policy required public scrutiny of all decisions and the 
information and reasons considered in making them. 
In sum, sections IV through VI show that Bentham's utilitarianism was 
primarily concerned with the problem of how to design government so that 
it could accurately identify and faithfully pursue the public good, and be 
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seen to do so. Bentham therefore conceived utility as a standard for official 
rather than private action. Bentham's utilitarianism is more fundamentally 
committed to publicity of official decisionmaking than to any particular 
policy judgment about the public welfare. It follows that Bentham's utility 
principle does not require him to endorse deceiving the public and framing 
an innocent person. 
Section VII sums up the larger utilitarian project of legal reform that 
motivated utilitarian penology. It then turns to the question of where, if 
anywhere, the venerable project of utilitarian penology fits in the 
topography of contemporary utilitarian philosophy. Our conclusion is that 
utilitarian penology should not be seen as an extension or application of any 
modem doctrine of utilitarian ethics, since it preceded all such doctrines and 
does not rely on any ethical doctrine. The best contemporary analogue to 
early utilitarian writing is policy oriented legal scholarship. But we shall see 
that a number of contemporary utilitarian philosophers have begun to 
struggle towards a conception of utilitarianism as a political philosophy 
concerned with the design and function of institutions, rather than an ethical 
philosophy concerned with individual moral obligations. These efforts to 
develop a utilitarian "public philosophy"'12 or "institutionalism" 13 may be 
seen as extensions of Bentham's original project of legal reform. Their 
authors may proudly claim this heritage, which does not commit them to 
framing the innocent. That charge is a frame-up. 
II. THE DEBATE OVER PUNISHING THE INNOCENT 
A. The Charge 
Many philosophers have asserted that utilitarianism requires framing 
and punishing an innocent person when doing so will advance utility. 14 
12. ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILrFIARIANISM AS APUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1995). 
13. See BAILEY, supra note 9; HARDIN, supra note 9, at 11-12. 
14. See G.E.M. Anscombe, Modem Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS 206-07 (Judith J. 
Thomson and Gerald Dworkin, eds. 1968); PHILIP BEAN, PUNISHMENT 34 (1981); E.F. 
CARRrr, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947); Alan Donagan, Is There a Credible 
Form of Utilitarianism?, in CONTEMPORARY UTRLTARIANISM 187-202 (Michael D. Bayles 
ed., 1968); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 59-64 (1978); Alan H. Goldman, Beyond 
Deterence Theory: Comments on Van Den Haag's Punishment as a Device for Controlling 
the Crime Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 721, 722 (1981); L.H. GOODMAN, ON JUSTICE: AN 
ESSAY ON JEWISH PHILOSOPHY 50 (1991); D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM 
(1967); D.K. Lewis, Utilitarianismand Truthfulness, 50 AUSTALASIAN J. PHIL. 17 (1972); 
Steven Lukes, Five FablesAbout Human Rights: What It Would Be Like If, 40 DISSENT 427 
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Dozens of legal scholars have repeated some version of this charge, 
generally citing it as the principal objection to utilitarian penology. 15 E.F. 
(Fail 1993); J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152 (1939); H.J. McCloskey, A Non-
Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 9 INQUIRY 249 (1965); H.J. McCloskey, An 
Examination ofRestricted Utilitarianism,66 PHIL.REV. 466 (1957); Richard A. McCormick, 
Ambiguity in Moral Choice, in DOING EvIL TO ACHIEVE GOOD 7, 33 (Richard A. McCormick 
& Paul Ramsey eds., 1978), EDMUND PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 33-35 
(1966); Jeffrey Reiman & Ernest Van Den Haag, On the Common Saying that it is Better that 
Ten Guilty Persons Escape than that One Innocent Suffer: Pro and Con, in CRIME, 
CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 234-35 (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred Miller Jr., & Jeffrey Paul eds., 
1990); GEORGE SCHEDLER, BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION AND "PUNISHMENT" OF THE INNOCENT: 
TOWARDS A JUSITIFICATION OF THE INSTITUTION OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT 11-20, 73-99 (1977); 
C.L. TEN, CRIME, GUILT AND PUNISHMENT, A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION 13-14 (1987); 
ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL 
QUESTION, 27-29 (1975); Ernest van Den Haag, Punishment as a Device for Controlling the 
CrimeRate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706 (1981). 
15. See Donald L. Beschle, What's Guilt (Or Deterrence) Got To Do With It?: The 
Death Penalty, Ritual, and Mimetic Violence, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 507 n. 119 
(1997); Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: Tfie Problem of 
Preventive Detention, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 781 (1996); David De Gregorio, 
People v. Marreroand Mistake of Law, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 279 n.220 (1988); Anthony 
Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime 
Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1997) ("utilitarianism would recommend such 
counter-intuitive practices as ... convicting those known to be innocent if sufficient 
deterrence was achieved."); James Duane, What Message Are We Sending to CriminalJurors 
When We Ask Them to "Send a Message" With Their Verdict?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 565, 603 
n.121 (1995) (asserting that punishing the innocent is a "perennial problem for the utilitarian 
model of punishment"); David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J.CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 328, 386 n.269 (1988) ("From a utilitarian point of view, punishment of 
innocent persons is perfectly justified for its deterrent effect, at least if the suffering prevented 
by the deterrence of future crime outweighs the suffering inflicted by present punishment."); 
Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67 (1992); Kent 
Greenawalt, Punishment,in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1337-38 (1983) 
("utilitarianism admits the possibility of justified punishment of the innocent"); Kent 
Greenawalt, See PrescriptiveEquality: Two Steps Forward, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1288 
n.62 (1997) (asserting that utilitarians need to qualify their position by imposing 
deontological restraints if they are to avoid condoning the punishment of the innocent); 
Helene Greenwald, Capital Punishmentfor Minors: An Eight Amendment Analysis, 74 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471, 1508 n.200 (1983) (under "utilitarian rationale, a man whom 
the authorities knew to be innocent could be punished, if members of the community believed 
him guilty and threatened to seek personal revenge unless he were punished."); John L. Hill, 
Law and the Concept of the Core Self. Toward a Reconciliation of Naturalism and 
Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289, 314 n.94 (1997); Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms 
of Arm-Twisting, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1586 (1993) ("utilitarian account of 
punishment... would permit the punishment of mere innocents for the sake of some 
utilitarian goal."); Karen Lutjen, Culpabilityand Sentencing Under Mandatory Minimus and 
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Carritt and H.J. McCloskey leveled the best known versions of this attack. 
Carritt reasoned that: 
if some kind of very cruel crime becomes common, and none of the 
criminals can be caught, it might be highly expedient, as an example, to hang 
an innocent man, if a charge against him could be so framed that he were 
universally thought guilty; indeed this would only fail to be an ideal instance 
of utilitarian 'punishment' because the victim himself would not have been 
so likely as a real felon to commit such a crime in the future; in all other 
respects it would be perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific. 16 
McCloskey posed the question: 
whether all useful punishment is just punishment. When the problem of 
utilitarianism in punishment is put in this way, the appeal of the utilitarian 
approach somewhat diminishes. It appears to be useful to do lots of things 
whaich are unjust and undesirable.... [w]hat ... most utilitarians now seek 
to avoid admitting is the implication that grave injustices in the form of 
the FederalSentencing Guidelines: The PunishmentNo Longer Fits the Criminal, 10 N. D. J. 
L. ETHICs & PuB. POL'Y 389, 392 (1996); Leo Martinez, FederalTax Amnesty: Crime and 
Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535, 573 n.160 (1991); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, 
Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1896 n. 80 (1991); 
Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare 
Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2042 (1996) ("Bentham (although perhaps not Mill) would have 
considered the punishment of the innocent person to be a morally right act if ultimately it 
resulted in more total happiness than would have existed if the person had not been punished. 
Under Bentham's form of consequentialism, the end of more total happiness justifies the 
means of punishing innocent persons."); Tamara R. Piety, Scorched Earth: How the 
Expansion of the Civil ForfeitureAct Has Laid Waste to Due Process,45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
911, 973 (1991); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1878 
n.105 (1987) (claiming utilitarians need "fancy footwork" to avoid endorsing punishment of 
innocent people); Nancy Rhoden, The Judge In the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1995 (1986); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL 
CRITICISM OF LAW 232-33 (1977); Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A 
FurtherExploration of the Denunciation Theory of Punishment,65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 324 
n.93 (1990) ("If a judge were actually to follow a utilitarian theory of punishment, the judge 
might actually be required to punish a defendant who was widely believed to be guilty, even 
if the judge knew the defendant to be innocent."); Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs,and 
Criminals:UtilitarianTheory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 320-21 
n.1 1 (1984); Kenneth Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 504 n.141 
(1992). R.J. Spujt, The Relevance of Culpabilityto the Punishment and Preventionof Crime, 
19 AKRON L. REV. 197, 199 (1985). 
16. E.F. CARRrrT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947). 
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punishment of the innocent, of those not responsible for their acts, or harsh 
punishments of those guilty of trivial offenses, are dictated by their theory. 
We may sometimes best deter others by punishing, by framing, an innocent 
man who is generally believed to be guilty, or by adopting rough and ready 
trial procedures, as is done by army courts martial in the heat of battle in 
respect of deserters, etc. 17 
In a key example, McCloskey asked us to: 
[s]uppose that a sheriff were faced with the choice of either framing a Negro 
for a rape that had aroused hostility to the Negroes (a particular Negro 
generally believed to be guilty but whom the sheriff knows not to be 
guilty)-and thus preventing serious anti-Negro riots which would probably 
lead to some loss of life and increased hatred of each other by whites and 
Negros-or of hunting for the guilty person and thereby allowing the anti-
Negro riots to occur, while doing the best he can to combat them. In such a 
case the sheriff, if he were an extreme utilitarian, would appear to be 
committed to framing the Negro. 18 
McCloskey concluded that utility requires the sheriff to sacrifice the welfare 
of the innocent person to save the many who might be killed or injured in 
the ensuing riot. McCloskey also provided a variant of the example, in 
which the utilitarian framer is a stranger passing through town rather than a 
public official. 19 
McCloskey provides no textual evidence that Bentham, Beccaria or 
other utilitarian writers on punishment thought that framing the innocent 
was necessary or desirable. 20 Neither do most of the scores of philosophers 
and legal scholars who have repeated this charge.2 1 Indeed, one legal 
scholar who recently charged that "under Bentham's form of 
consequentialism, the end of more total happiness justifies the means of 
punishing the innocent," was compelled to admit in the supporting footnote, 
that "Bentham actually opposed the punishment of innocent people . . . 
because Bentham believed it would not serve the ultimate aim of the 
17. McCloskey, A Non-utilitarianApproach to Punishment, supranote 14, at 253. 
18. McCloskey, An Examinationof RestrictedUtilitarianism,supranote 14, at 468-69. 
19. McCloskey, A Non-utilitarianApproach to Punishment,supra note 14, at 256. 
20. McCloskey's two influential articles do not cite Bentham, Beccaria or Mill at all. 
21. See IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 24-26, 30-31, 42 (1990) for 
the one notable exception. 
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criminal law, which was deterrence." 22 Another accuser supported his claim 
that utilitarianism "would allow ... for the punishment of the innocent," 
with Bentham's statement that "[i]f hanging a man in effigy would produce 
the same salutary impression of terror upon the minds of the people, it 
would be folly or cruelty ever to hang a man in person." 23 Thus, critics of 
utilitarian penology either ignore Bentham's writings altogether, or 
perversely present his arguments against unnecessary punishment as 
evidence of his willingness to punish the innocent. 
B. Five Responses 
Surprisingly, modem defenders of utilitarianism have also ignored the 
writings of the original utilitarians. 24 Instead of reexamining their proposals 
and premises, modem utilitarians have generally responded to the charge of 
punishing the innocent in one of five ways: by accepting that punishment of 
the innocent is an implication of utilitarianism, denying the possibility of 
this consequence by imposing a "definitional stop," minimizing the 
likelihood of such a consequence, charging that retributivism entails the 
same consequence, and reinterpreting utilitarianism as a "restricted 
utilitarian" or "rule utilitarian" ethics. 
1. Acceptance 
One response, favored by the unabashed act-utilitarian J.J.C. Smart, 
involves forthrightly, albeit reluctantly, embracing the potential conflict 
between desert and utility asserted by McCloskey: 
Surely if it is shown that, in certain circumstances ... a utilitarian ought, on 
his own principles, to commit a serious injustice, such as punishing an 
innocent man, then it seem that this does and should weaken the appeal of 
utilitarianism. And yet one can be made to vacillate back again. We also 
reflect that the serious injustice would ex hypothesi be the only possible 
alternative to an even greater total misery than would be caused by the 
injustice.... If a case really did arise in which injustice was the lesser of two 
22. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 
supranote 15, at 2041. 
23. Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. 
TAX REV. 535, 573 (1991) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 28-29 
(1830)). 
24. A noteable exception is John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3, 8, 
n.10 (1955). 
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evils (in terms of human happiness and misery, that is) the anti-utilitarian 
conclusion is a very unpalatable one too, namely that in some circumstances 
one should choose a greater total misery. 25 
On these terms, the conflict between desert and utility is simply a tragic 
choice which the toughminded utilitarian faces candidly. 26 Smart's response 
has the merit of consistency, but it seems unlikely to persuade anyone who 
is genuinely troubled by McCloskey's example. McCloskey claimed that 
Bentham also adopted this response to the charge of punishing the innocent, 
but cites no evidence. 27 
2. Definitional Evasion 
A second response is the so-called "definitional stop," which claims that 
punishment of the innocent is a logical impossibility because punishment 
implies inflicting harm on account of guilt. Stanley Benn insists that the 
charge of permitting punishment of the innocent rests: 
[o]n a misconception of what the utilitarian theory is about. 'Punishment' 
implies, in its primary sense, inflicting suffering only under specified 
conditions, of which one is that it must be for breach of a rule. Now if we 
insist on this criterion for the word, 'punishment of the innocent' is a logical 
impossibility, for by definition, suffering inflicted on the innocent.., cannot 
be 'punishment.' It is not a question of what is morally justified, but of what 
is logically possible .... The short answer to the critics of utilitarian theories 
25. J.J.C. Smart, The Methods of Ethics and the Methods of Science, 62 J. PHIL. 344, 
347-48 (1965); see also J.J.C. SMART, AN OUTLINE OF A SYSTEM OF UTILITARIAN ETHICS 
(1961). 
26. A recent example of this strategy in legal scholarship is provided by Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell, Principlesof Fairness versus Human Welfare: On the Evaluation of 
Legal Policy, Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business Discussion Paper no. 277, 344-
45 (Harvard Law School, 2000). Fortunately, Kaplow and Shavell place little reliance on this 
strategy for the excellent reason that they are exclusively concerned with the relative merits of 
utilitarian and retributivist analyses of legal policy. Since, as they point out, the utility of a 
systematic policy of framing the innocent (as opposed to an isolated act) is most unlikely, it is 
not clear that there is any conflict between utility and desert here. The strategy of acceptance 
is unnecessary if one treats punishment of the innocent as a policy question, and views policy 
questions as the only kind of question utilitarianism is designed to address. 
27. McCloskey, A Non-utilitarianApproach to Punishment,supranote 14, at 254. 
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of punishment, is that they are theories of punishment, not of any sort of 
technique involving suffering. 
2 8 
This response is obviously question-begging. It misses the point of 
McCloskey's example, which is that utilitarian ethics might tempt someone 
to misapply punishment by framing the innocent. Even if purposeful 
punishment of the innocent is a logical contradiction, framing the innocent 
so as to cause others to punish them is not. Neither is framing the innocent 
so as to create the public impression that they are being punished. 
In any case, the definitional stop cannot be derived from Bentham's 
conception of punishment. Bentham carefully avoided defining punishment 
to require the deliberate punishment of the guilty, precisely to avoid begging 
the question of the utility of punishing the innocent. 29 For like reasons, he 
argued against restricting the term punishment to the purposeful ("directly 
intentional") as opposed to the knowing or reckless ("mediately 
intentional") infliction of suffering on account of a prior act. 30 On 
Bentham's definition, the suffering of an offender's family as a result of his 
incarceration or execution is also punishment. 
This, however, is but a question of words. Take any lot of evil you will, .... 
[slay that it is punishment, the reason for avoiding to produce it, if 
unavoidable, will not be the stronger; say that it is not punishment, the 
reason for avoiding to produce it, if avoidable, will not be the weaker. 3 1 
3. Minimization 
A third response argues that utility would never, or would only very 
rarely, be served by punishing the innocent in any realistic or probable 
scenario. First, utilitarians disfavor punishment in general because its 
immediate effect is to inflict pain with no compensating production of 
pleasure. Second, punishment can often be very expensive to inflict. Third, a 
publicly announced policy of punishing the innocent would appear to have 
antideterrent effects. In a world where only innocents are punished, 
28. S.I. Benn, An Approach to the Problems ofPunishment, 33 PHIL. 331-32 (1958). 
29. "But so [punishment] be on account of some act that has been done, it matters not 
by whom the act was done. The most common case is for the act to have been done by the 
same person by whom the evil is suffered. But the evil may light upon a different person, and 
still bear the name of punishment." JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW BOOK I, Ch. 
1, I WORKS 391 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
30. Id. at 476-77. 
31. Id. at477. 
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everyone has an incentive to offend. And to the extent that there is even 
some chance of non-offenders being punished, the attractions of offending 
marginally increase. So in the ordinary course of things, an announced 
policy of punishing the innocent seems counter-productive. 
Yet, there are many examples of societies or authorities that have 
adopted policies of deliberately harming nonperpetrators as a response to 
crime. Are these policies utility-maximizing? Let us consider four types of 
possibly rational policies that might be considered forms of punishing the 
innocent: punishment of associates, punishment based on low standards of 
proof, preventive incapacitation and, finally, framing the innocent. 
(a) Punishment of Associates 
We might hope to deter offenses by punishing the relatives or associates 
of offenders instead of the offenders. They might be easier to apprehend 
than the offender, or the offender might care more about them, or they might 
be more vulnerable to suffering, or the offender might be offending for the 
very purpose of benefitting them. We might also hope to increase deterrence 
by punishing an offender's associates in addition to the offender. In fact, 
punishing an offender usually does inflict suffering on the offender's family, 
an undeserved consequence of retribution which retributivists should not 
evade by means of a definitional stop. 
We most often encounter the systematic punishment of offender 
associates in three closely related sorts of settings: bloodfeuds, campaigns of 
political or religious repression, and wars. None of these conflicts are utility 
maximizing. None would arise within a properly regulated utilitarian 
community. Bloodfeud societies have a highly solidaristic clan structure and 
no centralized authority with a monopoly on legitimate force. 32 Punishment 
in such societies proceeds on the premise of group responsibility. 33 Because 
the different groups are competing to out-offend one another rather than 
cooperating to minimize the overall rate of offending, it seems unlikely that 
a bloodfeud system maximizes utility. By contrast, utilitarianism presumes a 
single overarching authority equally concerned for the welfare of everyone 
32. See generally WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW 
AND SOCIETY IN SAGA ICELAND (1990) (detailing the processing of bloodfueds in medieval 
Iceland); George B. Wall, CulturalPerspectiveson Punishment ofthe Innocent,in 11 PHIL. F. 
492-93 (1971). 
33. See generallyMILLER, supranote 32 (group liability rendered feud a more effective 
instrument of social control than if only the wrongdoer suffered the consequence of his 
actions). 
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subject to its jurisdiction. Repressive regimes and occupying armies 
sometimes impose collective responsibility on subject populations for acts 
of resistance. Here too, there are special conditions that seem incompatible 
with the pursuit of utility. Such regimes are usually unrepresentative, 
unpopular and unconcerned with the welfare of the targeted population. 
Hence, they are unconcerned with the costs of deterrence, and they need to 
impose collective responsibility because they do not have public cooperation 
in identifying and apprehending offenders. Even liberal regimes impose a 
kind of collective responsibility when they defend themselves against enemy 
states. In organized warfare, in military reprisals, and in imposing
"economic" sanctions against other nations, liberal regimes attack ordinary 
people rather than political leaders. And the more repressive and 
unrepresentative the enemy state is, the more undeserved these attacks on 
ordinary persons are likely to be. A utilitarian political community may 
decide to defend its boundaries at a great cost in welfare to those outside 
those boundaries. But in so doing it is probably not consulting utilitarian 
principles because the conditions for developing and implementing 
utilitarian policy do not obtain. In sum, groups may find it useful to impose 
collective responsibility on other groups, whose welfare they do not count as 
equal to their own. But that does not mean that collective responsibility is 
utilitarian. 
(b) Punishment Based on Low Standards of Proof 
Governments adopt varying standards of proof. The lower the proof 
standard, the more guilty offenders will be punished, but also the more 
innocent suspects. Governments may lower standards of proof for criminal 
offenses directly, or they may do so indirectly by criminalizing conduct 
which correlates with those offenses (e.g., inchoate offenses), attaching 
unpleasant sanctions to ostensibly noncriminal judgments (e.g., civil 
commitment, civil contempt, civil forfeiture, bail, deportation), or by 
redefining offense elements as sentencing factors. Regardless of what 
technique for lowering burdens of proof we are discussing, utilitarians have 
no more reason to risk punishing the innocent by adopting low standards of 
proof than retributivists. Both are interested in punishing the guilty, whether 
for deterrence or desert, and both are interested in avoiding punishment of 
the innocent. But only the utilitarian seeks to avoid profitless punishment of 
the guilty. Given that desert is violated by acquitting the guilty as well as by 
condemning the innocent, it does not appear that desert requires more 
exacting burdens of proof than does utility. 
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(c) Preventive Incapacitation 
Utilitarian penology, concerned with prevention, seems open to 
preventive incapacitation of potential wrongdoers. Retributive penology, 
concerned primarily with denouncing past wrongdoing, might be thought to 
clearly to oppose to preventive incapacitation. Yet things are not so simple. 
On the one hand, Bentham did not consider preventive incapacitation as 
punitive unless it was a response to a past criminal act. 34 On the other hand, 
retributivists do not object to the use of coercive force to prevent crime, so 
long as it is not mischaracterized as punishment. Retributivists uniformly 
permit the preventive use of force by law enforcement officers and private 
citizens, provided that the threat of wrongdoing is sufficiently manifest and 
imminent.35 Apparently, the objection is to basing restrictive force on 
unreliable prediction rather than on prediction per se. Thus, there may be 
little practical difference between retributivist and utilitarian attitudes 
toward preventive detention. 
The utilitarian may agree that, as things now stand, it is disutilitarian to 
detain based on predictions of future criminality because such predictions 
are often unreliable and are easily distorted by prejudice. These dangers 
would make the institution of preventive detention a source of constant 
anxiety for any who might be detained wrongly. The utilitarian may add that 
detention does not even succeed in preventing crime unless prisoners are 
kept isolated from one another at great public cost. 
(d) Framing the Innocent 
Finally, what about framing the innocent, the problem posed by Carritt 
and McCloskey? Here we must distinguish two variants of the problem: (i) a 
systematic policy of framing the innocent and (ii) the isolated act of an 
individual. 
(i) An institution 
Rawls has argued that an institutionalized system of framing the 
innocent to enhance deterrence would be self-defeating if it were publicly 
34. See BENTHAM, supranote 29, at 476-77. 
35. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND 
THE LAW ON TRIAL 20-21 (1988) (discussing the blurred line between legitimate defensive 
force and illegitimate preemptive force). 
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known and that keeping it secret would require repression on a scale that 
would exact huge utility costs. 
Try to imagine, then, an institution (which we may call "telishment") 
which is such that the officials set up by it have authority to arrange a trial 
for the condemnation of an innocent man whenever they are of the opinion 
that doing so would be in the best interests of society. The discretion of 
officials is limited, however, by the rule that they may not condemn an 
innocent man to undergo such an ordeal unless there is, at the time, a wave 
of offenses similar to that with which they charge him and telish him for.... 
Once one realizes that one is involved in setting up an institution, one 
sees that the hazards are very great. For example, what check is there on the 
officials? How is one to tell whether or not their actions are authorized? How 
is one to limit the risks involved in allowing such systematic deception? 
How is one to avoid giving anything short of complete discretion to the 
authorities to telish anyone they like? In addition to these considerations, it is 
obvious that people will come to have a very different attitude towards their 
penal system when telishment is adjoined to it. They will be uncertain as to 
whether a convicted man has been punished or telished. They will wonder 
whether or not they should feel sorry for him. They will wonder whether the 
same fate won't at any time fall on them. If one pictures how such an 
institution would actually work, and the enormous risks involved in it, it 
seems clear that it would serve no useful purpose. A utilitarian justification 
for this institution is most unlikely. 36 
Igor Primoratz has responded that "Rawls' thesis that it is 'most 
unlikely' that the institution of 'telishment' could have a utilitarian 
justification simply will not stand."'37 Primoratz dismisses the concern that 
such an institution will be liable to abuse by asserting "we can assume for 
the sake of the argument," that well-meaning people will administer the 
institution. But of course a utilitarian designing an institution to endure over 
time under unpredictable circumstances to be staffed by unknown persons 
cannot make such an optimistic assumption. Utilitarian psychology is 
premised on the assumption that persons pursue their rational self-interest. 
Thus, utilitarians must assume that a governing elite which is in a position to 
systematically deceive the public will serve its own interests rather than 
those of the public. 
36. Rawls, supranote 24,at 11-12. 
37. IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 127 (1989). 
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:115 
Primoratz is obviously interpreting utilitarianism simply as the principle 
that each decisionmaker (whether individual or institutional) should do 
whatever will maximize utility on any conceivable set of empirical 
assumptions. He thereby ignores two aspects of utilitarian thought which 
Rawls apparently thinks make a utilitarian justification for telishment "most 
unlikely." First, utilitarianism cannot be "applied" to any conceivable set of 
empirical assumptions if it includes certain empirical assumptions-as, for 
example, about human psychology-among its fundamental premises. 
Second, utilitarianism does not treat individual decisionmakers and 
institutional decisionmakers as interchangeable. Individual decisionmakers 
predictably (perhaps even appropriately) maximize their own utility. 
Decisionmaking processes require an appropriate institutional design if the 
individuals participating in the process are to have the means to discover and 
the incentives to pursue the general welfare. Rawls is not simply arguing 
that telishment should only be used if its regular use would maximize utility. 
He is arguing that telishment should only be used if a utility-maximizing 
decisionmaking process can govern its use. He insists that we assess 
telishment not just as a government policy, but as a governing institution. 
Primoratz concedes that a publicly announced policy of telishment 
would be self-defeating. 38 But he goes on to argue that a secret institution of 
telishment is both a conceptual and an empirical possibility. 39 It is a 
conceptual possibility because "internal institutional rules are . 
possible... rules which are known to those who hold offices within an 
institution and to them only. Some institutions, the secret police, for 
instance, have just such.. rules -40 Primoratz proceeds to argue that an...... 
institutional practice of systematically framing and imprisoning the innocent 
is not only a conceptual but an empirical possibility, pointing to the Gulag 
Archipelago. 4 1 But this rejoinder misses Rawls' point, which is not that 
secret institutional practices are conceptually impossible. Rawls merely 
argues that such practices are unlikely to maximize utility. Obviously, the 
fact that the Soviet government adopted such a practice is no evidence that 
this practice served the welfare of the Soviet population-indeed, Primoratz 
quite obviously thinks it did not. Nor does the fact that the Soviet 
government claimed that it was acting in the public interest mean that it 
actually did so. Of course a utilitarian "justification" of any horrendous 
institution is possible in the trivial sense that officials might defend such an 
38. Id. 
39. See id. at 127-28. 
40. Id. at 127. 
41. See id. at 128. 
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institution as welfare maximizing, just as they might defend any such 
institution as fair. But Rawls' claim is that a true-as opposed to a 
putative-utilitarian justification of telishment is most unlikely. Hence the 
horrors of the Soviet example support-rather than refute-Rawls'claim. 
(ii) An individual act 
McCloskey's example of an isolated act of framing the innocent by a 
sheriff or a passing stranger is designed to avoid the problems associated 
with a systematic policy of framing the innocent. Yet even here T.L.S. 
Sprigge finds the claim that utility would recommend such conduct 
implausible. Where Rawls focuses on the kind of institutions that would 
required to implement a policy of framing the innocent, Sprigge focuses on 
the kind of information that would be required to justify an individual act of 
framing the innocent. He notes that framing the innocent produces certain 
misery for the person framed, that the expected benefits of the frame turn on 
the deception not being exposed, and that such exposure is highly probable. 
Then he points out how speculative the predicted benefits of the frame must 
be. How does the framer know that race riots will cease rather than being 
further fueled if he bears false witness against a member of the vilified 
group? How does he know they won't subside on their own? How does he 
know how violent they will be? Sprigge acknowledges that there are 
exceptional situations in which framing the innocent would produce the 
most felicific results. What he denies is that an individual, acting alone and 
in secret, is ever likely to know this before the fact. The elaborate and exotic 
fact scenarios that retributivists dream up to confute utilitarians are 
necessarily highly unusual situations, in which it is impossible for 
individuals to rely on habits or time-tested generalizations. The decision to 
frame an innocent person, Sprigge argues, must rely on a "hunch" that is 
likely to be wrong. And if the hunch is indeed wrong, the resulting decision 
may be disastrously destructive of human happiness.42 
Retributivists sometimes argue that the infrequency with which utility 
demands punishing the innocent is normatively irrelevant as long as 
utilitarianism could conceivably approve punishing the innocent under some 
circumstances. But Sprigge responds that the infrequency with which 
framing the innocent serves utility is cognitively relevant, because prudence 
requires reliance on generalization. An implicit theme in Sprigge's argument 
is that practical judgment about the utility consequences of social action 
42. T.L.S. Sprigge, A Utilitarian Reply to Dr. McCloskey, 8 INQUIRY 254, 275-78 
(1965). 
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depends upon large numbers of people pooling information and experience 
and deliberating soberly. Individuals are likely to have very limited and 
misleading information, to interpret it in ways that are distorted by self-
flattery, and to act on it impulsively. Isolated individuals are poorly 
qualified to serve as utilitarian policymakers. 
4. Comparison 
A fourth response attacks the comparison between utilitarianism and 
retributivism implied by the charge that utilitarianism approves punishing 
the innocent. First, unlike retributivists, who see punishment of the guilty as 
an unalloyed good, utilitarians never approve punishment. They accept it as 
an evil, sometimes outweighed by beneficial consequences. And the bad 
consequences likely to follow from punishment of the innocent are very 
much greater than the bad consequences likely to flow from punishment of 
the guilty. So that even if a utilitarian were to accept punishment of the 
innocent in some exceptional circumstance, she would do so with 
considerable regret. 
Now, consider the other side of the comparison, the implied claim that 
the retributivist could never under any circumstances accept punishment of 
the innocent. This might be plausible if retributivism were only a limiting 
principle, forbidding punishment of the innocent. But retributivism is also an 
affirmative principle, requiring punishment of the guilty. And since these 
two principles can come into conflict quite easily, both cannot be adhered to 
absolutely. In actual practice, neither can be adhered to absolutely, with the 
result that retributivists must, however reluctantly, expect some punishment 
of the innocent, as David Dolinko explains: 
[S]ince any actual criminal justice system is inherently fallible, any such 
system will inevitably inflict punishment on some people who are actually 
innocent and thus do not deserve it. Unless the retributivist rejects all 
possible systems of legal punishment, therefore, she is endorsing a system 
that she knows will condemn and punish innocent people. Presumably, she 
believes that the unjustified punishment of these innocents must be accepted 
to avoid the far greater injustice that leaving all of the guilty unpunished 
would produce. But isn't the retributivist then "using" those actually 
innocent persons who end up wrongly condemned? To be sure, she is 
ignorant of exactly who those unfortunate persons are. Yet this seems 
irrelevant: the terrorists who blew up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, 
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Scotland ... were "using" the hapless passengers to score a political point 
even if (as is likely) they were unaware of the passengers' identities.43 
Recall that McCloskey's accusations include the utilitarian's supposed 
tolerance for "summary" (and hence possibly inaccurate) trials. It looks very 
much as if the retributivist is in the same boat as the utilitarian: accepting as 
necessary, although not desiring, the infrequent punishment of the innocent. 
In fact, as we noted above, punishment of the innocent relatives of the 
offender is a frequent consequence of punishing the offender. And if 
punishment of the innocent is an inevitable byproduct of punishing the 
guilty, it may be that the retributivist-who sees punishment of the guilty as 
an intrinsic benefit-is more willing to accept punishment of the innocent 
than the utilitarian, who sees punishment of the guilty as an intrinsic cost. 
One may argue that the utilitarian is more culpable than the retributivist 
in accepting punishment of the innocent although, as Dolinko points out, it 
is hard to specify a culpability standard that distinguishes them. Is it that the 
utilitarian desires the punishment of the innocent? No, even McCloskey's 
sheriff regrets it. Is it that utilitarian knows it will result from her acts and 
the retributivist does not? But-and this is Dolinko's point-in adopting a 
proof standard of less than a hundred percent the retributivist also knows 
that innocents will be punished. And we might add that where the 
retributivist punishes the parent of young children, she even knows which 
innocents she will cause to suffer. 
The utilitarian may point to additional predictable violations of desert 
accepted by the retributivist. Crime imposes undeserved harm on victims. 
Since the retributivist is indifferent to crime prevention, she is indifferent to 
these violations of desert. If retributivist punishment predictably permits 
more crime than utilitarian punishment, additional desert violations are 
likely to result as the criminal justice system predictably errs in responding 
to some of these additional crimes. More criminals will wrongly go 
unpunished and more innocents will be punished unfairly. 44 
5. Restriction, or Rule Utilitarianism 
A fifth response involves interpreting utilitarianism in a different way 
than do its retributivists critics. According to this response, utilitarianism 
does not judge acts by the standard of their contribution to utility. Instead it 
43. David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623, 1632 
(1992). 
44. See Kaplow and Shavell, supranote 26, at 330-31. 
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judges acts by the standard of their conformity to a rule which, if universally 
followed, would advance utility. In other words, utilitarian ethics is "rule-
utilitarian" rather than "act-utilitarian." 451t follows from this interpretation 
that utilitarianism could only endorse acts of framing the innocent if it also 
endorsed a general rule or policy of framing the innocent. This interpretation 
of utilitarianism, if accepted, considerably eases the utilitarian's task. The 
utilitarian need not show, as Sprigge attempted to do, that an individual act 
of framing the innocent could never be foreseen to be utility maximizing. 
The utilitarian need only show, as Rawls tried to do, that a systematic policy 
of framing the innocent would not be utility maximizing. Indeed, Rawls 
argument has been interpreted as an endorsement of a rule-utilitarian 
ethics.46 
Rule-utilitarianism has traditionally been attacked, however, on the 
grounds that it arbitrarily restricts the utility principle. If the good is that 
which produces the happiest consequences, then the best act under the 
circumstances is the act producing the happiest consequences, even if under 
most circumstances that act would produce unhappy consequences. If the 
rule-utilitarian agrees that the ultimate good is the production of happy 
consequences, she has no reason to shrink from breaking a rule in the 
exceptional circumstance when that will produce more happiness. And to 
admit that it is sometimes better to produce less happy consequences is to 
admit that the production of happy consequences is not the ultimate good. If 
the utility principle does not apply universally, the critic reasons, the utility 
principle is wrong. 47 
A second powerful argument against rule-utilitarianism is that the 
distinction between acts and rules for acting is a purely formal distinction 
with no normative significance. If under some state of affairs act x appears 
to be the most felicific act, then presumably that state of affairs includes 
some set of conditions sufficient to make x appear to be the most felicific 
act. Hence, in all states of affairs sharing all of those conditions, x will also 
appear to be the most felicific act. In other words, for every act judged 
utility-maximizing, it should be possible to state a rule of conduct applying 
to relevantly similar cases. Hence, if it sometimes seems advisable to frame 
the innocent, the rule-utilitarian would have to endorse a rule of framing the 
innocent under some set of conditions. Thus, rule utilitarianism would 
45. For definition of these terms see R.B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 380 (1959). 
46. See Igor Primorac, Utilitarianismand Punishment of the Innocent, 57 REVISTA 
INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA DEL DIrr-ro 582, 598 (1980). 
47. See id. at 608; John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Extreme and Restricted 
Utilitarianism,25 PHIL. Q. 344 (1956). 
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appear no less vulnerable to the charge of framing the innocent than act-
48
utilitarianism. 
It seems to us that these arguments demonstrate that the rule-utilitarian 
position fails to capture the considerable insight in Rawls's argument. Rawls 
does not succeed in demonstrating that no class of cases could ever be 
identified in which it was felicific to frame the innocent. He does show that 
it would be imprudent to set up a legal institution to define and carry out the 
function of framing the innocent. The position supported by such an 
argument is not a rule-utilitarian ethics, or indeed any ethics. It is the 
position that legal and political institutions should be designed to maximize 
happiness. This position need not be formulated as a restriction on utilitarian 
ethics or some general utilitarian theory of the good. It may be formulated 
simply as a normative theory of social control. 
C. The State of the Debate 
What is left of the charge of punishing the innocent after considering the 
five modem responses? 
It seems to us that the strategies of acceptance and definitional evasion 
leave the charge untouched. Anyone disturbed by the prospect of undeserved 
punishment is unlikely to be soothed by the revelation that technically, it is 
not punishment. Nor are they likely to be persuaded that they should just 
grow up and accept life's unfairness. 
The strategies of minimization and comparison, however, do succeed in 
reducing the scope of the charge. They reveal that there is little reason to 
think that utilitarianism requires lower burdens of proof or readier resort to 
preventive coercion than does retributivism. They show that a utilitarian 
regime is no more likely than a retributivist regime to impose burdens on the 
family and associates of offenders. They show that however useful 
collective punishment may be to a repressive regime, it is not utilitarian. 
And they show that a utilitarian regime cannot pursue a systematic policy of 
framing the innocent, whether in public or in secret. 
Thus, the strategies of minimization and comparison dispose of a good 
deal of the charges on the retributivist indictment. Yet they leave open 
whether utilitarianism permits individuals to frame the innocent, if 
sufficiently confident that they can keep their deception secret. The strategy 
of restriction is a failed attempt to answer this question in the negative. It 
fails because it interprets utilitarianism as hedonistic ethics, but offers no 
48. See Primorac, supra note 46, at 600-01. 
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very good reasons why hedonistic ethics should be restricted to 
universalizable rules, and why it is not possible to universalize a rule of 
framing the innocent whenever it can be done secretly and beneficially. 
Ultimately, the strategy of restriction fails because it misconceives 
utilitarianism as an ethical theory (which can only be defended by restricting 
it to the ethics of policymaking). But utilitarianism is not an ethical theory. 
It is a legal theory. 
Most critics and some defenders of utilitarianism have assumed that 
deception of the public cannot be ruled out categorically as a means to the 
public good, because they assume that utilitarianism is a theory only about 
the appropriate ends of human action, not about the appropriate institutional 
means for defining and pursuing those ends. If instead we assume that 
utilitarianism is a theory about both ends and the institutions and procedures 
for defining those ends, then it is possible that it could prioritize institutional 
over individual actors, and certain procedural devices like publicity of 
decisionmaking over certain substantive goals like deterrence. Such a theory 
could eschew framing of the innocent as a counterproductive policy without 
committing itself to the view that framing the innocent would always be a 
counterproductive act. Moreover, a theory about institutions and procedures 
can be contingent on empirical facts, perhaps concerning human 
psychology, available technology, or prevailing cultural norms. Thus, a 
utilitarian theory of institutions can condemn framing of the innocent as a 
counterproductive policy without demonstrating that it would be 
counterproductive in all possible worlds. Such a theory would be a theory 
for its own world and time as Bentham's was. 
In the next section, we will examine Bentham's statements on 
punishment of the innocent and fictitious punishment of the guilty. This 
discussion will demonstrate that Bentham rejected these practices. Later 
sections will show why this view followed from Bentham's conception of 
the utilitarian project. 
III. BENTHAM ON PUNISHING THE INNOCENT 
The one critic of utilitarianism who actually examines any of Bentham's 
writings about punishment is Igor Primoratz. In developing his charge that 
Bentham approves punishment of the innocent and fictitious punishment of 
the guilty, Primoratz focuses almost entirely on two brief sections of 
Bentham's PrinciplesofPenal Law: Part II, Book IV, "Of the Proper Seat of 
Punishment," and Part II, Book I, Chapter V, "Expense of Punishment." 
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A. "Unavoidable Mis-Seated" Punishment 
Primoratz introduces his interpretation of Book IV by noting correctly 
that Bentham "emphasizes that it is (logically) possible to punish an 
innocent man. . . ."49 Primoratz then poses the question "may it be done, 
morally speaking?"' 50 Primoratz concedes that Bentham refers to such 
punishment "as 'mis-seated,' 'misapplied' or 'mistaken' punishment," 5 1 but 
denies that these designations entail any disapproval. According to 
Primoratz, 
[T]he crucial role belongs to the distinction between the cases in which such 
punishment can be avoided and those in which it is unavoidable. The word 
"unavoidable," however, is not taken in its usual, literal sense-for in that 
sense no punishment is unavoidable-but with an important qualification:
"without preponderant inconvenience." On account of this qualification, his 
distinction is actually a distinction between cases in which punishment of the 
innocent cannot be avoided, except at the price of mischief, harm, pain, or 
evil greater than that which would affect the innocent person punished, and 
cases in which we can desist from such punishment without thereby opting 
for such an inconvenient result. In a word, the distinction comes down to the 
one between profitable and unprofitable punishment of the innocent. 52 
The implication of this paragraph is that the terms "mis-seated,"
"misapplied," and "mistaken" have no normative significance or negative 
connotations, but are simply categories of possibly profitable punishment; 
and that the word "unavoidable" means the same thing as "profitable," 
"beneficial" or "good." Thus, Primoratz implies, we should not be misled by 
Bentham's statements that punishment is misapplied to the innocent or that 
punishment of the innocent should be avoided, to the extent possible. What 
Bentham really means, Primoratz insinuates, is that we should zealously 
punish the innocent as often as is profitable, and for any purpose we desire. 
According to Primoratz, Bentham: 
[D]oes not take innocence in itself to be a limit to legitimate punishment. For 
him it is only the ground for a utilitarian presumption against punishing: 
punishment of the innocent is generallyunprofitable, and therefore generally 
49. PRIMORAT"Z, supra note 37, at 24; see also BENTHAM, supra note 29 at 391. 
50. PRIMORATZ, supra note 37, at 24. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 24-25. 
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unjustifed. Thus his demand that punishment be remissible is not based 
simply on the fact that an innocent person can be punished by mistake; it is 
based on the fact that an innocent person can be punished by mistake and 
without a good utilitarian justification for punishing her.... 53 
But of course this is not what Bentham is saying at all. The fact that a 
person is known to be innocent is always a sufficient reason to not punish 
her. Bentham is simply saying that while the innocent should never be 
punished intentionally, some mistaken punishment of the innocent is an 
unavoidable price of punishing the guilty, because errors are inevitable. 
Thus: 
When ... punishment is inflicted on any person by whom no part is borne in 
the offense, it may be said to be mis-seated .... Where it is avoidable, mis-
seated punishment ought in no case to be employed. Wheresoever 
punishment not being, in the case in question, in itself undue, it is in your 
power to apply to the guilty . . . without having recourse to the innocent, 
there the evil ... that would be produced by the infliction of punishment on 
the innocent, is avoidable. ... [W]heresoever the nature of the case admits of 
the distinguishing who is innocent from who is guilty, the infliction of 
suffering on the innocent is avoidable.5 4 
Harming the innocent loved ones and dependents of the guilty-which 
Bentham regards as derivative or "extravasative" punishment-is another 
unavoidable price of punishing the guilty. 
Whether in the way and for the purpose of punishment, or in any other way, 
and for any other purpose, a man cannot be made to suffer, but his 
connexions... are made to suffer along with him; and forasmuch as it can 
only be by some rare accident that a man can be found who has not.., any 
connexions; thense it follows, that if, where it is unavoidable, the certainty or 
probability of its extravasation were regarded as a sufficient cause for 
forbearing to inflict punishment, it would only be by a correspondingly rare 
accident that any thing could be done for the prevention of offences of any 
sort; the consequence of which would be general impunity to crimes of all 
sorts, and with it the destruction of society itself. 5 5 
53. Id. at 31. 
54. BENTHAM, supranote 29, at 475-76. 
55. Id. 
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These predictable harms of deserved punishment are not of course 
absolutely unavoidable, since we could avoid such harms by avoiding all 
punishment. Nevertheless some mistaken and derivative punishment of the 
innocent is unavoidable relative to the goal of punishing the guilty. 
When the epithet unavoidable is on this occasion employed, some such 
limitative clause as is expressed by the words without preponderant 
inconvenience, must be understood. For, in point of possibility, 
punishment.., being on the part of the legislator and the judge an act of the 
will, to avoid inflicting it will... be respectively in their power at all times.. 
. On so simple a condition as that of seeing government, and with it society 
itself, perish, you may avoid inflicting punishment altogether.56 
Bentham is trying to be clear about two points that retributivists 
typically obscure: that punishment of the innocent is an unavoidable 
concomitant of punishing the guilty, but that punishment of the guilty is an 
avoidable policy choice. Thus, when retributivists claim to adhere rigidly to 
the principle of no undeserved punishment, they deceive themselves. If they 
really regarded avoiding punishment of the innocent as an absolute duty they 
could in fact adhere to it by avoiding punishment. They do not appreciate 
that they are responsible for choosing to punish the innocent because they do 
not see punishment of the guilty as discretionary. 
Retributivists in fact treat punishment of the guilty as an absolute duty 
which compels sacrifice of the innocent. Bentham points out that mistaken 
and derivative punishment of the innocent is not absolutely necessary, but 
necessary only relative to the goal of punishing the guilty. This goal is 
merely a contingent instrument of social welfare to Bentham, though an 
intrinsic good to retributivists like Primoratz. Accordingly, Bentham regards 
punishment of the innocent as less justifiable than do his retributivist critics, 
because he does not assume the necessity of punishing the guilty. Thus "to 
inflict punishment when, without introducing preponderant inconvenience, 
the infliction of such punishment is avoidable, is, in the case of the innocent, 
contrary to the principle of utility. Admitted:-and so is it in the case of the 
guilty likewise." 57 
Unnecessary punishment of the innocent, like unnecessary punishment 
of the guilty is "groundless: as such it is thrown away; it is so much evil 
expended in waste. .".."58 But, by the same token, where punishment of the 
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to the public welfare. And if these costs include mistaken and extravasative 
punishment of the innocent then these are necessary as well. This is all that 
is meant by Bentham's provocative sounding statement that "[t]o punish 
where, without introducing preponderant inconvenience, such punishment is 
unavoidable, is not... contrary to the principle of utility;-not in the case 
"
' 59 of the guilty: no, nor yet in the case of the innocent. This is not an 
endorsement of purposefulpunishment of the innocent. It is a justification of 
the unintended costs predictably imposed on the innocent in punishing the 
guilty. 
B. "Collective" Punishment 
Citing only the statements quoted above, Primoratz insinuates that 
Bentham regards purposeful punishment of the innocent as permissible for 
any goal whatsoever. He supports this insinuation with another misleading 
gloss. Primoratz asserts that Bentham thinks it is sometimes necessary to 
punish a large number of innocent people in order to ensure punishment of a 
few guilty persons: 
Sometimes... it cannot be established who is guilty and who is innocent. 
Then the aims of punishment cannot be attained by inflicting it exclusively 
upon the guilty, and therefore punishment of the innocent cannot be avoided 
"without preponderant inconvenience." In such cases the course of action 
with the best consequences attainable will not be to desist from punishing the 
innocent, but to punish them. 
An example of punishment of the innocent which in Bentham's view, can 
sometimes be useful, and thus also justified, is collective punishment. When 
it cannot be established who is the perpetrator of an offense, and therefore 
the guilty cannot be punished without the innocent being punished at the 
same time, and when the suffering [that is inflicted on the former is not 
greater than the good secured by such punishment,] it will be useful, and 
therefore also justified, to punish the whole group which is known to include 
the unidentifiable offender or offenders.60 
But of course, Bentham does not think it is ever absolutely necessary to 
punish anyone. To mistakenly punish some innocent people is necessary 
only to the goal of intentionally punishing some guilty persons. But since 
59. Id. 
60. PRIMORATZ, supra note 37, at 26. 
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punishment of the guilty is itself only a particularly costly and cruel means 
to the public welfare rather than an intrinsic value, it should only be 
employed where the costs (i.e., the wasted capacities and suffering of the 
guilty and innocent punished, the suffering of their families and friends, the 
expense of imprisonment, and the public insecurity, antideterrent incentives 
and popular disaffection arising from the inevitable punishment of the 
innocent) are not too great. Thus, the "aims of punishment cannot be 
attained" by punishing anyone, where the offender cannot be identified with 
a very high degree of probability. 
Bentham does indeed discuss collective punishment, and he does state 
that it can only be justified where the guilty cannot be distinguished from 
the innocent and where "the suffering of the innocent, when added to that of 
the guilty will not, in the whole, compose a mass of evil more than 
equivalent to the benefit of the punishment. ' 61 But this is not an 
endorsement of collective punishment and he does not endorse it. Quite the 
contrary. He continues that whether the guilty can be distinguished from the 
innocent "is easy enough to be judged of." Whether the benefits of collective 
punishment outweigh the combined suffering of the innocent and the guilty, 
however, "must be left to vague conjecture." 62 It would seem that the first 
criterion will often condemn collective punishment as unnecessary and the 
second criterion will never recommend it as clearly beneficial. 
And this is indeed how Bentham applies these criteria to three 
illustrative examples. His first example is the well "settled" but "rarely 
exercised" power to forfeit the privileges of a municipal corporation for "the 
misconduct of the corporators." Bentham concludes that "the insidious and 
unconstitutional use that was attempted to be made of it in the reign of 
Charles II has cast a stigma on the general doctrine .... Such a mode of 
punishment is plainly unnecessary and inexpedient. The particular 
delinquents in this way may always be ascertained .... ,"63 Bentham's second 
example involved a fine assessed against the city of Edinburgh after a mob 
stormed a prison and lynched a reprieved prisoner. Bentham observes that 
the fine probably had little effect, but served as an appropriate expression of 
disapproval and in any case was deserved because "it may be presumed... 
that there was a complicity of affection, in virtue of which all the inhabitants 
joined in endeavouring to protect the offenders from the visitation of the 
law." 64 If so, it did not qualify as collective punishment of a largely 
61. BENmmAM, supra note 29, at 483. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 484. 
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innocent group. Bentham's third example would not strike us as a 
punishment: a legislature responded to a vote selling scheme by some 
members of the gentry in a given locale by broadening the franchise 
throughout the electoral district to all smallholders. Bentham concludes 
reasonably that this diminution of the gentry's power was not justifiable as a 
collective punishment, since the guilty parties were known, but was 
justifiable as a democratic reform.65 None of these discussions concludes 
that the collective punishment of a largely innocent group is justified by the 
goal of punishing a few offenders. Certainly these discussions do not 
endorse executing or imprisoning groups on such a basis. Nor is such a 
conclusion likely on Bentham's premises. If "it cannot be established who is 
guilty and who is innocent," punishment of the innocent can and should be 
avoided by simply "desisting" from punishing anyone. This choice best 
serves "the aims of punishment" which are not to maximize punishment but 
to maximize happiness and security. 
Primoratz's characterization of collective punishment as "an example" 
of useful punishment of the innocent that Bentham would endorse implies 
that there are other such examples. But there are not. Bentham's critical 
discussion of collective punishment appears in the course of a systematic 
analysis and critique of all forms of "mis-seated punishment."'66 Bentham 
divides these into vicarious punishment whereby an innocent only is made to 
suffer for the act of a related guilty party; transitive punishment, where an 
innocent is punished along with a related guilty party, collective punishment 
and random punishment, where an unrelated innocent alone is made to 
suffer. Of vicarious punishment, Bentham expostulates: 
I was about to exhibit the absurdity and mischief of this mode of 
punishment, but what end would it answer? A simple statement that, that one 
man is punished for the offense of another, is calculated to produce a 
stronger impression on the mind, than could be produced by the aid of logic 
and rhetoric.67 
Against transitive punishments, Bentham reasons that offenders are 
more likely to be moved by the prospect of their own suffering than that of 
their relatives and that these relatives are unlikely to have much control over 
the offenders. 68 He considers such penalties costly, inefficient and 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 475-90. 
67. Id. at 479. 
68. Id. at 481. 
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unpopular. 69 He does suggest that forfeiture of the property of entire 
families may be warranted for the crime of rebellion, when the entire family 
is guilty. 70 In the category of random punishments, Bentham places 
forfeiture of property purchased in good faith from an offender, and 
punishment of persons convicted because of arbitrarily excluded evidence. 
Bentham attacks both practices at length. 71 Bentham concludes by 
explaining "mis-seated punishment" as arising from the hatred felt by men 
72 in power, which they gratify at public expense. 
Bentham considered mis-seated punishment extremely dangerous to 
public confidence in government. Even inadvertent punishment of the 
innocent could produce a state of "alarm" 73 if it became known. According 
to William Twining, the idea that Bentham saw utility in punishing the 
innocent "overlooks the disrespect and loss of confidence arising from 
admission that the laws cannot protect the law-abiding; that the courts may 
make terrible mistakes and that each wretch who goes to the scaffold may be 
an innocent victim." 74 In his Treatise on Judicial Evidence, Bentham 
instructed the judiciary to take every precaution against punishing the 
innocent: 
[I]t ought to be a maxim with the judge, that it is better to let a guilty man 
escape, than to condemn an innocent one; or, in other words, he ought to be 
much more on his guard against the injustice which condemns, than the 
injustice which acquits. Both are great evils, but the greater is that which 
produces most alarm .... Generally speaking, a too easy acquittal excites 
regret and uneasiness only among men of reflection; while the condemnation 
of an accused, who turns out to have been innocent, spreads general dismay; 
all security appear to be destroyed; no defense can any longer be found, 
when even innocence is insufficient.75 
Bentham here recognizes the possibility that punishing an innocent person 
could undermine the legitimacy of the government. By threatening citizens 
69. Id. at 482-83. 
70. Id. at 482. 
71. Id. at 485-89. 
72. Id. at 489-90. 
73. See G.J.Postema, The Principleof Utility and the Law of Procedure: Bentham's 
Theory of Adjudication, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL AssEssMENTs 308, 328 (Bhikhu 
Parekh ed., 1993); WILIAM TWINING, THEORIES OF EvIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE 99 
(1985). 
74. TWINING, supra note 73, at 96. 
75. JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 197 (1825). 
RUTGERS LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 32:115 
with arbitrary punishment, a policy of framing the innocent would squander 
the public sense of security that deterrent punishment aims to produce. 
C. "Apparent" Punishment 
Primoratz bases his charge that Bentham approves pretending to punish 
the guilty on a brief chapter of the Principles of Penal Law entitled 
"Expense of Punishment." The basic idea of this chapter is that "a 
punishment is economic when the desired [deterrent] effect is produced by 
the employment of the least possible suffering." 76 Bentham next introduces 
a distinction between the "real value" of a punishment, experienced by one 
subjected to it, and the "apparent value" anticipated by one who might yet 
be subjected to it. Bentham adds that "it is the real punishment that is the 
expense-the apparent punishment gives the profit."'77 Bentham next argues 
that since the welfare of the offender counts equally with that of all other 
community members, punishment should be as "economical" as possible: 
Ought any real punishments to be inflicted? Most certainly. Why? For the 
sake of producing the appearanceof it.... Every particle of real punishment 
that is produced, more than what is necessary for the production of the 
requisite quantity of apparent punishment, is just so much misery run to 
waste. Hence, the real punishment ought to be as small, and the apparent 
punishment as great as possible. If hanging a man in effigy would produce 
the same salutary impression of terror upon the minds of the people, it would 
78 be folly or cruelty ever to hang a man in person. 
Note that Bentham does not in fact say that real punishments ought not 
be inflicted or that purely apparent punishments ever can achieve deterrence. 
A policy of fictitious punishment could only succeed in utilitarian terms if 
systematic deception of the public were possible-inutilitarian terms. Such 
a policy would only succeed if it achieved deterrence or other benefits 
exceeding its utility costs. And systematic deception of the public would 
only count as possible in utilitarian terms if it could be done at a utility cost 
below the utility gain achieved thereby. Does Bentham suggest that the 
marginal gain from avoiding actual harm to the offender outweighs the very 
considerable utility costs of systematically deceiving the public? We will 
later see the enormous emphasis that Bentham places on the transparency or 
76. Bentham, supra note 29, at 398. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
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publicity of government decisionmaking as a "security against misrule." But 
for now it is enough to note that Bentham never presents fictitious 
punishment as a realistic possibility, nor proposes it as a policy. He speaks 
of it hypothetically, in order to clarify the analysis of the costs and benefits 
of punishment. He uses this arresting hypothetical to dramatize the point that 
utilitarianism counts the suffering of the offender as a cost, whereas 
conventional retributivist thinking treats it as a benefit. But the entire book 
is dedicated to the proposition that actual punishment of some offenders is 
necessary despite its human costs. 
If Bentham does not think fictitious punishment of offenders is a useful 
policy, does he think it can be done at all? In a footnote, he offers one 
recorded example of fictitious punishment, which Primoratz reads as an 
endorsement of the practice: 
At the Cape of Good Hope, the Dutch made use of a stratagem which could 
only succeed among Hottentots. One of their officers having killed an 
individual of this inoffensive tribe, the whole nation took up the matter, and 
became furious and implacable. It was necessary to make an example and 
pacify them. The delinquent was therefore brought before them in irons, as a 
malefactor: he was tried with great form, and was condemned to swallow a 
goblet of ignited brandy. The man played his part;-he feigned himself dead, 
and fell motionless, His friends covered him with a cloak and bore him 
away. The Hottentots declared themselves satisfied. "The worst we should 
have done with the man," said they, "would have been to throw him into the 
fire; but the Dutch have done better-they have put the fire into the man." 79 
What are we to make of this passage? Certainly it serves Bentham's 
pedagogic purpose in graphically illustrating fictitious punishment. It is also 
calculated to identify readers with the interests of the offender, a European 
like themselves, facing what they were bound to see as a horde of angry 
savages. A trading ship or colonial garrison is an insular and precarious 
microsociety in which the utility of each individual to the welfare of the 
whole is magnified. Thus a reader could be expected to approve of the 
clever ruse devised by the Dutch to save the garrison and a valued officer. 
Nevertheless, this is far from an endorsement of fictitious punishment. 
What are its utility benefits here? Saving lives by preventing war or 
massacre? But this could have been accomplished by actual as well as by 
fictitious punishment. The utility benefits lie only in saving the life of the 
79. Id. at 398-99. 
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offender, a benefit achieved at a cost and a risk. The cost is in deterrence-
the Dutch party is taught it need not fear punishment for offenses against the 
Hottentots. This cost to the welfare of the Hottentots is presumably ignored 
by the Dutch, who would not similarly indulge the murderer of a Dutchman. 
The risk is that the deception will be discovered and many lives will be lost 
after all. This risk is presumably minimized by the naivete of the Hottentots 
and the limited contact they have with the Dutch interlopers. Bentham 
characterizes the ruse as one which "could only succeed among the 
Hottentots." The implication is that it is not so easy to fool Europeans. Not 
so easy, but also not so justified if the reader assumes that their welfare 
counts-that the legal authorities are their servants, not their masters. 
Bentham is certainly not proposing that his own compatriots subject 
themselves to a regime of fictitious punishment. Nor is he proposing that the 
British public authorize officials to deceive it. Nevertheless Primoratz offers 
this gloss on the above passages: 
Whenever the deterrent effects of punishment on the general public can be 
attained by having the offender punished only apparently, without actually 
inflicting punishment, this will be the best option from the utilitarian point of 
view .... According to the utilitarian theory of punishment, whenever this 
would be the alternative with the best possible consequences, a feigned
80punishment should be staged instead of a real one. 
These claims are exaggerations of the chapter's actual conclusion, which is 
"that a punishment that appears of greater magnitude, in comparison of what 
it really is, is better than one that appears of less magnitude." 81 
It is of course true in the abstract that whatever alternative has the best 
consequences is best from a utilitarian point of view, but this begs many 
important questions about who judges what is best, and how, and for whom. 
If, for example, the public is to be the judge of what policies yield the best 
consequences for themselves, then a policy of deceiving the public will not 
likely recommend itself. To contemporary retributivist critics of 
utilitarianism, these questions of institutional competence and design are 
irrelevant. What policies and institutional arrangements actually serve utility 
is merely an empirical question, whereas they are interested only in ethical 
principles which hold regardless of the circumstances. But Bentham's 
enterprise was to develop a clear-sighted and empirically-informed analysis 
of policies and institutions. For him, empirically informed judgments about 
80. PRIMORATZ supranote 37, at 42-43. 
81. See BENTHAM, supra note 29, at 399. 
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what institutional arrangements create the best chance of advancing the 
public welfare in the face of uncertainty and venality are the very heart of 
the matter. 
D. PublicDeception 
In neither of the sections of the "Principles of Penal Law" glossed by 
Primoratz does Bentham endorse fooling the public. In the chapter "Expense 
of Punishment," he does identify an overlooked benefit of fictitious 
punishment, not in order to recommend that practice, but in order to remind 
the reader the offender's welfare must be considered in evaluating any 
practice. In Book IV, "Of Mis-seated Punishment," Bentham does not 
discuss or consider, let alone endorse, framing the innocent. He is again 
primarily concerned with pointing out the utility cost of punishment-in this 
case, the inadvertent but predictable harm to innocent persons. Bentham's 
relentless message is that we are not obliged to punish all the guilty and we 
cannot hope to spare all the innocent. Punishment is a necessary evil, a blunt 
and brutal weapon that harms the innocent along with the guilty. In 
reiterating these impious truths, Bentham is not approving but combatting 
deception of the public. 
Bentham occasionally sees utility in deceiving individuals-e.g., to 
spare their feelings or prevent their malicious use of information-but we 
will look in vain for recommendations to deceive the public. We can 
imagine why some critics of utilitarianism might be led to believe that 
Bentham would condone telling lies in certain circumstances, since Bentham 
expressed no ethical aversion to dishonesty. 82 His objection to it was purely 
prudential. As a result, some modem critics have cast Bentham as a 
proponent of deception, 83 and this reading of Bentham is encouraged by 
Henry Sidgwick's later reconstruction of utilitarianism as an ethical theory. 
In his Methods ofEthics, Sidgwick argues that lying is often the lesser evil: 
[T]here seems to be circumstances under which . . . Honour prescribes 
lying.... Just as each man is thought to have a natural right to personal 
security generally, but not if he himself is attempting to injure others of life 
and property: so if we may even kill in self-defense of ourselves and others, 
it seems strange that we may not lie, if lying will defend us better against a 
palpable invasion of our rights. .... just as the orderly and systematic 
82. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 205, (J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996). 
83. See FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra note 14, at 59-60. 
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slaughter which we call war is thought perfectly right under certain 
circumstances, though painful and revolting: so in the word-contests of the 
law-courts, the lawyer is commonly held to be justified in untruthfulness 
within strict rules and limits. . . .And ...Common sense ...seems to 
concede that it may sometimes be right [to deceive men for their own good]: 
for example, most persons would not hesitate to speak falsely to an invalid, 
if this seemed the only way of concealing facts that might produce a 
dangerous shock: nor do I perceive that anyone shrinks from telling fictions 
to children, on matters upon which it is thought well that they should not 
know the truth. But if the lawfulness of benevolent deception in any case be 
admitted, I do not see how we can decide when and how far it is admissible, 
except by considerations of expediency; that is, by weighing the gain of any 
particular deception against the imperilment of mutual confidence involved 
in all violation of truth.84 
Here Sidgwick reasons that if utility, not veracity, is the ultimate value, 
dishonesty may often be utility maximizing. 
One token of Bentham's supposed tolerance of dishonesty is his 
statement that "Falsehood, taken by itself. . . can never, upon the principle 
of utility constitute any offense at all."'85 Yet read in its context-a 
discussion of criminal fraud and libel-this statement simply says that lying 
should not be defined as a criminal offense unless it yields harm. This hardly 
commends lying to officials entrusted with maximizing the public security. 
The paragraph continues, "[c]ombined with other circumstances, there is 
scarce any sort of pernicious effect which [falsehood] may not be 
instrumental in producing." 86 Bentham believed lying tended to produce 
undesirable results.87 As Sissela Bok explains, "utilitarian calculation ... 
often appears to imply that lies, apart from their resultant harm and benefits, 
are in themselves neutral [since iut seems that a lie and a truthful statement 
which achieve the same utility are equivalent." However, she continues, "in 
ordinary life, as Bentham would be the first to agree, falsehood cannot be 
taken 'by itself'; most lies do have negative consequences for liars, dupes, 
all those affected, and for social trust."' 88 Instead of maintaining an abstract 
84. HENRY SIDGWICK,METHODS OF ETHICS 292-93 (1874). 
85. JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 205; see also FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG, supra 
note 14, at 59-60; Ernest Van den Haag, Punishment as a Devicefor Controllingthe Crime 
Rate, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 706, 709 (1981). 
86. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 205. 
87. TwINING, supra note 73, at 89. 
88. SISSELA BOK, LYING 50 (1978). 
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aversion to lying, Bentham expressed his disinclination in terms of the 
consequences usually resulting from deception. 
Due to these consequences, Bentham "elevated honesty to the chief, if 
' not sole, virtue, 89 and he believed it was "necessary as the light of day to 
us." 90 Bentham regarded falsehood as the "common instrument of all 
wrong" and the "irreconcilable enemy of justice" which is "passed off as the 
true friend and necessary instrument of justice."9 1 Bentham believed that: 
[v]eracity is one of the most important bases of human society. The due 
administration of justice absolutely depends on it; whatever tends to weaken 
it, saps the foundations of morality, security, and happiness. The more we 
reflect on its importance, the more we shall be astonished that legislators 
have so indiscreetly multiplied the operations which tend to weaken its 
influence. 92 
Such was the importance of official veracity, that dishonesty was a "poison" 
debilitating political life, and Bentham believed publicity was the only 
antidote. 93 Any assertion that official deception maximized utility was "the 
product of erroneous conceptions, the effect of which was to engage men to 
concur in the sacrifice of the universal to the sinister interest."'94 Bentham 
expected that utilitarian justifications of lying would be self-serving and 
would accordingly tend to discount its public costs. 
Proponents of political deception are likely to have failed to consider the 
entire scope of effects such a decision will cause. 95 If I lie to achieve some 
perceived good, I will lie again to shore up the original lie. My integrity
96 Ifmight suffer, and I could come to lie whenever it suited my purposes. 
89. NANCY L.L. ROSENBLUM, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 40-41 (1978). 
90. 1 Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 78 (John Bowring, ed., 1962). 
91. Jeremy Bentham, The Elements of the Art of Packing as Applied to Special Juries, 
Particularlyin the Cases of Libel Laws, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (John 
Bowring ed., 1962). 
92. Jeremy Bentham, The Rationale ofReward, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
210 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
93. JOHN DINWIDDY, BENTHAM 57 (1989). 
94. L.J. Hume, Bentham as a Social and Political Theorist, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: 
CRrrICAL ASSESSMENTS 482, 487 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993) (citing Jeremy Bentham. 
Manuscripts at University College, London, Box clviii, folio 68). 
95. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
PUNISHMENT 82, 90-91 (E. Ezorsky ed., 1973); BOK, supranote 88, at 61. 
96. BOK, supranote 88, at 52. 
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my lie is ever discovered my credibility be will diminished, and "[s]o 
dishonorable and pernicious to a man is the reputation of habitual or 
frequent falsity ...that, without the least prejudice to any other individual, 
by even a single departure from veracity it may happen to a man to do 
irremediable mischief to himself."' 97 Such a blemish would be particularly 
damaging if I were a public official or representative, since if the public 
came to believe that government lies and secretly breaks rules, it would have 
a profoundly subversive effect on the community's respect for the law. A 
"truly.massive utility loss" can result from lying, and thus there is a "very 
heavy surcharge, in utility terms, to be assessed against" any act of 
deception.98 
While the framing of an innocent man might produce certain immediate 
benefits, these necessarily speculative gains are arguably outweighed by the 
risks. Robert Goodin imagines that: 
Once it becomes public knowledge that, as a matter of policy, we are willing 
to hang innocent people to assuage a baying mob ... then everyone starts 
worrying: Who will be next? The anxieties associated with such thoughts 
systematically occurring across the whole population will more than suffice 
to cancel the utility advantages of ...throwing one prisoner to the mob on 
any given occasion. 99 
97. Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence Specially Applied to English 
Practice, in 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 267 (John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter 
Rationaleof JudicialEvidence]. 
98. ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS APUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 76 (1995). 
99. Goodin explains further: 
My point is instead that public officials cannot systematically violate people's rights, 
as a matter of policy, and expect that policy to continue yielding the same utility 
payoffs time and again. Take the case of punishing criminal offenders, for example. 
The criminal sanction deters crime only insofar as it is imposed on the guilty and 
only the guilty. Introducing any probability that the innocent will be punished along 
with the guilty narrows the expected utility gap between criminal and noncriminal 
conduct, and increases the temptation for everyone to commit a crime. Thus, if we 
are as a matter of policy to punish people whether or not they were guilty, just 
according to some utilitarian calculation of public convenience on a case-by-case 
basis, then the utilitarian advantages of punishing the occasional innocent person 
would quickly diminish, and probably soon vanish altogether. 
The reason utilitarian policy makers are precluded from violating the rights of the 
innocent, as a matter of policy, is that policies soon become public knowledge. If 
nothing else, they are easily inferred from past experience. Once news of such a 
policy gets out, people revise their expectations in the light of it-in the case of 
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In sum, Bentham disapproves of punishing the innocent, and deceiving 
the public. Thus, the charge of framing the innocent is belied by Bentham's 
own statements. How can so many philosophers and legal scholars have 
attributed this view to Bentham? The answer is that they consider Bentham's 
own tediously detailed statements about his views irrelevant. To them, he is 
a utilitarian moral philosopher and is therefore chargeable with all 
implications of the principles that the good is pleasure, that ethical acts are 
those which maximally produce pleasure or reduce pain, and that laws and 
policies are good in so far as they are ethical acts. Bentham's own beliefs 
about what institutional arrangements and policies would best serve utility 
are irrelevant because these are empirically contingent, and hence 
unphilosophical. We shall next examine the question of whether Bentham is 
a moral philosopher in this sense, and whether his utilitarianism is such a 
moral philosophy. 
IV. UTILITY AN ETHICAL PRINCIPLE? 
Critics of utilitarian penology ascribe a willingness to frame the 
innocent to Bentham belied by his own statements. They do so on the 
assumption that, as a utilitarian moral philosopher, Bentham is committed to 
approving any act that could maximize utility under some conceivable set of 
circumstances. Bentham appears to give some warrant for this interpretation 
in a few passages appearing at the beginning of his best known book, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Particularly 
interesting to modem professional philosophers is the following statement: 
The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work .... By the 
principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of 
every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have 
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in 
question .... I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of 
every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. 100 
criminal punishment, their expectations of being punished even if not guilty. There 
are major utilitarian payoffs to be had from sustaining certain sorts of expectations 
and from avoiding others, Settled policies ofone sort or another are characteristically 
required to produce socially optimal effects in both directions. That is one reason for 
utilitarian policymakers to abide by settled policies, even when greater utilitarian 
gains might be achieved in any given instance by deviating from them. 
Id.at 70-71. 
100. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 11-12. 
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But we will argue here that this passage is misunderstood as a claim that the 
work to follow is the application to legislation of an ethical philosophy. 
Hence, it would be a mistake to conclude from this passage that Bentham's 
legislative proposals commit him to some view about the moral obligations 
of individuals. 
A. Utility in Bentham's Predecessors 
To understand Bentham's conception of utilitarianism, it is helpful to 
consider the work of the three predecessors who most influenced him, David 
Hume, Baron Helvetius and Cesare Beccaria. Bentham derived his 
formulation of the utility principle from Beccaria, 10 1 who in turn drew it 
from Helvetius. 102 Helvetius in turn drew many important elements of his 
thought from Hume.103 Bentham claimed to have been greatly inspired by a 
reading of Hume, and to have borrowed the term "utility" from him.1 04 Of 
these three writers only Hume had any real interest in morality, and this was 
a sociological interest in the genesis and function of social norms rather than 
an ethical interest in the obligations of individuals. All three conceived of 
utility as a public value, to be pursued through institutions. 
1. Hume 
Hume's credentials as a utilitarian rest primarily on two works: Volume 
three of his Treatise ofHuman Nature, first published in 1740, and the more 
popular and accessible Enquiry Concerning the Principlesof Morals, first 
appearing in 1751. In both works he applied his empiricist methodology to 
problems of value, arguing that judgments of value were ultimately based on 
sense impressions. Hume did not distinguish among different types of value: 
"morals" included the subjects of aesthetic, economic and, especially, 
political value. 105 Rather than deriving standards of law and morals 
deductively from some concept of the good, Hume proceeded inductively, 
101. Frederick Rosen, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 82, at li. For a 
detailed consideration of Beccaria's influence on Bentham, see H.L.A. HART, EsSAYS ON 
BENTHAM 40-52 (1982). 
102. JOHN PLAMENATZ, THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS 50 (1958). 
103. Id. at 48-49. 
104. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON 
GovERNmENT, 440-41 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977). 
105. FREDERICK WHELAN, ORDER AND ARTEIICE IN HUME'S POLICAL PHILOSOPHY 
203-04 (1985). 
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by examining social practices of praising and blaming. 106 He concluded that 
prevailing ideas of virtue were associated with practices generally 
promoting human welfare or "utility." 107 These practices became widely 
endorsed because they were frequently associated with the experience of 
pleasure or of sympathy. While personal pleasure and sympathy for those 
nearest us were more powerful motives for action than concern for the 
general welfare, they were less prominent in moral discourse because they 
could not ground persuasive, or even intelligible arguments. 
'[T]is impossible we could ever converse with one another on any 
reasonable terms, were each of us to consider characters and persons, only as 
they appear from his peculiar point of view. In order, therefore, to prevent 
those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of 
things, we fix on some steady and generalpoints of view; and always, in our 
thoughts, place ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. 10 8 
By the exercise of imagination we are able to extrapolate from our own 
situation to that of other persons, both real and hypothetical and so to 
identify generally beneficial qualities and practices, worthy of praise. We 
thereby correct for our own partisan and ephemeral points of view in 
developing moral claims that will be intelligible to others and that will 
remain persuasive to ourselves over time. "Experience soon teaches us this 
method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our 
language .... 109 Morality requires a common point of view because it is a 
public, discursive practice. I10 
Thus, Hume concluded, the attitude of disinterested benevolence that 
characterizes much moral discourse should not be taken as evidence that 
morality is founded on reason. 111 All human values, Hume insisted, spring 
from hedonic sensation. The common moral attitude of impartial 
benevolence emerges from the discursive filtering of hedonic sensation in 
the context of a social practice of praising and blaming. Hume reasoned that 
a hedonistic style of valuation comes naturally to creatures that are self-
106. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 174 (1975) [hereinafter ENQUIRIES]. 
107. Id.at 172, 180, 183, 192, 231. 
108. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 581-82 (1978) [hereinafter 
TREATISE]; see also ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 228-29. 
109. TREATISE, supra note 108, at 582. 
110. ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 272-73. 
111. TREATISE, supranote 108, at 581-83. 
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interested and endowed with a capacity for sympathy. Concern for the 
abstraction of public welfare is "artificial" rather than natural, however. It 
arises from the human need to cooperate in developing and sustaining 
mutually beneficial institutions. 
In analyzing moral discourse, Hume observed that value judgments are 
typically expressed as character judgments, ascriptions of praise or blame to 
persons for manifesting virtues or vices. 112 Virtues were divisible into 
kinds, "natural" and "artificial." Natural virtues, such as courage and 
kindness, benefited particular persons and could be explained by the self-
interest or sympathy of the actor. 113 "Artificial" virtues involved adherence 
to social norms which generally benefited the public. 114 For the whole 
complicated enterprise of valuing, praising and blaming to have any point, 
virtues had to be beneficial to human welfare most of the time. But that did 
not mean that moral discourse must refer directly to utility, nor did it mean 
that every act must advance utility to be considered praiseworthy. Utility 
would more likely be advanced by inculcating and enforcing generally 
beneficial rules than by encouraging each individual to judge for him or 
herself how best to serve the general welfare on a given occasion. 115 
Pursuing utility was a cooperative enterprise, best mediated by institutions. 
Accordingly, Hume was far more interested in artificial than in natural 
virtues. 116 
Hume's paradigmatic virtue was "justice," the virtue of obedience to 
useful laws. The types of laws he chiefly emphasized were those that 
encouraged productive labor, investment and exchange by securing property 
and enforcing promises. 117 Such laws were necessary for human flourishing 
in a world in which human beings were self-interested but not self-reliant, 
and in which necessary goods were available but scarce, and capable of 
being appropriated by individuals. 118 In such a world, rules of property and 
contract would enhance human welfare, provided that they were generally 
respected and enforced. Different regimes of property and contract could 
fulfill this function: the specific content of such a regime mattered much less 
112. ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 173-74. 
113. WHELAN, supra note 105, at 220-21. 
114. Id. at 227-28. 
115. TREATISE, supra note 108 at 482, 497; see also ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 
210; WHELAN, supra note 105, at 227. 
116. TREATISE, supranote 108 at 474-84. 
117. ENQUIRIES, supra note 106, at 193-95; see also JONATHAN HARRISON, HUME'S 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 28-29 (1981). 
118. TREATISE, supranote 108, at 484-89, 494-95. 
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than its widespread acceptance and enforcement. 119 Since particular rules of 
property and contract were useful only as part of regimes that were generally 
accepted, obedience to such rules was useful only when it was widespread. 
This meant in turn that the "virtue" of justice depended upon an 
institutionalized social practice. It was an "artificial" virtue depending on a 
social convention. 120 If a particular society were to suddenly alter its regime 
of property and contract, obedience to the old regime would be disruptive 
rather than useful, and so would no longer be virtuous. 12 1 
According to Hume, acts tend to be deemed virtuous within the context 
of legal regimes and other cooperative social practices useful to the public 
welfare. Hume has sometimes been classified a "rule utilitarian" 122 because 
he did not offer any criterion of value for acts. 123 It would be more accurate 
to say that he developed the concept of utility as part of a description of how 
institutions like law solve problems of cooperation. Hume saw morality 
itself as an institution, a discursive social practice of praise, blame and 
argument, 124 that helped form and sustain utilitarian institutions. Because he 
sought to understand morality as a contingent social practice, he did not seek 
to discover the foundation of morality in some essence of the good. Morality 
was "founded" on utility1 25 only in the sense that morality grew out of the 
practical need to cooperate in securing the conditions of human survival, 
peace, and prosperity. Thus, that utility was the "foundation" of morality did 
not mean that individuals were obliged to cast prevailing moral norms aside 
and maximize utility. Although socially useful, morality remained morality: 
a social practice of invoking and following norms. 126 
2. Helvetius 
Helvetius was chiefly a psychologist, philosopher of mind and political 
theorist. His most influential work, Of the Spirit (1758), was devoted to two 
parallel arguments: that genius was entirely a function of education and did 
119. WHELAN, supra note 105, at 233. 
120. ENQUIRES, supranote 106, at 202; TREATISE, supra note 108,at 491-97. 
121. ENQUIRIES, supranote 106,at 199. 
122. HARRISON, supra note 117, at 31-33. 
123. Id. at 27-28, 33. 
124. ENQUIRIES, supranote 106, at 273. 
125. Id.at 174,231. 
126. Hume obviously employed a foundationalist approach to justification in 
epistemology. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 160 (1979). 
For an argument that Hume's overall approach to normative justification was 
nonfoundationalist,however,see HEtzOG, supranote 11, at 161-202. 
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not depend on personal characteristics, and that the good was entirely a 
function of institutional arrangements and did not depend on personal 
qualities of virtue at all. 127 These arguments proceeded from three key 
premises, all traceable, in part, to Hume: (1) an empiricist account of mind, 
according to which all our ideas result from sense impressions, combined 
and associated together; 128 (2) an emotivist account of value, according to 
which all our judgments are rooted in passions, and especially in self-
interest; 129 and (3) an egoist characterization of human nature as essentially 
self-interested. 
Helvetius proceeded to argue that both virtue and vice are illusions130 in 
that both good and evil actions proceed from the same sources: passion and 
self-interest. Moreover, all that we mean in characterizing another's action 
as good is that it serves our aims. Since we can only derive our ideas of the 
good from the experience of desire and its gratification, the only common or 
public meaning this term can be given is that of serving the welfare of the 
largest number of people. 13 1 The language of evaluation is meaningful only 
in so far as it refers to the self-interest of the audience; the language of 
obligation is meaningful only in so far as it refers to the self-interest of the 
actor. 
This point about the language of value is crucial in understanding the 
focus of early utilitarians like Helvetius and Bentham on public policy rather 
than private ethics. 132 Since Helvetius and his readers have a common 
interest in inducing others to serve the public welfare, he can use the words 
"good" and "virtuous" in referring to behavior that serves the public welfare. 
These terms have a common meaning only in the context of a public 
discussion about how to influence the behavior of third parties. Little is 
gained by addressing individuals and urging them to sacrifice their own 
interests to the public welfare so as to be "good"-for "goodness" would not 
have that meaning to them. Instead, "the good" would be synonymous with 
127. CLAuDE A. HELvErlus, DE L'EsPRrr, OR ESSAYS ON THE MIND AND rrS SEVERAL 
FACULTIES 7 (1970). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 10, 39. 
130. Id. at 29. 
131. Id. at 92, 102-03. 
132. As noted below, the utilitarian William Paley shared the view that talk of 
obligation was meaningless without an enforcement sanction. Unlike Helvetius, however, 
Paley reasoned that individuals were obliged to perform ethical duties by the sanction of 
divine judgment. WILLIAM PALEY, MORAL AND POLrrICAL PHILOSOPHY INWORKS OF WILLIAM 
PALEY 37-39 (1831). 
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their own self-interest. 133 It only makes sense to urge the pursuit of the 
public welfare if one is addressing the public or its institutional 
representatives. Helvetius identifies his subject as including "that part of 
morality at least, which is common to men of all nations, and which in all 
governments can have no other object in view than the public advantage." 134 
From this public perspective, "a man is just when all his actions tend to 
the public welfare." 135 For Helvetius, this principle can dictate that those 
exercising public power must cruelly sacrifice individuals for the public 
good. Helvetius offers, as an example, the practice among stranded and 
starving sailors of drawing lots to determine who should be killed to feed the 
rest: "this vessel is the emblem of the nation; everything becomes lawful, 
and even virtuous, that procures the public safety." 136 A second example 
involves undeserved punishment. To stop a wave of nocturnal murders, a 
sultan imposes a capitally enforced curfew; he then enforces the curfew 
strictly against a stranger who was not aware of its imposition. 137 For our 
purposes though, the significant thing about these examples is that they are 
open and candid exercises of public authority, in keeping with a focus on 
policy rather than private ethics. 
Thus, for Helvetius, public happiness is the aim of public policy, not of 
private morality. Only by influencing laws can the philosopher hope to 
improve behavior: 
If morality hitherto has little contributed to the happiness of mankind it is 
not owing to any want of perspicuity... in the moralists; but... it must be 
owned, that they have not often enough considered the different vices of 
nations as necessarily resulting from the different form of their government; 
yet it is only by considering morality in this point of light, that it can be of 
any real use to men. 138 
I say, that all men tend only toward their happiness; that it is a tendency 
from which they cannot be diverted; that the attempt would be fruitless, and 
even the success dangerous; consequently, it is only by incorporating 
personal and general interest, that they can be rendered virtuous. This being 
granted, morality is evidently no more than a frivolous science, unless 
133. See HELVETIUs, supra note 127, at 123- 124. 
134. Id. at xix (emphasis added). 
135. Id. at 60. 
136. Id. at 63. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 120. 
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blended with policy and legislation: whence I conclude that, if philosophers 
would be of use to the world, they should survey objects from the same point 
of view as the legislator.... The moralist is to indicate the laws, of which 
the legislator insures the execution, by stamping them with the seal of his 
139
authority. 
Helvetius conceives of law as a scheme of positive and negative 
incentives to encourage individual service of the public interest. He also 
urges a regime of broad education and unrestricted speech, to encourage 
intellectual achievement and ensure public scrutiny of the performance of 
government. Indeed, an enlightened and vigilant public is the only means by 
which lawmakers can be compelled to listen to the prescriptions of moral 
philosophers. While not explicitly advocating democracy, Helvetius 
comments that "if force essentially reside in the greater number, and justice 
consist in actions useful to the greater number, it is evident that justice is in 
its own nature always armed with a power sufficient to suppress vice, and 
place men under necessity of being virtuous."'140 
3. Beccaria 
Beccaria's immensely influential reformist tract, On Crimes and 
Punishments(1764) was greatly inspired by the utilitarianism of Helvetius, 
but also by Rousseau's Social Contract.141 Beccaria offered his extensive 
package of criminal law reforms as an application of political theory rather 
than ethics. His political theoretical premises were essentially liberal and 
contractarian. Thus, the government was legitimate in so far as rationally 
consented to, and rational persons would consent only to so much public 
coercion and injury as served their common interests. 142 While law should 
serve the common welfare, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," 
lawmakers inevitably served their own interests and profited by the public's 
ignorance and misplaced trust. 143 Hence legitimate law could only arise 
from the will of an enlightened general public, and the function of the 
philosopher was to enlighten the, public as to its own interest. 144 Like 
139. Id. at 124-25. 
140. Id. at 178. 
141. See David Young, Introduction to CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND 
PuNisHMENrs xiii (David Young trans., 1986). 
142. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 5, 7-8 (David Young 
trans., 1986). 
143. Id. at 5, 38. 
144. Id. at 5. 
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Helvetius, Beccaria used utility as the touchstone of policy analysis, because 
it was a principle on which individuals of differing views could rationally 
agree; 145 hence it could provide the basis for a social contract. 146 
Beccaria argued that public coercion and injury served the common 
interest only to the extent that they prevented greater private coercion and 
injury. 147 It followed that deterrence of crime was the only legitimate basis 
for punishment, and then only where noncoercive measures would not 
suffice. 148 And the most important noncoercive crime control device was 
the "public tranquility" achieved by establishing legitimate government. 
149 
Like Helvetius, Beccaria assumed that citizens were by nature ruled by 
passion and self-interest, 150 and that all social achievement proceeded from 
harnessing or enabling these energies rather than unnaturally suppressing 
them. 151 
Beccaria also insisted that both laws and their enforcement be public 
152 
and regular.153 He reasoned that certain punishment deterred more 
effectively than severe punishment for two reasons. First, certain 
punishment did not allow the offender the hope of escaping punishment. 
Second, both severity and discretion undermined deterrence and security by 
delegitimizing the law. If laws were too severe, citizens would refuse to 
cooperate with the investigation, prosecution and punishment of crimes. 
Hence, the more severe punishments became, the less certain, and so the less 
deterrent. 154 Moreover, if the law could be bent, citizens would seek 
advantage by turning their energies to intrigue rather than productive 
accomplishment. 155 Citizens would lose respect for law, and perhaps oppose 
it by force. 156 Rulers would criminalize dissent, causing unnecessary 
unhappiness and squelching enlightenment, art and science. Thus Beccaria 
was profoundly wary of discretion in the administration of justice. 157 
Beccaria accordingly insisted that justice was public and that private 
145. Id. at 3. 
146. Id. at9. 
147. Id. at 8. 
148. Id. at 16. 
149. Id. at 22. 
150. Id. at 14,75. 
151. Id. at 16,41. 
152. Id. at 28, 81. 
153. Id.at 81. 
154. Id. at 46. 
155. Id. at 75. 
156. Id. at 51-52. 
157. Id. at 10,53. 
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forgiveness of crimes should not play a role in the administration of criminal 
law. In a well-conceived regime of punishment, characterized by mildness 
15 8
and regularity, pardons would also be unnecessary. 
Thus Beccaria concluded that optimal deterrence of crime depended on 
avoiding over-criminalization, on certain but mild punishment, and above 
all, on regular administration of the criminal law. However, Beccaria's 
concerns transcended optimal deterrence. His larger concern was with 
rational, utility-maximizing governance. Here, governmental rationality 
depended on popular enlightenment, 159 participation in lawmaking, and 
scrutiny of the administration of the laws. 160 In sum, Beccaria's theory is 
about the legitimate use of public coercive power, rather than the private 
moral obligations of officials. "[O]nly the law may decree punishments for 
crimes, and this authority can rest only with the legislator, who represents all 
of society united by a social contract."' 161 Officials are expected to openly 
serve utility as an enlightened public defines it, by rigorously adhering to 
rules. 162 If they do so, an enlightened public will accept and abide by the 
laws, 163 the great aim of public security will be achieved, 164 the productive 
energies of society will be freed, and public happiness will flourish. 16 5 
Utility plays two primary roles in this argument. First, utility is a 
principle of psychology: thus elites, potential offenders and the wider public 
are presumed to be bent on maximizing their self-interest. Elites are 
presumed either to know their own self-interest or to profit unwittingly from 
received arrangements. The general public, however, depends on 
philosophical enlightenment for knowledge of the public interest. Thus, the 
second role for the idea of utility is evaluative and forensic. In arguing to the 
general public for law reforms, the philosopher should advert to the effect of 
the proposed reforms on the general welfare. If a proposed reform serves the 
public welfare, it may be rationally consented to. If there is rational consent, 
the reform is legitimate. Thus, the normative significance of utility rests on a 
contractarian theory of the legitimacy of laws, not on a general theory of 
value, or a theory of moral obligation. There is no room for officials to 
secretly pursue utility since this contributes nothing to the legitimacy of 
158. Id. at 80. 
159. Id. at 76. 
160. Id. at 5. 
161. Id. at 9. 
162. Id. at 54. 
163. Id. at 22. 
164. Id. at 12. 
165. Id. at 74-75. 
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government and risks destroying it. "The right to inflict punishment does not 
belong to an individual, but to all citizens or to the sovereign."' 166 
Accordingly, officials charged with the administration of punishment had to 
be closely observed, to prevent their betraying the public interest in favor of 
their own. 167 
Now that we have examined the utility principle and the place of private 
ethics in the writings of Bentham's most important predecessors, we are in a 
better position to read Bentham's statements about the utility principle in the 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. None of 
Bentham's main influences proposed utility as an ethical principle for 
evaluating or directing individual acts. 168 Hume identified utility primarily 
166. Id. at 55. 
167. Id. at 78. 
168. See PLAMENATZ, supranote 102, at 47-48. 
Other utilitarians preceded Bentham but did not influence him as substantially. Bentham 
occasionally claimed to have derived his formulation of utility as the greatest good of the 
greatest number from Joseph Priestley's Essay on the FirstPrinciplesof Government (1771), 
which proposed this only as the proper end ofgovernment, not of all human action. Frederick 
Rosen, Introduction to BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 205; JOSEPH PRIESTLEY, POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 14, 31, 46 (1993). 
Three other eighteenth century utilitarians-John Gay, David Hartley, and William 
Paley--did offer utility as an ethical principle. See John Gay, DissertationConcerning the 
FundamentalPrinciple of Virtue or Morality (1731) in ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON 
TO MILL 769-85 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939); DAVID HARTLEY, OBSERVATIONS ON MAN, His 
FRAME, HIS DUTY, AND HIS EXPECTATIONS (scholars' facsimiles & Reprints 1966 (1749)); 
PALEY, supra note 130 at 37-39. Their theories shared the psychological assumptions of the 
theories discussed in the text: all three authors assumed that ideas were formed by associating 
together sense-impressions, and that human action was motivated first by self-interest and 
second by sympathy. They joined Hume, Helvetius, Bentham, and Beccaria in the worry that 
this hedonistic account of human motivation left public-regarding action unexplained. As we 
have seen, Hume, Helvetius, Beccaria, and Bentham offered institutions like law as the 
solution to this problem and rational discourse as the means by which self-interested creatures 
could agree to form such institutions. Gay, Paley, and Hartley all adopted a very different 
response to this problem: human beings were bound to serve the general welfare by divine 
will. For Gay, that God wished his creatures to be happy sufficed to explain why all were 
obliged to serve the general welfare; they were motivated to do so by habits developed in the 
pursuit of affection and esteem. For Hartley and Paley, however, the compelling motivation to 
serve utility was the sanction of divine judgment in the hereafter. HARTLEY, supra,at 364-65, 
395-97. For Paley, divine judgment was necessary to explain not only the motivation but also 
the obligation to pursue utility. Although a cleric, he was shockingly positivistic about morals 
and scoffed at the notion that there could be obligations not enforced by sanctions. In this 
sense, his utilitarian ethics were nothing more than a utilitarian theory of law, with divine 
sanctions substituted for human ones. PALEY, supra note 132, at 37-39. Like Hume, 
Helvetius, Beccaria, and Bentham, Paley thought that utility must be pursued by enforcement 
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with the artificial virtues that depended upon social institutions like law. 
Helvetius argued that an ethical philosophy would be useless, and that 
philosophers could only serve utility by proposing legislation. Beccaria 
proposed such legislation, and endeavored to show that it would be 
perceived as politically legitimate, rather than showing that it would meet 
some ethical standard. All three authors offered public utility as an 
appropriate evaluative criterion for use in publicly legitimating legal policy, 
because it was a criterion on which they thought self-interested actors were 
able to agree. Utility also provided a standard by which the public could 
monitor and control self-interested officials. 
B. Bentham's Utility Principle 
Bentham's use of the utility principle in the Introduction is consistent 
with this general approach. Despite the title, the book is almost entirely 
about penal legislation and hardly about morals at all. Bentham's preface 
describes the work as an introduction to a penal code,169 and confesses that 
it does not live up to its title. 170 According to Bentham, the book's 
contribution to the study of morals consists only of its "analysis of... 
pleasure, pain, motive and disposition." 17 1 He notes that he has nothing to 
say on the subjects of virtue and vice. He does not even include within the 
subject the topics that a contemporary ethicist would expect to find: an 
analysis of the nature of the good, and of personal duties. He apparently 
considers morals to be the descriptive and normative study of character. The 
former is what we would today call psychology, and it is only that part of 
the subject of "morals" that the book addresses. The preface goes on to 
of generally beneficial rules, rather than case by case. Paley's reasoning was based on 
deterrence theory: he argued that governance of individual behavior required clear standards 
of behavior tied to certain enforcement sanctions. Since persons could only be obliged to 
fulfill standards of behavior that were enforced, they could in principle only be obliged to 
fulfill standards of behavior that were enforceable. And these must be clear and easily 
monitored rules. Id. at 39-40. Thus for Paley, as for Hume, Helvetius, Beccaria, and Bentharn, 
utility was more a feature of institutions than of acts. The utility of a norm depended upon its 
form as well as its content. Paley expressed this idea by distinguishing between the particular 
consequence of an act, and its more important general consequence (not its consequence if 
regularly repeated, but its compatibility with beneficial rules of conduct). Id. at 39. Thus the 
utility of an act depended more on its formal than on its substantive effect. 
169. BENT'HAM, supra note 82, at 1, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLEs OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1(J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996). 
170. Id. at3. 
171. Id. 
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outline an ambitious plan involving ten more books, all on the subject of 
legislation, none on the subject of "morals." 17 2 
The forensic function of the principle of utility is announced in the 
opening paragraph of the book. It exactly parallels the place of utility in the 
arguments of Beccaria and Helvetius: 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, 
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as 
well as to determine what we shall do.... They govern us in all we do, in all 
we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection 
will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to 
abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. 
The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the 
foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity 
by the hands of reason and law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in 
sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of 
light. 173 
This is the now familiar argument: individuals are self-interested, and 
cannot be persuaded to be good at their own expense. They can only be 
induced to be good by laws offering rational incentives. Arguments 
supporting such laws either rationally explain how such laws will gratify the 
audience or they are empty cant, merely indicating that such laws will 
gratify the speaker. When equated with utility, "the words ought, and right 
and wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they 
have none." 174 This is not a claim about the nature of the good, but about 
the nature of political discourse among self-interested actors. As H.L.A says 
of this passage, "it is ...intended to convey an idea which is central to his 
whole argument, namely that when so used [the words ought and right and 
wrong] raise a rationally settleable issue because only then do they invoke 
an external standard which reasonable men would accept for the 
determination of right and wrong."'175 
It is in this limited sense that the principle of utility provides the 
foundation of Bentham's argument. Bentham's argument is about good 
legislation. The audience for such argument is necessarily a public audience, 
and such an audience can only be rationally persuaded by arguments about 
172. Id. at6. 
173. Id. at 11. 
174. Id. at 13. 
175. Hart, Bentham'sPrincipleof Utility, in BErNTHAM,supranote 82, at xc. 
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the consequences of laws for the public welfare. And evaluation of acts 
according to the public welfare is the meaning of the utility principle when 
the actor one is trying to persuade is the public. When the actor one is trying 
to persuade is an individual, the principle of utility has the quite different 
meaning of self-interest. Here is how Bentham draws the line between the 
subjects of ethics and legislation: 
Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the 
course most conducive to his own happiness, by means of such motives as 
offer themselves: the art of legislation (which may be considered as one 
branch of the science of jurisprudence) teaches how a multitude of men, 
composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which upon 
the whole is most conducive to the happiness of the whole community, by 
means of motives to be applied by the legislator. 176 
Just as Bentham conceives morals as psychology, the study of character, he 
regards ethics as something like psychological therapy or self-help, the art of 
composing one's character so as to achieve happiness. 
Thus in identifying the utility principle as the foundation of his book on 
legislation, Bentham by no means implied that individuals are morally 
obliged to serve the public welfare. Such a claim would be pointless, since 
individuals are naturally compelled to serve their own welfare. It is only in 
the context of a work on legislation that utility stands for the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number. And it is only from this legislative 
perspective that even individual acts are to be evaluated and encouraged or 
discouraged according to their contribution to the public welfare. 177 Thus 
the "utility principle," interpreted as a public welfare standard, is 
fundamental to a work on legislation because it provides a useful standard of 
value. That does not mean that public welfare is foundational in the sense 
that it constitutes the essence of the good. 
C. Bentham's InstitutionalAccount ofMorality 
In moral psychology, Bentham followed Helvetius: all passions are 
good, or at least not bad. Actions are valuable according to their effects, 178 
and every passion or "motive" can be rendered useful by appropriate 
176. BENTHAM, supranote 82, at 293. 
177. Id. at 12-13. 
178. JOHN BOWRING, II DEONTOLOGY; OR, THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY 44-46 (1834) 
[hereinafter II DEONTOLOGY]. 
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sanctions. 179 In general, self-love is a highly useful passion, because 
individuals can be counted upon to augment their own happiness efficiently, 
expertly, and spontaneously, without any legislative prompting, thereby 
contributing to the aggregate welfare of society. 180 Like Helvetius, Bentham 
based libertarian policies on utilitarian reasons. 
Bentham discussed morality in one other way in the Introduction: as an 
informal system of social sanctions, deploying the currencies of honor and 
shame, esteem and contempt. 181 The availability of such informal "moral" 
sanctions reduces a society's need for formal legal sanctions. Such sanctions 
may achieve the utilitarian aims of the law at less cost. Bentham further 
developed this conception of morality in his one work on ethics, 
Deontology, assembled posthumously by his disciple John Bowring, from 
notes and fragments. A striking feature of the view of morality revealed in 
this book is how much it resembles Bentham's positivist conception of law. 
Bentham shared with Hume and Paley the view that morality is an 
institution, like law. Like law, morality is an instrument of social control, 
that cannot exist without enforcement sanctions. 
[W]here actions are supposed to be beneficial over so large an extent as to 
demand the attention of the legislative or administrative authorities, public 
recompense is brought to reward them. Beyond these limits vast masses of 
enjoyment and suffering are produced by human conduct, and here is the 
province of morality. Its directions and its sanctions become a sort of 
factitious law. Those directions are of course dependent on the sanctions to 
which they appeal; and it is only by bringing men under the operation of 
these sanctions that the moralist, or the divine, or the legislator, can have any 
success or influence. 182 
Just as there can be no descriptive claims about law that are not claims about 
positive law, there can be no descriptive claims about morality that are not 
claims about a functioning system of social control. Terms like "the right," 
"the good," and "virtue" have the same status for Bentham as terms like 
"natural law." They are nonsense. 
Of course, one can make prescriptive claims about morality, just as one 
can about law. But these are not, for Bentham, claims about how it is right to 
act. They are claims about what acts we should encourage and with what 
179. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 32, 100. 
180. Id. at 284. 
181. Id. at 34-35. 
182. II DEONToLOGY, supranote 178, at 2-3. 
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reasons, and what acts and reputations we should esteem and approve. These 
are prescriptive claims about institutional reform-about how the informal 
sanctions of morality should be organized and directed. And just as it would 
be puerile to propose a legal conduct rule without giving any thought to how 
that rule could be enforced, it would be silly to propound a dictate of 
morality without giving any thought to whether and how that dictate could 
be realized. 
For Bentham, the overwhelmingly salient constraint on any program of 
social control was the hedonistic basis of human motivation. 183 Thus, actors 
would only obey conduct standards if those standards either served their 
interests or were backed by sanctions. 184 A moral sanction involves societal 
disapproval rather than state coercion, but is nonetheless a sanction. 185 A 
moral standard has no validity unless a society can be induced to approve 
and disapprove conduct on its basis. A morality, then, is not a conception of 
the good, but a policy. A moralist proposes and advocates a morality not 
primarily to those who must decide whether to obey it, but to those who 
must decide whether to enforce it. He advocates it not on the basis of its 
rightness, but on the basis of its realizability and its service to the interests 
of its enforcers. 
Bentham's Deontology, accordingly, endeavored to show that a good 
deal of conventional morality could be defended as compatible with the 
enlightened self-interest of the actor.18 6 
'Give me,' may the utilitarian teacher exclaim,-'give me the human 
sensibilities-joy and grief, pain and pleasure-and I will create a moral 
world. I will produce not only justice, but generosity, patriotism, 
philanthropy, and the long and illustrious train of sublime and amiable 
virtues, purified and exalted. 187 
Bentham argued that most "virtues" can be reduced to prudence or 
benevolence. 188 We can easily encourage prudent behavior by teaching 
actors that it serves their long terms interests. 189 And we can reward 
benevolent behavior with gratitude and esteem-thereby encouraging 
183. II DEoNToLoGY, supranote 178, at 10-12. 
184. Id. at 7, 133. 
185. JoHN BOWRING, I DEONTOLOGY; OR, THE SCIENCE OF MORAUTY 21-22 (1834) 
[hereinafter I DEONTOLOGYI. 
186. II DEONTOLOGY, supranote 178, at 130-31. 
187. Id. at 10. 
188. I DEONTOLOGY, supranote 185, at 10. 
189. II DEONTOLOGY, supranote 178, at 28. 
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behavior that serves our own interests. 190 By presenting benevolence as a 
means to gratitude and esteem, utilitarian morality encourages the actor to 
make these social responses the measure of benevolence. In this way 
utiltiarian morality discourages paternalism. Bentham denied that a high 
opinion of one's own motives qualifies individuals to define the interests of 
others. Individual moral actors are simply not sufficiently competent or 
trustworthy institutions to identify or pursue the welfare of others, let alone 
the general welfare. 191 
Bentham advocated reforming moral discourse 192 to emphasize the 
compatibility of virtue and self-interest, 193 because only by these means 
could we render morality effectual as a tool of social control. 194 This would 
involve some reform in the content of moral discourse as well. Bentham 
advocated these changes not to bring morality in line with "the right" or "the 
good" (these terms are empty vessels) 195 but to make it effectual. The 
reform of moral discourse also would ensure that it would make a rational 
appeal to its audience and not deceive them into a blind subjection to the 
will of the moralist. 196 
If morality is a sanctions system, backed by public opinion, it makes 
little sense to say that McCloskey's sheriff is morally obliged to secretly 
frame a scapegoat. Morality in Bentham's sense only comes into play in 
judging acts that are publicly known and therefore capable of being 
encouraged or condemned by public opinion. Successful deception of the 
public may or may not maximize utility; it cannot be commanded by 
utilitarian morality because utilitarian morality can offer the actor no reason 
to fool the public. Indeed, deception of the public subverts the sanction 
system of utilitarian morality. Perhaps for this reason, Bentham's 
Deontology emphasizes veracity as a virtue, 197 and publicity as a requisite 
for morality's efficacy. "The more men live in public, the more amenable 
they are to the moral sanction. The greater dependence men are in to the 
190. Id at 39-41, 165-66. 
191. 1d at 288-89. 
192. I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 185, at 132-39; II DEONTOLOGY, supra note 178, at 
314. 
193. I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 185, at 10. 
194. I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 178, at 73-76. 
195. Id. at 10-11. 
196. Id. at 17,306. 
197. II DEONTOLoGY, supra note 178, at 66-67, 145-46; I DEONTOLOGY, supra note 
185, at 239-41. Bentham especially urges the sharing of tangible information with the public; 
it is less important, and sometimes even spiteful or cruel, to publicize one's opinions. I 
DEONTOLOGY, supra note 185, at 280. 
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public, that is, the more equality there is among them, the clearer the 
evidence comes out, the more it has of certainty in its results." 198 While 
morality cannot coerce publicity, it can reward those who make their 
behavior easy to monitor with public esteem and punish those who are 
secretive with disapproval. Law can assist morality by ensuring freedom of 
press and speech. 199 Should the law further restrict privacy in order to 
strengthen the moral sanction? Doing so threatens utility by reducing the 
autonomy of individuals and excessively empowering government officials. 
Utility is probably best served by holding only official conduct to the most 
stringent standard of publicity, even at the cost of weakening the moral 
sanction. 
This Benthamite conception of morality as a practical system of social 
control rather than an ideal standard of behavior has implications for another 
traditional criticism of utilitarianism. Critics have assumed that utilitarian 
ethics required each individual to maximize the public welfare. This would 
seem to require enormous individual sacrifices of energy, attention and 
wealth: e.g. giving all of one's money to Oxfam, adopting and caring for 
dozens of orphans, directing all of one's attention to the welfare of 
strangers. 200 But readers of Bentham's Deontology are not likely to 
conclude that utilitarian morality imposes such burdens. Such an ethic 
would make no appeal to the rational self-interest of the actor. It would be 
totally unrealizable and hence pointless as an institutionally enforced 
standard of behavior. No one would follow it and no one would cooperate in 
disapproving those who refused to follow it. Bentham does urge 
benevolence as a source of pleasure: but the pleasure derives from the 
gratitude of those helped, the admiration of others, and from self-
approbation. If morality sets an impossibly high standard of benevolence, it 
strips all attainable levels of benevolence of these pleasurable consequences 
and so proves an impediment rather than an encouragement to benevolence. 
Such a severe morality would not advance utility. 20 1 Hence it would not be 
utilitarian. 
Bentham recognized a further difficulty with the notion that each 
individual is morally obliged to act so as to maximize the public welfare. 
Not only have individuals little motivation to pursue the public interest to 
198. I DEoNTroLoGY, supra note 185, at 100. 
199. Id. 
200. See SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 1-2 (1989); Peter Railton, 
Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134 
(1984); BAILEY, supranote 9, at 22-24; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 500-01 (1971). 
201. II DEONTOLOGY, supranote 178, at 75. 
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the detriment of self-interest, but they are not especially competent to do so. 
They may know a great deal about their own preferences, but little about 
those of other people, or of the circumstances facing them, and even that 
knowledge is likely to be distorted by self-interest. Bentham found 
' 202 individuals to be "essentially unapt to perform the skills of utility 
calculation, lawmaking, and governance, and therefore he wrote: 
Were every man his own legislator laws would be made as badly as cloathes 
would be, if every man were his own tailor... it is not every man that can 
make a shoe; but when a shoe is made every man may tell whether it fits him 
without much difficulty. Every man can not be a shoe maker but any man 
may chose his own shoemaker.203 
It should be clear that for Bentham, utility is not an ethical principle. 
Instead, utility is a practical standard for judging institutions. It follows that 
Bentham's theory of legislation is not subordinate to an ethical view. 
Instead, his proposals for reforming law and his proposals for reforming 
morality are both subordinate to utility, his standard for evaluating 
institutional reforms. Morality has exactly the same logical status as law in 
his theory. Both are institutional means to advance value.204 Neither is a 
standard of value. But while morality and law have the same derivative 
status in his theory, they are not equally important. Morality is a less 
effectual instrument of the public welfare than legislation, and less amenable 
to systematic reform.205 In any case, morality does not supply the utility 
principle. Instead, the utility principle is a procedural standard for resolving 
policy disputes among self-interested actors of relatively equal power and 
authority. 206 
202. Jeremy Bentham, Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 98 
(John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter ConstitutionalCode). 
203. Jeremy Bentham, Manuscripts at University College, London, cxxvii 2, cited in 
Ross HARRISON, BENTHM 209 (1983). Similarly, Bentham writes: 'Whether it be possible 
for every man to be made a lawyer by a book is what I shall not be positive about: but that I 
know, that if it be, it must be by a book of the Legislature's writing." Jeremy Bentham, 
Manuscriptsat University College, London, lxxa, 105 (quoted in D. Lieberman, Bentham's 
Digest, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRrrICAL ASSESSMENTS 339 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993)) 
[hereinafter Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London]. 
204. I DEONTOLOGY, supranote 185, at 27-28. 
205. Id. at 2-4. 
206. Bentham clearly fashions the utility standard for use in a context in which no one 
can simply impose their views by force or authority. Even though laws are to be framed by 
expert legislators, they still must convince the lay public of the utility of their proposals. Thus 
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V. UTILITY AS PROCESS AND DISCOURSE 
Utilitarianism is ordinarily thought of as a substantive theory of value, 
concerned with the good consequences, rather than the right origins, of 
action. Yet our recharacterization of utilitarianism as a theory of government 
rather than a general theory of value complicates this picture. Bentham turns 
out to be very concerned about the procedures by which governmental 
decisions are made. The rightness of action turns out to be role-dependent: 
some acts may be done only by persons acting in an official capacity and 
pursuant to a public decision. As in any theory about law, the normative 
status of action often depends on whether it is duly authorized. The 
correctness of a decision often turns on the process by which the decision is 
made. 
Moreover, Bentham's substantive criterion of value, happiness, turns out 
to be less consequentialist than is commonly supposed. Human happiness, as 
Bentham defines it, is not simply a function of actions. It is substantially 
influenced by the procedures that exist for determining action. This result 
follows from Bentham's assumptions about the phenomenology of pleasure 
and pain. 
A. Security and Procedure 
For Bentham, the distinctive feature of human hedonic experience was 
the human ability to anticipate future experience and to feel pleasure and 
pain about these expectations. This capacity to anticipate the future enables 
humans to sustain personal identity and to formulate and calculate self-
interest. It also greatly expands the capacities of human creatures to enjoy 
and suffer and accounts for their superior weight in the felicific calculus. 207 
But the human capacity to anticipate future hedonic experience had another 
implication for Bentham as well. It meant that humans were generally risk-
averse, deriving constant pleasure from the contemplation of security, and 
constant anxiety from the contemplation of danger and risk. Declining 
the utility standard presupposes a context of discursive equality. For Bentham, equality was a 
substantive as well as a procedural ideal: "Like security, though placed in an inferior position, 
equality served as one of the ends of legislation and hence was also a necessary condition for 
achieving the greatest happiness .... Bentham argued that the greatest happiness principle 
meant an 'equal quantity of happiness' for every member of the community in question .... 
Bentham justified this emphasis on equality by introducing the idea of diminishing marginal 
utility." Rosen, supra note 101, at xxxvii. 
207. See Jeremy Bentham, Principlesof the Civil Code, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS 308 
(John Bowring ed., 1962). 
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marginal utility208 meant that humans were more interested in securing for 
themselves the basic constituents of survival and contentment, than in 
risking all for a chance at ecstatic heights of pleasure. Bentham's strong 
identification of happiness with security made security the primary aim of 
his normative theory of law. As Frederick Rosen comments, 
The importance of security in Bentham's utilitarian system has often been 
overlooked. . . . Security became, for Bentham, a means to the end of 
happiness and a necessary condition for its maximization. As with Hume, the 
maintenance of secure possession of one's life and property was considered 
the main task of government, and Bentham was led through the emhasis on 
security to embrace an indirect form of utilitarianism. This interpretation of 
Bentham's utilitarianism... rejects the view that Bentham was a simple act-
utilitarian intent upon the maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain 
without regard to its distribution .... 209 
Because of the importance of secure expectations for public happiness, 
Bentham emphasized clearly defined and securely protected entitlements, 
and predictability of government action. The result was a theory of 
government emphasizing the rule of law. 
While guaranteeing physical security and property was the main 
function of government, there was of course no guarantee that necessarily 
self-interested officials would carry out their public function. In addition, 
the coercive powers necessary to carry out government functions also posed 
a threat to security. Government officials could only be expected to fulfill 
their public functions if their personal interests were tied to the public 
interest by a disciplinary regime of positive and negative sanctions 
combined with public monitoring. Accordingly, Bentham devoted 
considerable attention to designing a utilitarian process of policymaking and 
administration equipped with "securities against misrule." These securities 
involved the subordination of judicial and administrative functions to 
legislative functions; legislating formal rules rather than teleological 
standards; the democratic election of legislators; a clear, analytically precise, 
and common language of legislation and policy debate; and, above all, 
publicity of government operations. 
208. FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: A 
STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 211-20 (1983). 
209. Rosen, supra note 99, at xxxvi; see generally P. 1. KELLY, UTILTARIANISM AND 
DISTRmIBUTIvE JUSTICE: JEREMY BErNTHAM AND THE CIVIL LAW (1990). 
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For Bentham utility was not, as it is for many modem academic 
philosophers, an ideal standard for judging hypothetical actions in 
hypothetical worlds. Bentham acknowledged that a judgment about the 
public interest requires information about preferences and consequences, 
and a judge whose personal interest is tied to the public interest by political 
and legal sanctions, backed by the monitoring of an enlightened, mobilized 
public. Thus Bentham's utilitarian standard of value cannot be separated 
from the institutional process by which it is formulated and applied. For all 
practical purposes, there is no utility apart from some reliable institutional 
process of gathering information about the public interest, conducted under 
the scrutiny of a public with the means to protect itself. 
Utilitarian procedures must precede any substantive definition of the 
public welfare. Otherwise , the utility costs resulting from the insecurity of a 
public vulnerable to despotic oppression would dwarf any conceivable good 
consequences achieved by a "dictatorship of the utilitariat." Nor, on 
Bentham's psychological assumptions, would any good consequences 
accrue from such elite rule. Rulers capable of ruling in their own interest 
would be virtually certain to do so. Hence, what utility demands must be 
determined by a democratically controlled process of inquiry and 
deliberation, not by isolated sheriffs-or moral philosophers. If the 
utilitarian standard of value is freed from procedural constraints tying it to 
the interests of actual people it ceases to have any empirical referent. It 
becomes no more meaningful than the idle chatter of moralists about right 
and good and virtue and natural law. 
B. UtilitarianLanguagein the Policy Process 
1. Utilitarianism as a Rhetorical Practice 
To understand the meaning of Bentham's utility standard it is necessary 
to understand the rhetorical practice in which Bentham used it and intended 
that it be used. What Bentham proposed and defended was the practice, not 
the standard. Bentham famously eschewed any logical "proof" of the utility 
principle: "for that which is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be 
proved: a chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere. To 
give such a proof is as impossible as it is needless." 210 The proof was in the 
performance. As H.L.A. Hart notes, 
210. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 13. 
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Bentham is plainly not at his ease in philosophical argument as he is in the 
close, minute analysis and classification of concrete detail, attention to which 
is required in the application of the principle of utility.... He writes as one 
too long convinced of the principle and too eager to hurry on to demonstrate 
how it could be fruitfully applied to the practical problems of social life to 
pause long over metaphysical argument. 211 
Hart adds that Bentham did not consider his distinctive contribution to be 
discovering the normative importance of hedonic consequences-this had 
been pointed out by Helvetius, among others. 212 Bentham considered his 
distinctive contribution to be developing and demonstrating a method for 
reasoning about such consequences. Helvetius had shown to Bentham's 
satisfaction that the "moral philosopher" must adopt the perspective of the 
legislator. Bentham resolved to do what Helvetius had not done: to adopt 
that perspective and to develop and put into practice a science of legislation. 
The result was the discursive praictice of public policy analysis. That today 
we have difficulty imagining how modem governance would proceed 
without this tool is precisely the sort of practical proof at which Bentham 
aimed. Bentham did not care whether the utility principle was a true 
definition of the good for all possible worlds; he sought to show that it was a 
useful criterion in his world by showing how it could be used beneficially. 
Before we can evaluate Bentham's "moral philosophy" we must 
understand it. And we cannot understand it unless we recognize that the 
function he ascribed to moral philosophy is very different from the function 
presupposed by the discipline of ethics today. The function of moral 
philosophy laid down by Helvetius and pursued by Beccaria was to improve 
human happiness by proposing useful laws. The aim of the utilitarian 
"system," acording to Bentham was "to rear the fabric of felicity by the 
hands of reason and law." 213 Moral philosophers of course had no armies or 
police or formal lawmaking authority. They could improve legislation and 
contribute to happiness only by mobilizing public opinion, their only 
enforcement sanction. Moreover, since laws can best produce utility by 
inspiring a feeling of security, moral philosophers could enhance the utility 
of good laws by explaining their operation and effects. Accordingly, the job 
of the utilitarian "moral philosopher" is to propose laws and to equip the 
public to rationally evaluate these proposals and alternatives. 
211. Hart, supra note 175, at vxxxvii. 
212. Id. 
213. BENTHA, supranote 82, at 11. 
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Accordingly, a major aim of Bentham's utilitarianism was to develop 
and put to use a transparent language of legislation and public policy 
analysis. A precise terminology, free of such spectral entities as legal 
fictions, natural rights, and moral virtues, would preclude legislatures from 
disguising the operation and effect of laws. A precise language would 
prevent judges and officials from legislating under the guise of interpreting 
ambiguous terms. Finally, a precise language would discipline participants 
in political debate to offer reasons intelligible to all. In Bentham's view, the 
public should treat obfuscatory laws as bad laws and obscure reasons as no 
reasons. Because the utility of laws could not be guaranteed without 
transparency, transparency was lexically prior to utility as a criterion of 
legitimacy. 
2. The Language of Law 
Bentham believed that the "excellence and efficacy of every system of 
Laws will depend upon two grand points belonging to it: the policy or matter 
or purport of the laws ... and the form of tenor of them."2 14 All types of 
obscurity corrupted the tenor of the law and therefore prevented it from 
achieving its objectives. If laws were not clear and accessible, the public 
would not be aware of the rules governing them. This would compromise 
the expressive, formative, and deterrent effects of the law. And without a 
clear understanding of the contents of the law, the public would have little 
opportunity to critically evaluate and reform its legal system. 
The whole of the law was "of no use farther than it is known."2 15 A 
body of law should be judged, therefore, "not from the quantity of what is 
extant, but from the quantity of what is known." 2 16 Yet while the "notoriety 
of every law ought to be as extensive as its binding force" and "no axiom 
can be more self-evident: none more important," none was "more 
universally disregarded. '2 17 By Bentham's count, "the greatest part of the 
people are unapprised of the 99 parts in a hundred of the Laws that govern 
them." 218 Until this "grievance [was] remedied," he declared, "the business 
of legislation is from the beginning to the end of it cruel mockery." 219 
214. Bentham, Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London, supranote 203, at xxvii. 
215. Id. at lxxix. 
216. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LimsS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 193 (Charles Warren 
Everett ed., 1945). 
217. JEREMYBENHAM, OFLAWSiNGERAL 71 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970). 
218. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College, London, supranote 203, at lxxa. 
219. BENTHAM, supranote 217, at 71. 
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Bentham's career as a notable reformer and polemicist began with his 
Comment on the Commentaries,220 a critique of the obscurity of the 
common law as distilled and defended by Blackstone. Bentham complained 
of the "dark Chaos" and "glorious incertainty" of the common law, that set 
the interpreter "loose into the wilds of perpetual conjecture." 22 1 Rife with 
technical legal terminology, "smothered amidst a redundancy of words," 
riddled with "unmeaning," and often contradictory, the law appeared to the 
lay reader as a "flock of chimeras." Blackstone's Commentaries222 only 
compounded the common law's incomprehensibility. "His nomenclature," 
wrote Bentham, "is like a weathercock: you never meet the same term twice 
together in the same place" and his definitions provided "strings of identical 
propositions... explaining ignotum per ignotius.' '223 Antiquated legal terms 
lived on without any consensus on their contemporary meaning, and 
encouraged lazy habits of thought: 
The long acquaintance we have had with it makes us take for granted we 
have searched it already; we deal by it, in consequence, as the custom-house 
officers in certain countries, who, having once set their seal upon a package, 
so long as they see, or think they see that seal upon it, reasonably enough
224 
suppose themselves dispensed with from visiting it anew. 
The obscurity of the common law produced an uninformed public. 
. For Bentham the incomprehensibility of the law not only reduced the 
ability of legitimate laws to deter, but it cloaked counterproductive rules and 
unregulated official discretion. Concealed from public scrutiny by the law's 
unintelligibility, ambition and corruption stood a greater chance of going 
undetected: "The case is this. A large portion of the body of the law was, by 
the bigotry or artifice of Lawyers, locked up in an illegible character, and in 
a foreign tongue.... [T]he pestilential breath of Fiction poisons the sense of 
every instrument it comes near."225 "A fiction of law may be defined," 
Bentham explained, as "a willful falsehood, having for its object the stealing 
legislative power, by and for hands which durst not, or could not, openly 
220. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES (J.H. Bums and H.L.A. 
Hart eds., 1977). 
221. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College,London, supra note 203, at lxxix. 
222. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769) 
(1979). 
223. BENTHAM, supranote 220, at 349. 
224. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 74-75. 
225. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 235 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
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claim it; and, but for the illusion thus produced, could not exercise it."226 
More broadly, Bentham defined "fiction in the sense in which it is used by 
lawyers ...[as] a false assertion of the privileged kind, and which, though 
acknowledges to be false, is at the same time argued from, and acted upon, 
as if true." For Bentham such deception could never maximize utility: 
"[f]iction of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade."'227 Bentham 
complained that 
[bly wrapping the real dispositions of the law in a covering of nonsense, the 
knowledge of it is rendered impossible to the bulk of the people-the bulk of 
those whose fate depends upon it. What meets their eyes is gross and 
palpable nonsense .... In jargon such as this, no man in whose brain the 
natural provisions of common sense has not been eaten out by false science 
can avoid beholding so much vile and scandalous nonsense; but if, by the 
help of that portion of common sense which each man's fortune has 
imparted to him, it were possible to him to divine what disastrous sense may 
be at the bottom of this nonsense, the nonsense would miss its mark. 228 
Worse even then a deception and confusion of the public wrought by 
legal fictions, was its corruption of the public mind. The law's use of fiction 
taught the lesson that deception was an acceptable practice and even a 
necessary condition of justice,229 thus "corrupting the morals of the people." 
"Wheresoever the use of fiction prevails," Bentham maintains, "every law 
book is an institute of vice; every court of judicature is a school of vice."'230 
Fictions were also responsible for "[c]orrupting the intellectual faculties of 
the people.... To what state of debility and deprivation," he asks, "must the 
understanding of that man have been brought down, who can really persuade 
himself that a lawyer's fiction is anything better than a lie of the worst 
sort.. .".-231 Bentham complained that lawyers 
226. Quoted in Charles K. Ogden, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAm, THE THEORY OF 
FIcTIONs xviii (C.K. Ogden ed., 1959). 
227. BENTHAm, supranote 226, at 141. 
228. Id. at 148. 
229. "Legislator and people confirmed in the habit of bowing down to falsehood and 
absurdity, and recognizing them as being, what lawyers are continually proclaiming them to 
be, necessary instruments in the hands of justice .....Id. at 148-49. 
230. Id. at 149. 
231. Id. 
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. . . refuse to administer justice to you unless you join with them in their 
fictions; and their cry is, see how necessary fiction is to justice! Necessary 
indeed; but too necessary; but how came it so, and who made it so? 
As well might the father of a family make it a rule never to let his 
children have their breakfast till they had uttered, each of them, a certain 
number of lies, curses, and profane oaths; and then exclaim, "You see, my 
dear children, how necessary lying, cursing, and swearing are to human 
' 23 2 
sustenance! 
Bentham concluded that obfuscation "has never been employed but to a bad 
purpose. It has never been employed but to any purpose but the affording a 
justification for something which otherwise would be unjustifiable. '2 3 3 A 
legal system's tolerance of such artifices therefore "affords presumptive and 
conclusive evidence of the inaptitude of the form of government in support 
of which it is employed . . . [and] of intellectual weakness, stupidity, and 
servility, in every nation by which the use of it is quietly endured." 
2 3 4 
The project of cleaning up legal "word magic" became the "necessary 
concomitant and forerunner of improvement of the law."' 23 5 Laws must be 
written in the common language of the people, and "[w]heresoever it is seen 
to differ, it will be seen to differ to its disadvantage:-peculiar absurdity the 
' 23 6 immediate effect-peculiar mischief the result." Law should be 
comprehensible to "the meanest understanding" and should aspire toward 
"the maximum of comprehensive simplicity." To achieve such clarity, the 
law must possess four qualities: "Precision, Apprehensibilty, Brevity, and 
Amplitude." 23 7 Since "all questions of Law are no more than questions 
concerning the import of words," the process of securing proper definitions 
was essential. "Nothing has been, nothing will be, nothing ever can be done 
on the subject of Law that deserves the name of Science," Bentham 
believed, "till that universal precept of Locke, enforced by Helvetius, be 
steadily pursued, 'Define your words.'"238 "Fixation" of words "has for its 
purpose, the removal of ambiguity: explanation, the clearing up of 
232. Id. at 149-50. 
233. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 77. 
234. Id. 
235. Bentham, Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London, supra note 203, at xxvii. 
236. Jeremy Bentham, Nomography; or the Art of InditingLaws, in 3 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 241 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
237. Bentham, Manuscriptsat UniversityCollege, London, supra note 203, at lxxa. 
238. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES 340 (J.H. Bums & 
H.L.A. Hart eds., 1962). 
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obscurity,"239 and for Bentham these "verbal distinctions are equally tedious 
and indispensable." 240 
Bentham took pains to separate and clarify terms such as power, right, 
and trust. He replaced eulogistic terms like "purity" and dyslogistic terms 
like "lust" with neutral language in order to rid arguments of their emotive 
appeal. Bentham sought to replace all references to institutions and 
principles "considered an object of respect and veneration" with references 
to the fallible legal actors representing them. Bentham's famous 
renunciation of the language of natural rights as imaginary "nonsense upon 
stilts" belongs to this project to purge the law of fictions and he devotes a 
chapter in his Theory of Fictionsto this problem.24 1 
3. The Language of Policy Reform 
Bentham believed that the discourse of policy reform was just as corrupt 
as the discourse of law. He reasoned that would-be despots and aristocrats 
would naturally seek power by criticizing corrupt leaders rather than the 
institutional arrangements that bred corruption, and by proposing ineffectual 
reforms that left opportunities for corrupt leadership in place. Accordingly, 
every corrupt, deceptive regime was destined to generate its own equally 
corrupt and deceptive dissenters and reformers. The existence of vigorous 
political debate might create the appearance of democratic participation in 
policy formation, but such debate was often nothing more than squabbling 
among thieves, designed to mislead the public and preempt meaningful 
critique and reform. 
Unhappily, for the members of the democratical section, their conceptions, 
their judgments, their suffrages, their language, have till this time been 
placed almost completely under the guidance, and almost, as it were, under 
the disposal of, those of the aristocratical: and thus it is, that by the sinister 
interest of these their adversaries, not only have they been placed and kept 
under the yoke of misrule, but the only instrument in which they could seek 
relief ...has been employed ... in the aggravation of it, and in keeping 
them, as far as may be, from all thoughts of applying a remedy. 242 
239. Jeremy Bentham, RadicalReform Bill, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENrHAM 593 
(John Bowring ed., 1962). 
240. Ogden, supra note 226, at xxvi (quoting Bentham). 
241. BENTHAM, supra note 226, at 118-22. 
242. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supranote 202, at 44. 
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No meaningful criticism and reform was possible unless the public's 
attention was directed at the consequences of policy for their interests. And 
this was only possible if debate was conducted in the lucid terminology of 
costs and benefits, interests and desires, pleasures and pains, incentives and 
sanctions. Thus a transparent language of policy debate was just as 
important as a transparent language of law. Chapter II of the Introduction to 
the Principlesof Morals and Legislation is largely devoted to a critique of 
phrases used in 18th century moral and political argument like "moral 
sense," "common sense," "understanding," "rule of right," "fitness of 
things," "law of nature," "right reason," and "natural justice." 243 "The 
mischief common to all these ways of thinking and arguing," Bentham 
concluded, "is their serving as a cloak, and pretence, and ailment, to 
despotism. .. "244 These were all empty phrases, conclusions about right 
and wrong masquerading as reasons. It was not that arguments from 
religious revelation, or moral sense, or aesthetic judgments of fitness, were 
necessarily wrong. It was just that arguments of this type had no discursive 
function: privately experienced intuitions could not justify an action to 
anyone else or settle a disagreement. 
'But is it never, then, from any other considerations than those of utility, that 
we derive our notions of right and wrong?' I do not know: I do not care. 
Whether a moral sentiment can be originally conceived from any other 
source than a view of utility, is one question: whether upon examination and 
reflection it can, in point of fact, be actually persisted in and justified on any 
other ground, by a person reflecting within himself, is another: whether in 
point of right it can properly be justified on any other ground, by a person 
addressing himself to the community, is a third. The first two are questions 
of speculation: it matters not, comparatively speaking, how they are decided. 
The last is a question of practice: the decision of it is of as much importance 
as that of any can be.24 5 
By contrast to the various languages of moral intuition prevalent in 
eighteenth century writing, utilitarian discourse was uniquely suitable for 
reasoned public deliberation about public policy. 
In his quest to reform the language of law and politics, Bentham devoted 
considerable energy to inventing and defining terms for use in legislation 
and policy analysis. Some of these neologisms, "international," "maximize" 
243. BENTHAM, supranote 82, at 26-27. 
244. Id. at 28. 
245. Id. 
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and "codify"for example, have proved their utility and entered the language. 
Most, like "adscititious" remain on the shelf. Bentham's esoteric 
terminology and his interminable litanies of definitions and distinctions 
render his voluminous writings unbearably tedious, which probably accounts 
for their unfamiliarity among commentators on utilitarianism. Thus at one 
level, Bentham's efforts to reform political and legal discourse were 
ironically Quixotic: his idiosyncratic terminology constitutes a sort of 
jurisprudential esperanto. But at another level, his efforts were a resounding 
success: all contemporary policy analysis begins with costs and benefits; all 
contemporary jurisprudential analysis begins with an analysis of 
authoritative sources, competent decisionmakers, and sanctions; all legal 
analysis begins with written instruments. 
Utilitarianism was not a reflective or theoretical enterprise, but a 
discursive practice of public enlightenment. It aimed at creating a 
transparent process of government. This process would permit the public to 
contribute information about its interests, to see that information being used 
to develop and justify policy, to see that policy being faithfully 
implemented, to reward dutiful officials, and to punish delinquent ones. By 
these means the public welfare would be looked after, but more importantly, 
by these means the public could assure itself its welfare was being looked 
after. The entire project of securing utility depended upon public 
information and public understanding. 
The first requisite was a transparent language of legal and policy 
analysis. But there were three other procedural conditions for a utilitarian 
policy process. First, legality, involving a clear separation of lawmaking 
functions from law applying functions. This would require legislative 
supremacy, formal (and clearly intelligible) rules of law, and sanctions 
against the exercise of administrative and judicial discretion. Second, 
democracy, requiring the popular election of legislative representatives. 
Third, publicity, requiring that the public be informed of every government 
decision and the information, policy reasons, and legal authority supporting 
it. The next section examines these three "securities against misrule," which 
comprise the requisite conditions for the utilitarian policy process. 
VI. SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: LEGALITY, DEMOCRACY, PUBLICITY 
A. Legality 
Bentham's notion of legality had two key components: legislative 
supremacy, and administrative regularity. Bentham's complaints about the 
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common law drove him to design a political system in which all law was 
promulgated by a legislative body based on a calculation of utility. 246 To 
remedy the common law's obscurity, inaccessibility, and ambiguity, 247 
Bentham proposed that laws should be codified by elected legislators, 
publicized and distributed widely, and subject to as little judicial 
interpretation as possible. 
Much of Bentham's animosity toward the common law focused on 
judges. He saw government as a self-promoting enterprise he called "Judge 
and Co.," and he saw "judge made law" as a corrupt enterprise like "priest 
made religion."' 248 Bentham charged that the bench and bar "love the 
sources of their power, of their reputation, of their fortune: they love 
unwritten law for the same reason that the Egyptian priest loved 
hieroglyphics, for the same reasons that the priests of all religions have 
loved their peculiar dogmas and mysteries." 249 He also argued that the 
object of judicial legislation was "the sacrifice of the universal interests of 
all men in the character of the justiciables, to the particular and sinister 
interest-either of the Judge, or of the despot, whose creature and 
instrument he is, or both together." 250 
In response to these concerns, Bentham proposed to vest lawmaking 
power exclusively in legislators who would be directly accountable to the 
public for their decisions, would have access to all the information necessary 
to calculate under the utility principle, and would deliberate publicly. Once 
promulgated, these laws would govern all members of the community, 
particularly government officials, such as McCloskey's sheriff. The 
judiciary would have to render decisions in strict compliance with such 
246. See DINWIDDY, supranote 93, at 64. 
247. See G.J. Postema, The Expositor, The Censor, and the Common Law, in 3 
JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 227, 229 (Bikho Parekh ed., 1993). 
248. See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 8-9, 25-26, 75; see also 
Jeremy Bentham, Letters to Lord Greenvilleon the ProposedReform in the Administrationof 
Civil Justice in Scotland, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 3, 5-8 (John Bowring ed., 
1962) [hereinafter Letters to Lord Greenville]; Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Judicial 
Procedurewith the Outline of a ProcedureCode, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 
125-26 (John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter Principles of Judicial Procedure]; Jeremy 
Bentham, Rationale of JudicialEvidence, in 7 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 197-98 
(John Bowring ed., 1962) [hereinafter Rationaleof JudicialEvidence, vol. 7]. 
249. Jeremy Bentham, General View ofa Complete Code of Laws, in 3 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 206 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
250. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: SECURITIES 
AGAINST MISRULE AND OTHER WRITINGS FOR TRIPOLI AND GREECE 252 (Philip Schofield ed., 
1990) [hereinafter SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE]. 
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laws.251 The role of the judiciary would therefore be confined to "giving due 
execution and effect to the Laws, whatsoever they may be," 252 but not to 
extending or limiting them by interpretation.
Bentham's legislature was omnicompetent, and Bentham held that the 
executive's "sole declared end and purpose is the giving execution and 
effect to the will formed and declared by the members of the legislature. 
253 
Executive and judicial officials were denied any authority to create law. 
Within the executive, Bentham envisioned a tight chain of command.254 For 
example, if a subordinate abused her post, or otherwise breached an order, 
her superior would dismiss her.255 Inversely, if a subordinate believed her 
superior had betrayed the will of the legislators, she would report it to the 
legislature and protect herself by sending copies of her complaint to the 
press and every official in the dominion. 256 L.J. Hume commented that 
"Bentham was opposed to a fermenting bureaucracy whose members might 
develop and apply their own standards of what was tolerable and intolerable, 
or their own notions of the public interest,"'257 and thus "only the public-
acting through the legislature-could speak for the public interest." 258 
This structure permitted officials no opportunity to exercise independent 
judgment regarding the good of the community or to act outside of 
251. See Postema, supranote 73, at 316. 
252. BENTHAM, SECURrrIEs AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 252. 
253. Bentham, RationaleofJudicialEvidence vol.7, supranote 248, at 122. 
254. See FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMoCRACY: A 
STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 163-64 (1983); see also B.B. Schaffer, The Idea of the 
Ministerial Department: Bentham, Mill and Bagehot, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL 
ASsEssMENTS 836, 840 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993). 
255. See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 383-417; see also ROSEN, 
supra note 254, at 65, 86. 
256. Bentham gives explicit instructions: 
Suppose for example by one such functionary or set of functionaries information of 
an act of oppression received and committed to writing: if their situation is that of a 
set of functionaries constituting a Judicatory of the highest order, then suppose a 
copy sent to every Judicatory in the dominion, and by the joint authority of them all 
made public at one and the same time: made public, by whatsoever means of 
publicity happen to be at their command. Here the security against vengeance from 
the oppressor is at its maximum: unless it should be deemed advisable that from this 
branch of the authority of the state communication be also made to the military. 
BENTHAM, SECURrrIES AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 42. 
257. L.J. Hume, Jeremy Bentham and the 19th Century Revolution in Government, in 
3 JEREMY BENTrHM: CRIcTA. ASSESSMENTS 820, 825 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993). 
258. Id. 
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designated channels. In fact, the oath taken by the judiciary captures this 
relationship: 
I will on each occasion use my best endeavors to give execution and effect to 
every part of [the law], according to what shall appear to me to be the intent 
of the Legislature for the time being: not presuming on any occasion to 
substitute any particular will of my own, to the will of the Legislature, even 
in such cases, in any, where the provisions of the law may appear to me 
inexpedient: saving only the exercise of such discretionary suspensive power
2 5 9 
... with which the Legislature may have thought fit to intrust me. 
The above named "suspensive power" provided the judge's only 
authorized procedure for initiating reform in the legislative code.260 John 
Dinwiddy explains: 
Bentham recognized that cases would arise in which the strict application of 
the code as it stood would produce an outcome that conflicted with the 
greatest happiness principle. In such circumstances, the judge could not 
simply override the code, basing his decision on a direct appeal to the 
principle of utility. This would be tantamount to making or amending law on 
his own authority.... [b]ut what the judge could do was to postpone a final 
decision on the case, and to propose to the legislature, through the Justice 
Minister, an amendment or refinement of the law. 26 1 
Hence, instead of determining what decision would maximize utility in the 
particular case, Bentham expected the judge either to apply the law, or 
propose a more efficacious rule to the legislature and the public. 262 Any ad 
259. See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 533. 
260. Hume, supra note 257, at 820, 825. 
261. DINWIDDY, supra note 93, at 68; see also RosEN, supranote 254, at 163-64. 
262. See G.J. Postema, Bentham on the Public Character of Law, in 3 JEREMY 
BENTHAM: CRITICAL AssEssMENTs 163, 167-68 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993) (quoting Bentham, 
Manuscriptsat University College, London, supranote 203). But see Postema's earlier views 
in Chapter 12 of G.J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1986). Here 
Postema argues that a judicial power to maximize utility by over-riding the law must follow 
from Bentham's supposed commitment to act-utilitarian ethics. Of course, this is hardly a 
satisfactory way of proving Bentham's commitment to act-utilitarian ethics, the very point in 
question. In fact, Bentham's explicit rejection of such a judicial power in his Constitutional 
Code tends to refute the assumption that he was an act-utilitarian. Postema's argument is 
criticized in John Dinwiddy, Adjudication Under Bentham's Pannomion, 1 UTIL. 283 (1989) 
and Paul Kelly, Review: Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, 1989 HIsT. POL. THOUGHT 
366 (1989). 
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hoc exception made by a judge or other administrator would be unauthorized 
and thus unlawful. 263 The law would stand until legislatively altered: "on 
any occasion, an ordinance, which to some shall appear repugnant to the 
principles of this constitution, shall come to have been enacted by the 
legislature, such an ordinance is not on that account to be, by any judge, 
treated or spoken of, as being null and void. .,,264 
Bentham's scheme would require officials like McCloskey's sheriff to 
carry out the law, regardless of the consequences. Bentham demands that 
both private individuals and officials follow the maxim: "To obey 
punctually: to censure freely. '265 While the sheriff must yield to the 
legislature's will, the authorized means of reform remain available to her. A 
sheriff could only frame the innocent if the legislature were to prospectively 
and publicly permit this. Should legislators authorize government officials 
to frame the innocent? As Sissela Bok points out, we do occasionally 
legislate to allow certain forms of governmental deception, for example in 
our use of unmarked police cars to discourage speeding. 266 Yet, a public 
policy of framing the innocent whenever officials deem it useful seems far 
less likely to advance utility, for reasons explored earlier. As Bok poses the 
question, 
Do we want to live in a society where public officials can resort to deceit and 
manipulation whenever they decide that an exceptional crisis has arisen? 
Would we not, on balance, prefer to run the risk of failing to rise to a crisis 
honestly explained to us, from which the government might have saved us 
through manipulation? And what protection from abuse do we foresee 
should we surrender this choice?267 
For Bentham, the latter consideration would have been decisive. The 
constant threat of despotism inherent in ad hoc and secret official 
decisionmaking exacts a huge cost in security, far outweighing the 
263. But see Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 202, at 160 (stating that 
"[o]nly by unalterable physical impotence, is the Supreme Legislature prevented from being 
its own executive, or from being the sole Legislature."); see also Hume, supra note 257, at 
820, 831. 
264. JEREMY BENTHAM, CONSTTrUTIONAL CODE (1830) (reprinted in JEREMY 
BENTHAM'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 218 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1973)); see also Bentham, 
ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 41-46. 
265. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 230 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
266. BOK, supra note 88, at 177. 
267. Id. at 180. 
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satisfaction derived from any dubious prospect of enhancing utility on a 
given occasion. Bentham thought security best ensured by subjecting 
executive and judicial officials to legislatively defined rules. The next 
problem was how to ensure that the legislature would pursue the public 
interest. Bentham solved this problem by placing the legislature under the 
supervision of the public by two devices: elections, and publicity. 
B. Democracy 
Bentham voiced an increasing commitment to representative democracy 
over the second half of his life, particularly in three important works on 
constitutional law: Plan for Parliamentary Reform in the Form of a 
Catechism, ConstitutionalCode and Securities Against Misrule and Other 
Writings for Tripoli and Greece. In his Constitutional Code, Bentham 
defines "good rule" as follows: 
The only species of government which has or can have for its object and 
effect the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is... a democracy: and 
the only species of democracy which can have place in a community 
numerous enough to defend itself against aggression at the hands of external 
adversaries, is a representative democracy.... 
Every other species of government has, necessarily, for its characteristic 
and primary object and effect, the keeping the people or non-functionaries in 
a perfectly defenceless state, against the functionaries or rulers, who being, 
in respect of their power and the use they are disposed and enabled to make 
of it, the natural adversaries of the people, have for their object the giving 
facility, certainty, unbounded extent and impunity, to the depredation and 
268 
oppression exercised on the governed by the governors. 
Bentham's mature views are summarized by Frederick Rosen: 
Bentham's aim was to achieve intelligent and responsible government at 
minimum expense, and he believed this could only be achieved through a 
representative democracy based on near universal suffrage, the secret ballot, 
frequent elections, a free press, open government, and military and judicial 
systems which incorporated accountability to the people wherever possible. 
He believed strongly in the virtues of popular participation but saw the real 
danger to representative democracy not in too little participation but in the 
268. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supranote 202, at 47. 
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power of ruling elites, even those elected or removable by the people, to use 
their powers to profit at the expense of the people generally. Many of the 
detailed provisions of Constitutional Code are designed to increase 
accountability and to place educated and competent officials in positions of 
power. Bentham was less interested in simply limiting the powers of 
government and more interested in limiting the powers of government to rule 
arbitrarily and oppressively. 269 
Elie Haldvy dates Bentham's enthusiasm for democracy from 1808 and 
explains it as the product of two factors: Bentham's resentment of the 
aristocratic government's indifference to his prison reform proposals, and 
the influence of James Mill. 270 Yet H.L.A. Hart rejects Haldvy's account as 
too crude to explain Bentham's vacillating enthusiasms. 27 1 Hart, instead 
divides Bentham's thinking about democracy into two distinct phases; the 
first exemplified by his "antipathy and rejection" toward the Declarationof 
Independence and its guiding principles of natural rights, and the second 
characterized by an "indiscriminate admiration" for the actual forms of 
governance at work in the young United States.272 
Much of the difficulty of tracing the development of Bentham's political 
attitudes can be attributed to the presence of so many implicit democratic 
principles in his early work. As early as the 1776 Fragmenton Government, 
Bentham resolved "to call the cause of the people the cause of [v]irtue. '' 273 
During the early years of the French Revolution Bentham had already
"recommended first for France and then for Britain, . . a system of 
representative democracy with near universal suffrage." 274 Instead of 
finding a single definitive moment of democratic revelation, we see 
Bentham slowly losing reasons to support his monarchy, while gaining 
reasons to endorse democratic structures. When the scales of utility tipped 
against his previously held positions, around 1809, he then endorsed the 
superior model. 
269. See ELiE HALI VY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHIC RADICALISM 254-56 (Mary 
Morris trans., 1966) (1955). For a careful discussion of Bentham's attitude toward the denial 
of his Panopticon program, see JAMES STEINTRAGER, BENTHAM 78-82 (1977). 
270. Rosen, supra note 101, at xlvi; see also M.H. James, Bentham's Democratic 
Theory at the Time of the FrenchRevolution, 10 THE BENTHAM NEWSLETTER 5-16 (1986). 
271. See generally HART, supranote 101. 
272. Id. at 56. 
273. JEREMY BENTHAM, COLLECTED WORKS: A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND 
A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 440 (1977). 
274. Rosen, supranote 101, at xliv; see generallyROSEN, supranote 254. 
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Some have argued that, since Bentham's utilitarianism commits to 
nothing without an analysis of utility, there is nothing inherently democratic 
about the system. Such critics cite the example of Catherine the Great of 
Russia despotically applying similar principles,275  and add that 
utilitarianism could approve a totalitarian system that successfully 
conditioned its citizens into happy submission. 276 R.C. Pratt has even 
argued that Bentham's ultimate theory of democracy is "sharply inconsistent 
with the main body of Benthamite doctrine." 277 Such arguments live off of 
Bentham's refusal to proclaim inherent goods and truths before actually 
applying the utility calculus. 
Yet there is a content to Bentham's conception of utility that is hard to 
disentangle from democracy. Public utility, after all, means "that which 
gratifies popular preference." Frederick Rosen has argued that "what 
counted with a proposed reform was that the people for whom it was 
intended saw it as being in the public interest to adopt it."278 Moreover, to 
the extent that Bentham identified utility with security of expectation, public 
utility became closely identified with institutional conditions that could 
guarantee the gratification of popular preference. Finally, when one recalls 
that the utility principle presupposed the prevalence of egoistic motives, it 
would seem that no official could be counted on to serve popular preference 
unless checked and overseen by popular will. Only popular sovereignty 
could insure the subservience of government to popular preference. The 
association of utility with democracy therefore seems hard to escape. 
How, then, can one account for Bentham's long periods of ambivalence 
about democracy? These are largely explained by his spirit of positivism. 
This spirit not only inspired, but transcended the notion that law had no 
existence unless embodied in effective institutions. His writing is pervaded 
by a suspicion that normative ideals such as right, good, virtue and morality 
have no precise meaning unless embodied in effective institutions. So too, 
with democracy. Accordingly, when democracy was advocated as an 
abstract ideal of popular sovereignty founded on the chimera of natural 
liberty, Bentham was skeptical. And when such rhetoric was invoked to 
support a demagogic reign of terror that attacked the security of civil liberty, 
he was repelled. By contrast, governing institutions that secured civil liberty 
and thereby maintained the consent of a populace with the practical power to 
275. See STEINTRAGER, supra note 269, at 78. 
276. R.C. Pratt, The Benthamite Theory of Democracy, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 568 (Bhiku Parekh ed., 1993). 
277. Id. at 561. 
278. Rosen, supra note 101, at lviii. 
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remove them had greater claim to legitimacy. In Bentham's view the power 
even of a monarch was entirely constituted by the obedience of the 
governed, and hence by public opinion.279 
Whether particular institutions in fact responded to popular preference 
was therefore an empirical question. The important point to grasp is that 
Bentham's positivist spirit impelled him to reduce all abstract values to 
concrete institutions. This is no less true of "utility" than of "democracy." 
After all, he spent his entire professional career on the task of giving 
institutional definition to the utility principle, and devoted very little effort 
to giving it conceptual definition. Modern critics of utilitarianism ignore the 
details of Bentham's proposals which they regard as empirically contingent 
judgments about the means to achieving utility in one possible world. But 
Bentham's proposals about political process are not so much means to 
achieve utility as they are means to identify it and to insure its influence. 
Over a lifetime of experience in promoting reform, Bentham became 
convinced that democratic representation, like linguistic transparency, 
legislative supremacy, and administrative regularity, was a procedural 
precondition to the pursuit of utility. 280 
By his own admission, Bentham was initially blinded to the 
complementary relationship between utility and democracy by the 
references to natural rights in the founding documents of the United States. 
Bentham's initial polemics against natural rights appeared under the name of 
John Lind, a business acquaintance of Bentham's father who became 
Bentham's close friend and collaborator. In 1775, Bentham assisted Lind 
with his Remarks on the PrincipalActs of the Thirteenth Parliamentof 
GreatBritain, which argued that the British parliament was justified in its 
enactment of the "Intolerable Acts" of 1774.281 Bentham also worked with 
Lind on his 1776 Answer to the Declaration of the American Congress, 
which began, in Hart's words, a "long sceptical campaign against the 
doctrine of natural and unalienable rights of man." 282 Lind and the young 
279. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 51. 
280. See NANCY ROSENBLUM, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF THE MODERN STATE 85 (1978) 
(arguing that 'The Catechism" illustrates why it remains unclear whether and when Bentham 
became a committed democrat: his principal arguments for democratic institutions were either 
speculative deductions from utility or preferences based on the estimate that popular elections 
appeared to be the least objectionable method of choosing governors). See also id. at 83-86. 
281. But see Jeremy Bentham, Emancipate Your Colonies! Shewing the Uselessness 
and Mischievousness of DistantDependencies to an European State, in 4 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 408-18 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (urging emancipation of colonies based 
on strict principles of utility). 
282. HART, supranote 101, at 53. 
2000] FRAMED: UTILITARIANISM AND PUNISHMENT 
Bentham held that the "terms natural and inherent rights, when applied to 
men in such a state, are . . . perfectly unintelligible," and therefore he 
believed "the Citizen is to look for his rights in the laws of his country." 283 
Bentham and Lind coined the slogan that "liberty is the name of nothing 
positive" and rejected the notions of natural property and natural rights in 
favor of legally constructed versions of these goods.284 Thus the colonists' 
cry of no taxation without representation rested on a mistake: colonists 
mistakenly believed their property belonged to them independent of law, and 
therefore they understood taxation as a form of a payment for services that 
they could withdraw when dissatisfied. For Bentham and Lind, property is 
constituted by law and is inherently subject to legal burdens: "Take away the 
fence which the law has set around this thing . . . and where would your 
right or property be then?"'285 Taxation was such a legal burden that defined 
and conditioned entitlements to property. 286 The notion of a right antecedent 
to law was for Bentham an absurdity, famously "nonsense upon stilts." Such 
talk of natural rights sprung from the "imagination" 287 and signaled the 
"effusion of a hard heart operating upon a cloudy mind."'2 88 "[D]eaf, 
unyielding, and inflexible," principles of natural rights "will hear of no 
modification... [and] will look at no calculation."289 Thus when Bentham 
read the Declaration of Independence, with its preamble infused with 
references to unalienable rights, he saw merely "bawlingupon paper." 290 To 
Bentham's annoyance, the Englishman Richard Price sought to justify the 
American cause with the maxim "Every Man His Own Legislator." Once 
Bentham looked beyond the fallacies of the new nation's arguments and into 
283. JOHN LIND, REMARKS ON THE PRINCIPLE ACTS OF THE THIRTEENTH PARLIAMENT OF 
GREAT BRITAIN BY THE AUTHOR OF THE LETTERS CONCERNING THE PRESENT STATE OF POLAND 
191 (1775). 
284. See Jeremy Bentham, Principlesof the Civil Code, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 297, 308 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
285. LIND, supra note 283, at 54-56. 
286. See Jeremy Bentham, A Manual of Political Economy, in 3 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 75-80 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
287. See Jeremy Bentham, Plan of ParliamentaryReform in the Form ofa Catechism, 
in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 515 (John Bowring ed., 1962)("imagination, with its 
favorite instrument, the word right") (emphasis added) [hereinafter Plan of Parliamentary 
Reform]. 
288. Jeremy Bentham, Supply Without Burthen, in JEREMY BENTHAM'S ECONOMIC 
WRITINGS 283, 335 (W. Stark ed., 1952). 
289. Bentham, PlanofParliamentaryReform, supranote 287, at 467. 
290. Jeremy Bentham, AnarchicalFallacies,in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
494 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
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the merits of its practices, he admitted that irritation might have distorted: 
"Dr. Price with his self-government made me an anti-American." 29 1 
As late as 1782 Bentham could find little to reform in his home 
constitution: "The Constitutional branch of the law of England, taking in its 
leading principles, would probably be found the best beyond comparison 
that has hitherto made its appearance in the world; resting at no very great a 
distance, perhaps, from the summit of perfection." 292 By 1809, Bentham 
still believed England lived under a "Matchless Constitution," but now 
"matchless in rotten ' '293 boroughs and sinecures! Throughout his career 
Bentham struggled with the problem of fashioning a form of government 
that would genuinely serve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. If 
individuals are primarily motivated to serve their own interests, how can a 
community ensure that its governors will serve the interests of their 
constituents rather than their own? Maintaining the dominion of "majority 
interests" of the people over the "sinister interests" of the rulers remained a 
central concern throughout Bentham's work, and this difficulty ultimately 
led to his disillusionment with English institutions. Bentham became 
increasingly dismayed by the amount of patronage controlled by the King. 
This power rendered the King unduly persuasive withParliament, thereby 
compromising its ability to challenge the King's agenda. Once the party 
leader and members became indebted to the King for favors, the King could 
then quash or pass legislation, extending his power.294 The King's power of 
patronage also contaminated the press. Under the pretense of maintaining 
loyalty and military secrecy during the Napoleonic Wars, the press failed to 
remark the King's gradual rise to absolute rule, and when The Times refused 
to print Bentham's calls for reform in 1809,295 he concluded that they had 
been "bought or intimidated into a state of mendacious slavery." 296 Without 
an independent press, the King's march toward despotism could proceed 
unchecked, to the people's detriment.297 
291. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College,London, supra note 203, clxx (cited 
in HART, supra note 101, at 61). 
292. Jeremy Bentham, On the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, 
in 1THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171, 185 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
293. Bentham, PlanofParliamentaryReform, supranote 287, at 437. 
294. See STEInrRAGER, supranote 269, at 84-86. 
295. In fairness, the 10,000 word document may have been too long for The Times to 
accept. 
296. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College, London, supranote 203, clxx 126. 
297. STEINTRAGER, supranote 269, at 84-85. 
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With the aristocrats "powerful, opulent, and tired,"'298 and the King fully 
disassociated from the interests of the masses,299 political reform was 
imperative: "the country, if my eyes do not deceive me, is already at the 
very brink:-reform or convulsion, such is the altemative. ' '300 The prospect 
of reform, however, seemed unlikely, since it required the legislators to take 
a position contrary to their own interests. At the very least, reform required 
an extension of the franchise that would make the legislators subordinate to 
the will of the people, and it seemed improbable that the legislators would 
initiate such a sacrifice of their power. As Steintrager wrote such reforms 
would entail the "end to sinecures, and places for themselves and for their 
friends and relatives ... a loss of power to borough holders and opulent 
country gentlemen ... [and] the Members in general would actually have to 
attend the sessions of Parliament and to work at their legislative duties."'30 1 
Additionally, Napoleon's threat made calls for reform particularly untimely, 
and the increasing limitations on the press and fear of sanction caused 
Bentham to refrain from publishing on these matters from 1809 until 
1817.302 Considering these conflicts between the governors and press and 
the governed, Bentham's outlook was bleak: 
Gagging Bills-suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act-interdiction of all 
communication between man and man for any such purpose as that of 
complaint or remedy-all these have already become precedent-all these 
are in preparation-all these are regarded as things of course. 
The pit is already dug: one after another, or all together, the securities 
called English libertieswill be cast into it.30 3 
At this point, Bentham began thinking more seriously of the advantages 
of democracy and the apparent success of the United States. The United 
States represented the very obverse of English repression: it had "No 
dungeon acts, no gagging acts, no riot act," freedom of press and speech, 
public offices filled by skill rather than family name, no standing army, no 
established church, no hereditary honors, no sinecures, and a simple 
functionality that operated "without so much as a single useless place, 
. 298. See T.P. Peardon, Bentham's Ideal Republic, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL 
AssEssMENTs 624-25 (Bhiku Parekh ed., 1993). 
299. See id. 
300. Bentham, Planof ParliamentaryReform, supranote 287, at 435. 
301. STEINTRAGER, supranote 269, at 87. 
302. See id. at 83-85. 
303. BENTHAM, supra note 82, at 435. 
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needless place, overpaid place, unmerited pension-not to speak of 
sinecures-not so much as a peerage, to settle or a borough to buy off a 
country gentleman." 304 In contrast to the situation in France, Bentham heard 
of growing propriety and safety with the expansion of suffrage. It now 
seemed possible, in light of the American model, that the sinister interests of 
the governors could be successfully harmonized with and subordinated to 
the interests of the majority, and the fears he partially shared with the 
English aristocracy that majority rule would result in the dissolution or 
radical redistribution of private property were allayed. 305 
As evidence that a viable form of government could indeed promote the 
greatest good for the greatest number, the United States became Bentham's 
favorite topic, and "Look to America" his favorite slogan.30 6 The 
democratic themes in his theories now advanced to the fore, and he urged 
England and all nations to adopt universal suffrage, secret balloting, short 
parliaments, equal electoral districts, and a general system of representative 
democracy. He hailed the United States as "that newly created nation, one of 
the most enlightened, if not the most enlightened, at this day on the 
' '307 globe, "the best government that is or ever has been," 308 and a 
"matchlessly felicitous system." 309 Although Bentham retained his distaste 
for the natural rights doctrines Americans invoked, he was quick to 
dissociate bad philosophy from good government: 
Who can help lamenting, that so rational a cause should be rested upon 
reasons, so much fitter to beget objections, than to remove them? But with 
men who are unanimous and hearty about measures, nothing so weak may 
pass in the character of a reason: nor is this the first instance in the world, 
where the conclusion has supported the premises, instead of the premises the 
3 10
conclusion. 
Bentham confessed his own past misconceptions of democracy in order to 
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another," he wrote, and conflations of the two "are sent forth to strike terror 
into weak minds... to frighten men out of their wits and prevent them from 
forming any sound judgement. ' 311 
Bentham was now prepared to support a fully representative democracy. 
His overriding objective, to establish a government that would achieve the 
greatest good for the greatest number, required that the interests of the 
legislators be reconciled with the greatest good of the people. Bentham 
viewed constitutional law as he viewed criminal law: as a means to 
artificially reconcile the interests of a potential malefactor with the interests 
of the general public. The threat of punishment causes each individual to re-
evaluate the potential costs and benefits of criminal acts, and thereby steers 
the self-interest of the potential criminal back in line with the general 
interest of the public. Bentham viewed legislators with the same eyes: 
forever tempted to favor their own interests over the public's, they were 
potential criminals in need of legal deterrents. Bentham repeatedly warned 
the public to "Minimize Confidence" and "Maximize Control," and he 
concluded that the only way to control the legislators was to subject them to 
appointment and dismissal by the majority whose interest they were to 
serve. Constantly scrutinized by a public that could remove him from his 
post, the legislator, like the criminal, would be forced to find her own best 
interests in service to the majority interest. 
While originally Bentham believed that a mixed constitution with some 
elected elements would suffice to identify the governors with the governed, 
he later became convinced that only a full democracy would ensure this 
coincidence. 312 Although he would not publish such an argument until 
1817, 3 13 he formulated it in 1790, in his unpublished On the Efficient Cause 
and Measure of ConstitutionalLiberty: 
The propositions I lay down are these: (1) That the efficient cause of 
constitutional liberty or of good government which is another name for the 
same thing is not the division of power among the different classes of men 
entrusted with it but the dependence immediate or mediate of all of them on 
311. Jeremy Bentham, Jeremy Bentham to His Fellow Citizens, in 4 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 419, 448 (John Bowring, ed., 1962). 
312. See HART supra note 101, at 63. 
313. See Pratt, supranote 276, at 562. 
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the body of the people. (2) That the whole sovereign power ought to rest in 
the hands of persons placed and displaceable by the body of the people.
3 14 
Bentham reasoned that the people will choose representatives who will serve 
their interests, and those who seek to gain and hold an office therefore must 
attend to the popular will.3 15 In his Constitutional Code, Bentham argued 
that the desire of the legislator to become and remain a legislator will form a 
"junction of interest" with the interests of the people to elect and be served 
by someone advocating their desires.3 16 Thus, Bentham writes to the 
legislator 
Should it be asked, Why it is your desire that the greatest happiness of all... 
should be the end to which . . . [government] should be directed? [M]y 
answer is,-because on the occasion in question, such is the form, the 
establishment of which would in the highest degree contributory to my own 
greatest happiness. 3 17 
Once the interests of the governed and the governors have been 
harmonized, sinister interests must be continually guarded against. Since the 
legislators were the lynchpin in Bentham's representative democracy, he 
insisted on reforming the process of their election.3 18 Representation of the 
welfare of all required universal suffrage (including females and resident 
aliens) and any exceptions needed to be justified by a utility analysis. In 
addition to the extension of franchise, ballots were to be secret, elections 
annual, and electoral districts equal. 3 19 The function of the election process 
was to choose legislators competent to act in the interests of their 
constituents, not simply to translate their opinions into law. Bentham 
considered the layman "essentially unapt" to make law, but fully competent 
to select a good lawmaker. 320 An election, therefore, is not intended to 
314. Bentham, Manuscriptsat University College, London, supra note 203, cxxvii 5 
(citedin HART, supranote 101 at 61). 
315. See Peardon, supranote 298, at 625. 
316. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 6. 
317. Id. at 7. 
318. Bentham stressed the importance of elected representatives in his 1789 Essay on 
Representation intended for France. See Bentham, Manuscripts at University College, 
London, supra note 203, clxxx, 87-121. 
319. See Bentham, PlanforParliamentaryReform, supra note 287, at 435. 
320. Bentham did have opinions on the qualities of a good law maker, which he 
divided into three characteristics: appropriate probity, appropriate intellectual aptitude, and 
appropriate active talent. On appropriate probity he wrote: 
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collect the people's views on any particular substantive issue, but rather 
merely to appoint competent and conscientious officials. 32 1 Like a doctor, 
the legislator is judged by the success of her treatment, not her conformity to 
the patient's prescriptions. 
To ensure personal accountability for legislative action, Bentham 
strongly discouraged decisions by committee, devised clear parliamentary 
procedures, and demanded uninterrupted attendance of all sessions.322 
Publication of the legislatures' proceedings, determinations, and conflicts 
was essential to enable voters to assess each legislator's representation of 
their interests. In addition to outlining proper reporting and publication 
procedures for legislative action, Bentham devised a system of bookkeeping 
that would ensure transparent execution of legislatively mandated policy. 
Bentham demanded "clear, correct and comprehensive" records be kept, so 
that the public could assess the effects of policy and uncover corruption.32 3 
An unrestricted press would call attention to this information. 
Bentham believed that, when protected by these safeguards, the 
community could not be wrong about its own interests. Bentham thought a 
community's pursuit of its own desires, even if misguided, was always 
preferable to the sinister rule of oligarchs. Even if the public occasionally 
judges its interests poorly, or ineffectively pursues those interests by 
electing the wrong legislator, its judgment would improve with 
experience-provided that publicity, and a transparent language of 
governance enabled the public to understand its own experience. Bentham 
On each occasion, whether in speaking or delivering his vote,--on the part of a 
representative of the people, appropriate probity consists in pursuing that line of 
conduct, which, in his own sincere opinion, being not inconsistent with the rules or 
morality or the law of the land, is most conducive to the general good of the whole 
community for which he serves; that is to say, of the whole of the British empire:-
forbearing, on each occasion, at the expense either of the general good, or of his duty 
in any shape, either to accept, or to seek to obtain, or preserve, in any shape 
whatsoever, for himself, or for any person or persons particularly connected with 
him, any advantage whatsoever, from whatsoever hands obtainable; and in particular 
for those hands in which, by the very frame of the constitution, the greatest mass of 
matter of temptation is necessarily and unavoidably lodged, viz. Those of the King, 
and other members of the executive branch of the govemment,-the King's 
Ministers. 
Id.at 539. 
321. See Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supranote 202, at 98-99. 
322. Jeremy Bentham, Catechism of ParliamentaryReform, in 3 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM, 540 (John Bowring ed., 1962). 
323. Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supranote 202, at 23. See generallysupraat 232-
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envisioned a time when the desires of the public would be synonymous with 
their true best interests: 
Even at the present stage in the career of civilization, its dictates coincide, on 
most points, with those of the greatest happiness principle; on some, 
however, it still deviates from them: but as its deviations have all along been 
less and less numerous, and less wide. Sooner or later they will cease to be 
discernable. 324 
The public comes to best comprehend its own interests through experience, 
examination, explanation, and argumentation, and therefore education and 
the free exchange of information became imperative. Thus John Stuart Mill 
spoke of the emphasis on education in the thought of James Mill, Bentham's 
partner in electoral reform: 
So complete was my father's reliance on the influence of reason over the 
minds of mankind, whenever it is allowed to reach them, that he felt as if all 
would be gained if the whole population were taught to read, if all sorts of 
opinions were allowed to be addressed to them by word and in writing, and 
if by means of the suffrage they could nominate a legislature to give effect to 
the opinions they adopted. 325 
Bentham and the elder Mill believed the strength of the best arguments and 
legislation would win over all citizens who were allowed to freely examine 
their desires and the objectives of their community. Government was not a 
forum for the struggle of interest groups, but for the discovery and rational 
justification of policies that could generate a consensus among 
participants. 326 
C. Publicity 
To ensure that self-interested officials would properly perform the utility 
calculus, Bentham proposed a public process of governance. Bentham had 
324. JEREMY BENTHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL CODE VOL. 1 36 (F. Rosen & J.H. Bums 
eds., 1983). 
325. JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 106 (1873). 
326. According to R.C. Pratt, this explains why "Bentham and Mill came to make 
such simple assumptions about a democratic society. They did not turn to the political realm 
to discover a process that would resolve conflicts, conciliate interests .... They wished only 
for an assembly with the proper interest orientation which once properly understood, would 
introduce Utilitarian-inspired legislation." Pratt, supranote 276, at 565. 
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little confidence in his legislators, and he took every precaution to ensure 
that the public could monitor their every move. 327 Publicity of political 
process, according to Bentham, was a necessary safeguard against misrule, 
and he barred any suspension of this security. Bentham's constitutional 
scheme guaranteed that his public would know, or at least could know upon 
inspection, all of the information available to the legislature, the decision 
made by the legislature, and its stated rationale. In order to assure that each 
decision would be made by the appropriate legislator and that no 
administrator could overstep her authority, Bentham erected a hierarchy of 
decision-making responsibility. He sought to ensure that the decision-maker 
would always be the person most knowledgeable about the issue, and would 
be held accountable for her decision. The "public must keep a careful eye on 
legislators and administrators alike," he believed, "lest they corrupt one 
another to the detriment of the greatest happiness of the greatest number," 
and thus only "when such suspicion exists will the services that can be 
rendered to the public actually be given." 328 Bentham saw public inspection 
of governmental decisions as the only sure safeguard against corruption and 
misrule, and he therefore constructed a transparent deliberative structure 
which would allow the public full access to all of the state's proceedings. 
This public review of governmental functions was a sine qua non of 
security.329 
To watch over the judges and lawyers Bentham proposed: 
[a] constantly existing body of assessors to the Judge... under the name 
of a Jury. . . .Of this Jury the decision might either be obligatory, as 
according to the present practice, on the Judge, or not. One great service will 
be rendered by it in either case: namely the imposing on the Judge a sort of 
moral necessity to lay open to the public ear the grounds of every thing that 
he does. For this reason the Jury should be in attendance whensoever the 
judge himself is in attendance, for if the intentions of the Judge are evil, a 
single moment in which he acts by his own uncontrol[l]ed authority may 
suffice to deprive the party who is in the right of the benefit looked for at the 
hands of a Jury. 
In Judicature, where there is no publicity, there is no justice: no tolerably 
adequate security for the giving due execution and effect to the laws, 
327. See STEINTRAGER, supra note 269, at 99. 
328. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 351; see also 
STEINTRAGER, supra note 269, at 111. 
329. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 252. 
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whatsoever they may be. That justice should have been the object where the 
doors of the Judicatory have been kept regularly closed is not possible.330 
The primary function of this jury is not to render verdicts, but to witness the 
judge's work. When drafting a plan to reorganize the French judiciary, 
Bentham stated that "[plublicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest 
spur to exertion, and the surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the 
judge himself, while trying, under trial. ' 33 1 The jury would hear evidence, 
ask any relevant question, inspect documents and exhibits, render opinions, 
and while the judge was not obligated to follow the jurors' decisions, their 
statements would be recorded in the official record.332 In addition, Bentham 
would have filled the court with spectators, representing public opinion. He 
named the members of this audience "Judicial Inspectors," and suggested 
legislation to ensure their presence at every trial.333 "Their mere presence," 
he believed, "would guarantee publicity and assure that some attention 
would be paid to the Greatest Happiness Principle." 334 Bentham's similar 
use of surveillance as a disciplinary technique in his model prison fascinated 
Foucault. In this "Panopticon" the behavior of all prisoners and the 
performance of all employees are transparent to the director; yet any 
member of the public can similarly survey and assess the director's 
management of the facility. 335 Bentham's courtroom was a similar 
Panopticon, putting both the defendant and the law on public display. 
In order that both the judge and jury hear any and all information that 
might be relevant to a decision, Bentham endorsed exceedingly liberal rules 
of evidence. 336 In his study of Bentham's theory of evidence, William 
Twining nicely captures Bentham's position when he explains that the 
330. Id. 
331. Jeremy Bentham, Draught of a Code for the Organization of the Judicial 
Establishment in France: With Critical Observations on the Draught Proposed by the 
National Assembly Committee, in the From ofa Perpetual Commentary, in 4 THE WORKS OF 
JEREMY BENTHAM 285, 316 (John Bowring ed., 1962); see also BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF 
PENAL LAW, supra note 29, at 1, 145; Ross HARRISON, BENTHAM 131 (1983). 
332. See Peardon, supra note 298, at 621, 634. 
333. See id. 
334. Id. 
335. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLNE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF A PRISON 204 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., 1977). 
336. See generally Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence vol. 7, supra note 248; 
see also TWINING, supra note 73, at 27-28 (summarizing Bentham's theory of evidence); Dale 
Nance, Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227, 292 (1988) (Bentham saw no reason to 
distinguish between judge and jury regarding the appropriateness of the rules of evidence). 
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"direct end of evidence and procedure is to implement substantive laws 
deemed to be consonant with utility ...[and t]he means of achieving this 
end is by establishing the truth through the rational and efficient collection, 
presentation and weighing of evidence. ' 337 With this end in mind, Bentham 
stated that the court should "hear everybody who is likely to know anything 
about the matter: hear everybody, but most attentively of all, and first of all, 
those who are likely to know most about it-the parties."'338 Bentham 
opposed evidentiary constraints based on the protection of confidential 
relations, 339 attorney-client privilege, 340 the right against self-incrimination, 
and the right to silence. 34 1 These same evidentiary rules would apply, when 
relevant, to the legislator investigating questions of policy. 
Bentham also insisted that all proceedings of the state should be printed 
in the newspapers, 342 including the issues under review, the evidence 
offered, and the conclusion reached. 343 This, in Bentham's opinion, allowed 
the community to monitor and assess governmental decisions, and enabled 
the citizenry to report abuses of executive authority to the violator's 
superior. Bentham believed such critical exchanges between the rulers and 
the ruled should be encouraged, and that these lines of communication 
should be "as free and unclogged as possible." 344 
337. TwiNING, supra note 73, at 89; see also M.A. Menlowe, Bentham, Self-
Incrimination,and the Law of Evidence, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 252, 
268 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993) (explaining that for "utilitarians, the law of evidence is a 
judicial tool for maximizing utility. He thinks that the function of the law of evidence is to get 
at the truth because he believes that serves the fundamental utilitarian goal. Truth is most 
likely to be obtained when all evidence is prima facie admissible."). 
338. Bentham, Rationale ofJudicialEvidence vol. 7, supra note 248, at 599. See also 
DINWIDDY, supranote 93, at 64. 
339. See BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EvIDENCE 327-49 (1827); see also 
TWINING, supra note 73, at 99. 
340. See BENTHAM, supranote 339, at 302-25; see also TWINING, supranote 71, at 99. 
341. See TwINING, supra note 73, at 99; see also L.J. HUME, BENTHAM AND 
BUREAUCRACY 172-73 (1981). 
342. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 11, 50. 
343. See HUME, supranote 341, at 99. 
344. HUME, supra note 341, at 100 (citing Bentham, Manuscripts at University 
College, London, supra note 203, lxxxvii). We could discuss at length Bentham's 
commitment to open communication as a corollary to his principles of evidence, and we refer 
the reader to Mack's discussion, where he states: "There is, finally, the principle of free 
communication. It would be nearly impossible to exaggerate its importance in the Utilitarian 
canon. From first to last Bentham demanded total freedom to assemble, speak, write, and 
publish; in open-air meetings, Parliament, the courts; in books, magazines, and newspapers. 
'Let all things be known' was a vital commandment of the Utilitarian gospel. Unless 
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As an additional benefit of such publicity, citizens would become aware 
of the decisions made and reasons cited by their appointees, and voters could 
hold officials politically accountable at the next election. 34 5 For the 
populace to cast their vote for the candidate who best deserved their 
confidence, they had to know the legislator's opinions. Bentham wondered 
"[h]ow are they to know this but by knowing... how he has given his vote 
and what reasons if any he has assigned for giving it? And in nine cases out 
of ten how can they judge ... without learning any thing of the reasons? '346 
Debates, hearings, and legislative sessions would be transcribed, relayed by 
the press, and reviewed by the public, and the electorate would choose their 
leaders based on this information. 347 Because transgressions would be 
punished by a loss of popularity, Bentham thought publicity would 
discipline politicians: "the eye of the public makes statesmen virtuous." 348 
Bentham realized that a "law conformable to utility may happen to be 
contrary to public opinion," but he believed this to be "only an accidental 
and transitory circumstance" since "[a]ll minds will be reconciled to the law 
as soon as its utility is made obvious. As soon as the veil which conceals it 
has been raised, expectation will be satisfied, and the public opinion will be 
gained over."349 Bentham believed it was the legislator's duty to convince 
the community of the merit of the laws it endorsed, and if it failed to do so it 
would suffer at the next election. 350 
Bentham saw publicity as the dominant protection against misrule. He 
saw no need for a system of checks and balances, distributing power through 
separate branches of government. 35 1 "Without publicity," he writes, "all 
other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are 
of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other institutions might 
present themselves in character of checks, would be found to operate as 
communication is free there can be neither good government nor indirect legislation." M.P. 
MACK, JEREMY BENTHAM: AN ODYSSEY OF IDEAS 315 (1963). 
345. HUME, supranote 341, at 99-100. 
346. MACK, supra note 344, at 320 (citing Bentham, Manuscripts at University 
College, London, supra note 203, lxxxvii, 114). 
347. See STEINTRAGER, supranote 269, at 106. 
348. Jeremy Bentham, Extracts from Bentham's Commonplace Book, in 10 THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 145 (John Bowring ed., 1962); see also DINWIDDY, supra note 
93, at 83. 
349. Jeremy Bentham, Civil Code, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 324 (John 
Bowring ed., 1962); see also Ross Harrison, The People is my Caesar,in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 900, 915 (Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993). 
350. See STEINTRAGER, supra note 269, at 107. 
351. See DINWIDDY, supra note 93, at 89. 
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cloaks rather than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks only in 
appearance." 352 He proclaimed the most insidious political disease to be 
"[p]olitical gagging: i.e. obstruction in any way of the communication 
between mind and mind for the melioration of the common lot on any 
subject of discourse: more especially on a political subject."'353 Bentham 
prescribed one "word-publicity, for conveying the like conception of the 
remedy:-the only remedy (it will be seen) which, without a change in the 
'354 form of the government, the nature of the disease admits of." 
Bentham regarded the public monitoring function as a constitutional 
structure, an organ of government that he referred to as the "Public Opinion 
Tribunal. '355 Membership in the Public Opinion Tribunal consisted of the 
"whole number of the members of the political community in question as 
constituting the entire body, the functionaries of government, all ranks 
together . . .[and] all those by whom any cognizance is taken of public 
affairs may be considered as constituting the Tribunal of Public 
Opinion," 356 Bentham viewed newspaper editors as leaders of this body.357 
Just as membership was afforded to all citizens, the Tribunal's authority 
ranged over the entirety of political life, and it "may be conceived as 
constituted by so many Sub-Committees as there are aggregates of 
individuals who on any occasion in any place take actual cognizance of this 
or that operation of a political nature, to whatsoever part of the field of 
government it appertains. '358 The Tribunal's physical presence would be 
felt through audiences at legislative and judicial sittings, public meetings, 
and also via those who explicitly took up political issues in speeches and 
writings. 359 
Bentham imagined the Public Opinion Tribunal performing the 
following functions: 
1. Receiving claims and accusations. 2. Receiving oppositions and defense. 
3. Receiving, compelling, collecting and storing evidence. 4. Receiving and 
hearing or reading arguments of parties litigant or advocates. 5. Forming 
opinions or judgment on ditto: with correspondent will. 6. Giving expression 
352. BENTHAM, supranote 339, at 524. 
353. BENTHAM, SEcuRITIEs AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 26. 
354. Id. at 25. 
355. id. at 28. 
356. Id. 
357. Id. at 57. 
358. Id. at 59. 
359. See ROSEN, supra note 208, at 27. 
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to such judgment at will. 7. Giving impression to such expression. 8. Giving 
diffusion to such impression. 9. Giving execution and effect to such 
judgments[s] and will. 360 
In his ConstitutionalCode, Bentham also required the Tribunal to perform a 
"statistic or say evidence furnishing function." In this capacity, the Tribunal 
was to provide information that might serve as "grounds for judgment.., in 
relation to any public institution, ordinance, arrangement, proceeding 
measure, past, present or supposed future contingent, or to any mode of 
conduct, on the part of any person, functionary or non-functionary, by which 
the interests of the public at large may be affected ... .- 361 The Public 
Opinion Tribunal, thus, would gather all the information relevant to 
governmental activities (the statistical function), review it, identify 
indiscretions (the censorial function), suggests changes (the meliorative-
suggestive function), and publicly voice its opinions. 362 The Tribunal was 
free to level any attack against governmental impropriety, and Bentham 
placed no restrictions on the intensity of its criticisms, for in his opinion the 
"military function gets paid for being shot at. The civil functionary is paid 
for being spoken and written at."'363 
The Tribunal was indispensable to the operation of a utilitarian policy 
process: 
Regarding then this [political] body in the character of a workman, operating 
on the minds of public functionaries, publicity may be stated as the 
characteristic and indispensable instrument of this workman: an instrument 
no less indispensable and characteristic than the turning-latheis of the sort 
of workmen called a turner. It is by publicity that the Public Opinion 
Tribunal does whatsoever it does: any further than employment is given to 
his instrument, the workman can not do any thing.364 
Because of its centrality to utilitarianism, Bentham took every measure to 
facilitate the Public Opinion Tribunal's performance of its 
responsibilities. 365 Bentham demanded that governmental departments keep 
360. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 60-61. 
361. Bentham, Constitutional Code, supra note 202, at 41-46; see also BENTHAM, 
supra note 264, at 213. 
362. Peardon, supranote 298, at 621, 641; see alsoROsEN, supra note 208, at 27. 
363. Peardon, supra note 298, at 621, 641. 
364. BENTHAM, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 28. 
365. DINWDDY, supra note 93, at 83. 
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their books and records accurate, logically organized, and easily accessible 
to the public. 366 Bentham believed any person obstructing the operations of 
the Public Opinion Tribunal should be "numbered among the enemies of the 
human species," and he stated: 
Every act, whereby ... a man seeks to weaken the effective power of the 
Public Opinion Tribunal, or by falsehood, or.. . by suppression of truth, to 
misdirect it, is evidence of hostility on his part to the greatest happiness of 
the greatest number: evidence of the worst intentions, generated by the worst 
motives.... Every act, whereby a man seeks to diminish the circulation of 
opinions opposite to those which he professes, is evidence of his 
consciousness of the rectitude of those which he is combating, and thereby 
of the insincerity, hypocrisy, tyrannicalness, and selfishness which have 
taken possession of his mind. 367 
Bentham would not tolerate any interference with the Public Opinion 
Tribunal, nor could he imagine any reason to suspend publicity. 
Along with democracy, legality, and discursive transparency, publicity 
is a fundamental feature of a utilitarian constitution. Together, these four 
"securities against misrule" fulfill the dual function of disciplining officials 
to gratify the public and reassuring the public that their servants are thus 
disciplined. Because they are procedural conditions for collective rationality, 
they are not just contingently useful instruments. They are constitutive of the 
public interest or the utility that utilitarianism promotes. By designing 
publicity into the structure of governing institutions and supporting it with 
additional institutional structures like a free press, Bentham's Constitutional 
Code would bring into being the constitutional organ of an informed and 
mobilized public: the Public Opinion Tribunal, which oversees all 
government activity and holds administrators accountable for betrayal of the 
public interest. Citizens ultimately "direct their rulers, through public 
opinion and the vote, to accept reforms and advance policies that can be 
justified in terms of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.' '368 
Publicity is the indispensable condition for the emergence of a genuine 
popular sovereign. This popular sovereign is the ultimate audience for 
366. Peardon, supra note 298, at 621, 636, 642; see also RosEN, supra note 208, at 
112. 
367. BENTHAM, supranote 264; see also ConstitutionalCode, supra note 202, at 41-
46. 
368. See RosEm, supranote 208, at 40. 
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utilitarian discourse, and the existence of that audience is the condition for 
the meaningfulness of that discourse. 
How would Bentham's commitment to publicity of government action 
apply to the case of an official like McCloskey's sheriff bent on framing an 
innocent person to pacify a bloodthirsty mob? 
First, when we consider Bentham's insistence on strict adherence to 
formally promulgated laws and his antipathy toward judicial and 
administrative discretion, it seems unlikely that he would permit a petty 
police official to take matters into his own hands and disregard all of the 
procedural safeguards against misrule. Bentham constructed this entire 
procedural apparatus with the aim of checking legislators, administrators 
and judges, and he structured the making and implementation of law so as to 
allow these high-ranking officials no unscrutinized discretion whatsoever. 
Bentham believed no one should be allowed to act on behalf of the 
community without a full review of their actions by the Public Opinion 
Tribunal, and a sheriff would not be exempt from this safeguard. If Bentham 
could not trust an elected legislator to perform the utility calculus without 
publishing in the newspaper all of the evidence before her, her decision, and 
the reasons given for her choice, then surely a lone sheriff would not be 
afforded the opportunity to secretly decide the fate of her community. 
Similarly, if a judge was not even allowed to interpret a law without a jury 
present because, in Bentham's words, justice is not possible "where the 
doors of the judicatory have been kept regularly closed," how could a sheriff 
secretly appropriate the functions of judge, jury, and executioner? 
Second, Bentham's emphasis on transparent government and public 
evidence similarly deflates the claim that a sheriff could frame an innocent 
person. If we consider the actions that a sheriff would actually need to take 
to accomplish such a scheme, she would quite clearly need to violate several 
of her nation's procedural laws. In mounting the case to frame the innocent 
person, she would need to hide or destroy exculpatory evidence and 
fabricate inculpatory evidence, and Bentham clearly forbade such 
deception. 369 Her official records would subsequently contain falsified and 
369. See SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supra note 250, at 85-86, where Bentham 
enumerates the offenses: 
Liberty of communication by word of mouth, to as many as chosen, information 
in any shape in which it is regarded by the individual in question as contributory to 
greatest happiness. 
Right recognized. Giving expression andpublicity to all facts and observations of 
which, in the judgment of the individual in question, the conception promises to be 
contributory to the greatest happiness of the greatest number: whether the tendency 
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incomplete information. These transgressions would obstruct the proper 
review of her decision by the public, and she would thus be "numbered 
among the enemy of the species."' 370 In the end, it would be the sheriff who 
was punished both for disregarding the rule of law37 1 and for improperly 
punishing an innocent party. 372 
of the correspondent information be to raise or lower this or that person in the scale 
of public opinion. 
Correspondents acts of power prohibited as being violations of these rights 
[include] ...4. Seizing, detaining, destroying or deteriorating any paper or other 
substratum on which signs expressive of a discourse in question are marked. Issuing 
or contributing to the issuing of any order for such seizure, detention, destruction or 
deterioration. Giving or contributing to give execution to any such order. 5. 
Obstruction by force, intimidation or deceit the approach, entrance or continuation of 
persons in any number to, into or in any place in which they have separately any 
right to station themselves. Obstructing them while in the act of making reciprocal 
communication of such their information and the opinions and wishes suggested by 
it. 
370. BENTHAM, supra note 264, at 216; see Bentham, ConstitutionalCode, supra note 
202, at 41-46. 
371. T.P. Schofield, 'Economy as Applied to Office' and the Development of 
Bentham's Democratic Thought, in 3 JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 868, 875 
(Bhikhu Parekh ed., 1993) (citing Bentham, Manuscripts at University College, London, 
supranote 203, cxiii, 30-33). 
372. See BENTHAM,SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE, supranote 250, at 88-89. 
Whensoever, on the alleged ground of justice, the person of any man is put under 
confinement, information thereof shall be given in the most public manner to the 
end that all persons taking an interest in his welfare may have it in their power to 
take lawful measures for securing him against injustice. 2. To this end, the name 
and situation of every habitation designed by authority to be used as (a place] of 
confinement, whether on the score of delinquency or insanity, shall be entered in an 
appropriate register, one exemplar whereof shall be kept in the metropolis in the 
Office of the Chief Judicatory; and of this exemplar a copy shall be kept at the 
Office of every other Judicatory.... 10. Every person who knowingly and willfully 
has been contributory to the injurious imprisonment of any person shall himself 
suffer imprisonment for a length of time equal to that during which the 
imprisonment had place: and shall moreover, to the extent of his means, be 
compelled to furnish, or contribute to the furnishing, compensation in a pecuniary 
shape for the injury. 
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VII. INSTITUTIONAL UTILITARIANISM AND ETHIcAL UTILITARIANISM 
A. UtilitarianPenologyas an Application of InstitutionalUtilitarianism 
Utilitarian penology was not an outgrowth or application of utilitarian 
ethics. Utilitarians like Beccaria and Bentham were interested in reforming 
public institutions to beiter serve the public welfare. Since they thought that 
individuals were destined to pursue their own welfare they did not see 
ethical preachments as a particularly useful enterprise. They thought of 
public utility as a public criterion of judgment for settling political 
arguments, rather than as a motive for individual action. It was primarily a 
criterion for use in legislation. 
For someone of a skeptical, positivist turn of mind like Bentham, a 
standard of judgment like utility had no meaning apart from some concrete 
institutional process of decisionmaking. Bentham endeavored to design 
institutions that would not so much maximize utility as they would realize 
utility by providing a process for identifying it that could be publicly 
accepted as legitimate. Bentham thought of public confidence that 
government was guided by the public welfare as the major portion of the 
public happiness sought. 
This larger aim of public confidence or "security" in the utilitarian aims 
of government necessitated a number of procedural constraints on 
government action. Thus, all government action should be pursuant to 
legislation promulgated by democratically elected representatives. 
Legislation should take the form of clear formal rules, couched in language 
intelligible to the public, and justified by reasons of public welfare clearly 
intelligible to the public. It should be faithfully implemented and enforced 
by executive and judicial officials with little discretion, subject to public 
monitoring and sanctions for misbehavior. Governmental publicity, 
education, a free press, and a lucid language of policy analysis and critique 
were all necessary to enable the public to assess the performance of 
government. The entire utilitarian policy process depended upon the 
circulation of information: the ingathering by government of information 
about individual interests and social conditions; the outflow of information 
to the public about the nature, grounds and effects of government decisions; 
the exchange of information and opinions among members of the public 
about public needs and the performance of government. This circulation of 
information was crucial not only to enable government to serve the public 
interest, but to compel it to do so, and to reassure the public that government 
was so compelled. 
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These procedural requisites of utilitarian government combine with 
other utilitarian constraints to keep utilitarian punishment within narrow 
channels. Utilitarian penology begins with the idea that punishment is an 
evil that purposefully destroys welfare. It adds the observation that 
punishment is nevertheless useful in enforcing public will and deterring 
malevolence in so far as it can be seen to be precisely directed at 
wrongdoers. Yet, the weapon of punishment often cannot be aimed with 
great precision. Errors will be made, and in an interdependent society, the 
harmful effects of deserved punishment cannot be confined to the guilty. 
Utilitarian penology acknowledges that dutiful, law-abiding citizens cannot 
assure themselves they will not be punished undeservedly. The result is that 
the use of punishment not only inflicts costly suffering but inevitably 
threatens the very public security it is designed to serve. 
The utilitarian responds in two ways. First, the utilitarian strives to use 
less destructive methods of social control whenever possible: positive 
incentives, education, therapeutic treatment, moral persuasion, architecture, 
surveillance, publicity, and so on. The utilitarian would rely on legislative 
decriminalization rather than judicial, prosecutorial or police discretion to 
avoid unnecessary punishment. Second, the utilitarian hedges the imposition 
of punishment with procedural rules designed to assure the public it is as 
regular and accurate as possible. When conceived as public security, utility 
turns out to demand much of the familiar civil libertarian agenda in criminal 
justice. Punishment should be conditioned on offenses that are defined 
legislatively, prospectively, specifically and publicly. Offenses should be 
conditioned on voluntariness and culpability so that only deterrable 
wrongdoing is punished and citizens can be confident they have some 
control over whether they subject themselves to punishment. Prosecutions 
should meet exacting standards of proof, and evidentiary reliability. 
Punishments should be reversible and convictions subject to exhaustive 
review and appeal. Criminal justice decisionmaking at all levels should be 
publicly monitored and reviewed. 
Utilitarian penology is not organized around the goal of maximizing 
deterrence or minimizing crime. It is organized around the goal of 
maximizing utility, which chiefly depends on creating a democratically 
controlled, procedurally regular, transparent, formalistic, bureaucratically 
rational process of governance. Public confidence that government can be 
publicly compelled to serve the public welfare is more important to utility 
than the particular consequences for the public welfare of any policy 
decision. 
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On this interpretation, utilitarian penology cannot be charged with 
condoning or demanding punishment of the innocent (except in the limited 
sense that all efforts to punish the guilty entail risks of inadvertently 
punishing the innocent and unfairly harming innocent associates of the 
guilty). Since utilitarian penology does not rest on any ethical theory, it does 
not entail an ethical obligation on the part of individuals to act so as to 
maximize utility. Hence, it entails no ethical obligation to bear false witness 
or frame the innocent or otherwise subvert legal process, even if an 
individual could know that such an act would maximize utility on a 
particular occasion. Utilitarian penology could not recommend a 
government policy of publicly and deliberately punishing innocent people 
because this would impose needless suffering, create perverse incentives, 
and destroy public security. Utilitarian penology could not recommend a 
government policy of secretly framing the innocent, because a system of 
criminal justice could only advance its primary aim of public security if it 
was sufficiently transparent in design to guarantee the public that such acts 
would be discovered and punished. 
An illuminating modem example of this kind of utilitarian penology is 
Henry M. Hart's famous essay The Aims of the Criminal Law,373 which 
offers a consequentialist argument for restricting punishment to 
blameworthy conduct. Hart poses the question of the justifying purposes of 
punishment by imagining a concrete decisionmaker-a constitutional 
commission-charged with deciding whether to include punishment among 
the powers of government. 374 He reasons that while deterrence is an 
important purpose of criminal law, 375 it cannot suffice as a justification for 
punishment because onerous civil sanctions also deter.376 Hart argues that 
the feature distinguishing punishment from other onerous sanctions is that it 
also expresses blame and thereby inflicts humiliation.377 Yet Hart does not 
then proceed to argue, as might a retributivist, that officials are ethically 
obliged to blame only the blameworthy. Instead, he argues that the 
"utility" 378 of official blaming lies in inculcating a sense of moral and social 
responsibility among citizens, and investing their social and self-esteem in 
373. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the CriminalLaw, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 
401 (1958). 
374. See id. at 402. 
375. See id. at 406-08. 
376. See id. at 403-04. 
377. See id. at 404-06. 
378. See id. at 406. 
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obedience to law.379 Hart concludes that punishment should be 
constitutionally restricted by this educative function. 380 Accordingly, 
legislatures should only be permitted to criminalize, and courts to punish, 
blameworthy conduct.38 1 Prosecutorial and police discretion should be 
curbed to the same end. 382 These restrictions, Hart reasons, will conserve 
the moral authority, and hence the educational efficacy, of the criminal law. 
Note that while Hart's overall question is how punishment can best 
serve the public welfare, he divides it into a series of questions about how 
particular institutional mechanisms should be used in a structured process of 
making and applying criminal law: 
In the criminal law, as in all law, questions about the action to be taken do 
not present themselves for decision in an institutional vacuum. They arise 
rather in the context of some established and specific procedure of 
decision.... This means that each agency of decision must take account 
always of its own place in the institutional system and of what is necessary to 
maintain the integrity and workability of the system as a whole. 38 3 
Hart's conclusion that public welfare requires restricting punishment to the 
blameworthy depends heavily on his starting the analysis at the level of 
constitutional design, like Rawls and Bentham, rather than at the level of 
police discretion, like McCloskey. Once Hart's constitutional commission 
has exercised its discretion to define the public welfare, McCloskey's sheriff 
has little discretion to do the same. 
Hart, of course, is not commonly described as a utilitarian: he is known 
as a major exponent of the postwar "Legal Process" school which 
emphasized the proper allocation of policy decisions to competent 
institutions.384 Yet, if we are right in characterizing utilitarianism as a 
design for a rational policy process, Hart's legal process analysis of 
punishment is a legitimate heir to Bentham's utilitarian penology. Indeed, 
we think much contemporary legal policy analysis is more closely related to 
Bentham's original project of legal reform than the "utilitarian" ethics 
debated by contemporary academic philosophers. 
379. See id. at409-11,413. 
380. See id. at412. 
381. See id. at 431-35. 
382. See id. at 428-29. 
383. Id. at 402. 
384. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (mir. ed. 1957). 
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B. The Invention ofEthical Utilitarianism 
Utilitarian ethics is a simple and elegant theory, and as such very useful 
to philosophers who must teach undergraduate courses in ethics and advance 
the discipline in fifteen page increments in the pages of philosophy journals; 
if it did not exist it would have to be invented. Yet it is entirely unnecessary 
to the Benthamite project of designing a welfare maximizing policy process. 
The discontinuities between Bentham's concerns on the one hand, and those 
of, say, J.J.C. Smart on the other have, sometimes been noticed upon but, we 
think, usually mischaracterized. According to Alan Donagan, for example, 
the difference is that the original utilitarians were "rule utilitarians:" 
The early utilitarians, Bentham and the Mills, did not treat it as the office of 
a moralist to calculate the consequences of individual acts, this murder or 
that lie, but only whether the consequences of classes of acts like murders or 
lies are better or worse than the consequences of the classes of alternative 
acts in which the agents refrain from murdering or lying. Not all utilitarians 
have followed Bentham and the Mills in this. Professor J.J.C. Smart, for 
example, has argued that to "restrict" utilitarianism as in practice Bentham 
and the Mills did leads to absurdities .... 385 
According to this formulation, the chief difference between the original 
utilitarian reformers and their modem academic epigones is a disagreement 
about ethics. Whereas "act-utilitarians" like Smart believe we should each 
act so as to enhance utility, rule utilitarians believe we should act in 
conformity to rules that would enhance utility if followed universally. But to 
call Bentham and the Mills rule-utilitarians is to suggest that they were 
interested in identifying utility-maximizing policies to preach them as moral 
duties rather than to enact and enforce them as legislation. 
Of course, on utilitarian premises, rule-utilitarian moralizing would not 
be very effectual in advancing the public welfare. Utilitarian psychology 
predicts that moral preaching will seldom motivate action, and rule-
utilitarian norms only advance the public welfare if they are followed 
systematically (otherwise they are act-utilitarian norms). Those early 
utilitarians who did write about moral duties, like Hume and Paley, argued 
that they had to take the form of rules in order to be potentially enforceable 
by sanctions. In other words, even those early utilitarians who wrote about 
morality treated it as an institution, not just a set of ethical duties. But for the 
most part, the early utilitarians were practical reformers, not speculative 
385. See Donagan, supra note 13, at 187-88. 
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philosophers. They were interested in rules primarily because they were 
trying to improve law. 
Certainly Bentham, and his most immediate forebears Helvetius and 
Beccaria, had virtually no interest in ethics. Their views on law were not 
"restrictions" of any views about ethical duties. John Stuart Mill, like Hume, 
is a more complicated case. Mill was primarily a political theorist and 
reformer, famed for his advocacy of democracy 386 and civil liberties. 387 Yet 
his pamphlet Utilitarianismseems to set forth a conception of utilitarianism 
as an ethical standard for judging all acts: "The creed which accepts as the 
foundation of morals 'utility'. . . holds that actions are right in proportion as 
they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness. ' 388 Nevertheless, J.O. Urmson has made a convincing case that 
for Mill, utilitarianism has a far more restricted scope as an ethical 
standard.According to Urmson, Mill places us under no ethical obligation 
to maximize. Mill judges actions as morally wrong only if they violate a rule 
of conduct, the violation of which usually substantially harms the public 
welfare.389 These moral wrongs are of two types: violations of legal rules, 
which merit punishment, and violations of ethical rules, which merit the 
"moral sanction" of public disapproval. For Mill, it is not utilitarianism that 
is restricted, but ethics. Ethics concerns not the general question of what 
actions should be done, but the narrower question of what actions should be 
done out of a sense of ethical duty. 390 "Ninety-nine hundreths of all our 
actions are done from other motives, and rightly so done if the rule of duty 
does not condemn them."' 39 1 Utility is best served if individuals pursue their 
own happiness most of the time; to act always or even very frequently out of 
a sense of duty spoils the enjoyment of life. Moreover, like Bentham, Mill 
thought law more important than morality as a definer and enforcer of 
duties: 
386. See JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(1958). 
387. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LBERTY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1951) (discussing the liberty of thought, individuality, and 
the limits of society's authority over the individual). 
388. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM: WITH CRITICAL ESSAYS 18 (Samuel 
Gorovitz ed., 1971). 
389. J.O. Urmson, The Interpretationof the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill, in MILL, 
UTILITARIANISM 168, 170 (1970). 
390. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 25 (1971). 
391. Id. 
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Utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the 
• . . interest of every individual as nearly as possible in harmony with the 
interest of the whole; and, secondly, that education and opinion, which have 
so vast a power over human character, should so use that power to establish 
in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own 
happiness and ... the practice of such modes of conduct ... as regards for 
the universal happiness prescribes. 392 
Mill was a utilitarian; and he adhered to a sort of Kantian ethics of 
universalizable rules, with utilitarian benefits. But his utilitarianism, which 
was chiefly a program of legal and political reform, far exceeded this "rule-
utilitarian" ethics. As Russell Hardin comments: 
Much of the mid-twentieth-century effort to read earlier utilitarians, such as 
Mill, as really rule-utilitarians largely misses the point of the earlier concern, 
which was with institutional arrangements that would help secure good 
consequences and not with individual rule following. To avoid such 
confusion we should speak not of rule-utilitarianism but of institutional 
39 3
utilitarianism. 
Thus the early utilitarians cannot be placed on one side or the other of 
contemporary debates within utilitarian ethics. In so far as they were 
utilitarians, they were not ethicists, but political and legal theorists. 
Ethical utilitarianism was invented by Henry Sidgwick in his 1874 
treatise, The Methods of Ethics.394 Here he defined ethics as an academic 
395 bydiscipline-the "ideal" or normative "science" or study of "conduct, 
' 396 which he meant "the voluntary action of individuals. Ethics was 
therefore to be distinguished from jurisprudence and politics.397 Sidgwick's 
subject was "methods" of acquiring knowledge about what actions are right 
do.398 for individuals to He distinguished two general methodological 
approaches: inquiring into the consequences of an action for happiness, and 
inquiring into opinions or "intuitions" about the rightness of an action. 
Among consequentialist approaches, he distinguished utilitarianism, or 
392. Id. at 24. 
393. HARDIN, supra note 9, at 79. 
394. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHics (1874). 
395. Id. at 1. 
396. Id. at 4. 
397. See id. at 1, 4. 
398. Id. at 5-7. 
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"universalistic hedonism" from "egoistic hedonism." 399 In thus comparing 
ethical methods, Sidgwick admitted that he was not studying them 
"historically, as methods that have actually been used or proposed for the 
regulation of practice; but rather as alternatives between which . . . the 
human mind seems necessarily forced to choose when it attempts to frame a 
complete synthesis of practical maxims and to act in a perfectly consistent 
manner."40 0 Thus in expounding "utilitarianism," Sidgwick made no claim 
to offer an accurate interpretation of the thought of Hume, Helvetius, 
Beccaria, Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, or any other actual figure 
in the history of utilitarianism. He was attempting to work out the 
implications for individual obligation of an ethical theory built on a 
foundation of universal hedonism. In so doing, he distinguished his 
enterprise, "the scientific study of right conduct," from that of previous 
writers, who, he opined, were drawn into confusion and inconsistency by the 
'40 1 
exigencies of "practical reason. 
While Sidgwick developed a utilitarian ethics in The Methods of Ethics, 
he apparently did not regard utilitarianism as exclusively or fundamentally 
an ethical doctrine. Rather, he saw utilitarianism as a conception of the good 
with implications for jurisprudence and political theory as well as ethics. 
Moreover, he saw these jurisprudential and political implications as more 
centrally important from a utilitarian standpoint.402 Nevertheless, he saw 
some moral obligations flowing from the great utility of laws in advancing 
the general welfare. Thus, order being preferable to chaos, even non-optimal 
laws should generally be obeyed and defended; citizens should endeavor to 
increase the utility of the laws when they could do so without threatening 
social order.403 Sidgwick devoted two chapters to critiquing intuitionist 
views on law and justice,404 but his aim was to refute claims that law should 
be ruled by deontological morality, and that legal burdens and benefits 
should be distributed on the basis of desert without regard to behavioral 
incentives. 405 Thus he was chiefly concerned with freeing law and policy 
from ethics. 
Sidgwick succeeded in laying out the boundaries of ethics as an 
academic discipline, with the result that utilitarianism was afterwards 
399. Id. at 64-66. 
400. Id. at 10. 
401. Id. at 10, 11. 
402. See id.at 14. 
403. See id.at 16,412-13. 
404. See id.at 236-88. 
405. See id.at 415-18. 
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understood as an ethical doctrine primarily. Professors of ethics forgot that 
utilitarianism was a program of legal reform before it was an ethical theory, 
and came to see the legislative agenda as a restricted application of 
utilitarian ethics. 
C. The Revival of InstitutionalUtilitarianism 
A number of contemporary philosophers have begun to revive the 
institutional utilitarianism of Beccaria, Bentham and Mill. Yet, even they 
find it difficult to separate this earlier tradition from the ethical 
utilitarianism of Sidgwick. In Morality within the Limits of Reason, Russell 
Hardin writes: 
Utilitarianism provides both an individual and a social moral theory because 
the one is inherently incomplete without the other. To a large and sad extent, 
this view was lost in much of twentieth-century utilitarianism, which, in the 
spirit of most twentieth-century moral theory of all philosophical varieties, 
has typically focused on essentially personal problems of choice in small-
number interactions such as personal promising and face-to-face charity. 406 
Hardin concludes that utilitarian policy analysis depends upon and 
"completes" utilitarian ethics. Assuming that ethics have always been 
integral to utilitarianism, Hardin reasons that utilitarians were driven to 
pursue utility by institutional means because of the incompetence of 
individual moral actors to identify and pursue the public welfare on an ad 
hoc basis.407 And he reasons that utilitarians will usually proceed by means 
of rules rather than calculation because of the high cost of information. 
Hardin rejects all criticisms of utilitarianism based on hypothetical examples 
involving an individual with perfect knowledge of causal relationships at 
odds with common experience.40 8 Accordingly, he rejects Carritt's and 
McCloskey's charge of punishing the innocent, on reasoning similar to that 
offered by Rawls: 
If utilitarianism recommends an institution for punishment of properly 
convicted persons, then that is the kind of institution a utilitarian would 
want. We must create institutions to achieve utilitarian ends because 
individual actions unconstrained and unguided by institutional structures will 
406. HARDIN, supra note 9, at 12-13. 
407. See id. at 13-14. 
408. See id. at 22-29. 
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not achieve them as well. There is perhaps no more grievous limit to 
individual human reason than this. It is precisely the point of such an 
institution as... criminal justice to override individual reason for the social 
4 0 9good. 
For Hardin, institutional utilitarianism and rule-utilitarianism are simply 
versions of act-utilitarian ethics that recognize the "limits of reason." 
Another proponent of institutional utilitarianism is James Wood Bailey. 
Bailey also moves from act-utilitarian premises to institutional utilitarianism 
by noting the disabilities of individual moral actors as utilitarian 
decisionmakers. Like Hardin, Bailey adverts to cognitive disabilities: 
individuals are much more competent to identify their own interests than to 
identify those of other people. The pooling of information necessary for 
utilitarian social planning requires democratic or bureaucratic institutions, or 
pricing mechanisms policed by judicial institutions. But mostly, Bailey is 
interested in the motivational disabilities emphasizied by Helvetius and 
Bentham: individual actors cannot be trusted to sacrifice their own interests 
to the general welfare, or to honestly reveal their preferences, unless 
constrained to do so by sanctions. 4 10 For Helvetius and Bentham this just 
meant that there was little to be gained by preaching benevolence. But 
Bailey argues that it is actually immoral to demand that committed 
utilitarians subject themselves to exploitation by engaging in unreciprocated 
benevolence. This demand imposes too great a burden and makes 
utilitarianism an unappealing creed. The likely result is to discourage belief 
in utilitarianism4 11 and so to reduce support for the utilitarian institutions 
and policies that can do far more than individuals to advance the public 
good. An excessively burdensome morality is self-defeating, and hence, not 
useful. 4 12 
Like Hardin, Bailey believes that his institutional utilitarianism avoids 
the problem of framing the innocent. Bailey treats this problem as part of 
two more general objections: that utilitarianism might require "imposed 
sacrifices" 4 13 and that it might require "some form of undemocratic and 
systematic deception of the people. This is what Bernard Williams 
derisively calls 'Government House Utilitarianism.' "414 Bailey responds by 
409. See id. at 102, 104, 105. 
410. BAILEY, supranote 9, at 160. 
411. See id. at 56-58. 
412. See id. at 49, 54. 
413. Id. at 21-22. 
414. Id. at 152. 
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arguing that these dangers are both precluded by his principle that 
utilitarians must protect themselves against exploitation by those whose 
motives are non-utilitarian. As Rawls argued, utility is not served by 
creating dangerous institutions checked only by the benevolent impulses of 
those administering them. Institutional power must be checked by individual 
rights, and by regular and public public procedures. In an imperfect world, 
[Olpen political procedures are an institutional requirement of utilitarian 
political theory. The omnipresent possibility of exploitation through 
manipulation of the process makes any kind of Government House 
untenable. No sane citizenry would ever tolerate the existence of an elite, 
which makes choices about what morality the rest of us are to believe, for 
the excellent institutionalist reason that would-be exploiters would find their 
way into Government House like ants into a picnic basket. And that invasion 
would lead to an outcome that would be disastrous in utilitarian terms.415 
Bailey's non-exploitation principle is functionally identical to Bentham's 
aim of security. Bailey derives not only a requirement of publicity, but also 
a requirement of democracy, 416 and a scheme of individual civil and welfare 
rights417 from this concern. The resulting theory has every claim to the label 
"utilitarian" since it is barely distinguishable from Bentham's. Whether it 
retains much relationship to its supposedly act-utilitarian premises is open to 
question, however. 
A third advocate of institutional utilitarianism, Robert Goodin, offers a 
much simpler proposal in Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy. Like 
Hardin, Goodin assimilates the original utilitarians to Sidgwick and so treats 
them as both ethical and institutional utilitarians. But he considers 
institutional utilitarianism to have been much more central to their 
enterprise: "Jeremy Bentham was famous in his own day primarily as a 
reformer of legal systems; James Mill as an essayist on government; John 
Stuart Mill as an essayist, social reformer, and parliamentarian; John Austin 
as a jurisprude."4 18 Like Hardin, Goodin laments the virtual disappearance 
of institutional utilitarianism in the twentieth century: 
There was an important shift among utilitarian writers that came 
somewhere between Sidgwick's 1874 Methods of Ethics (where public 
415. Id. at 153. 
416. See id.at 108-14. 
417. See id. at 95-106. 
418. ROBERT GOODIN,UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 12 (1995). 
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affairs loomed large) and G.E. Moore's 1903 PrincipiaEthica (where the 
greatest good is defined in terms of more private ideals, such as friendship 
and aesthetic appreciation). Whatever the cause of that shift, its 
consequences could not have been more deleterious to the proper defense of 
the utilitarian cause.... 
Throughout the twentieth century, defenders of utilitarianism have been 
primarily concerned to defend it in its least plausible form, as a code of 
personal conduct. 4 19 
Goodin argues that utilitarians can defend their doctrine against its strongest 
criticisms and rid it of its greatest flaws, by simply abandoning ethical 
utilitarianism. As Goodin explains, 
[Aidvocating utilitarianism as a public philosophy spares us the burdens 
associated with maximizing at the margins in each and every case. It 
involves instead adopting institutions and practices and policies, on a 
utilitarian basis; and those must, by their nature, be publicly accessible and 
relatively long lasting. That in turn means that in choosing institutions and 
practices and policies we cannot maximize at the margins, adapting our 
choices to peculiarities of utility mixes in particular cases. We must instead 
adapt our choices to standard situations recurring across protracted periods, 
and do so in full knowledge that the nature of our choices will sooner or later 
become common knowledge.4 20 
Goodin reasons that this public and political conception of the role of 
utilitarian reasoning precludes framing of the innocent, killing people to 
harvest their organs for transplants, and other such practices. The supposed 
benefits are overwhelmed by the costs to the general security and confidence 
if these practices become public. 42 1 Goodin identifies his "public 
utilitarianism" as a discursive enterprise much like the one we attributed to 
Bentham. Goodin reasons that utilitarian policy analysis requires 
interpersonal comparisons of utility and that while such comparisons can be 
made, they cannot be made precisely. Because of this and other "limits of 
reason" utilitarian calculations can never be precise and are always subject 
to rational argument. 
419. Id. at7. 
420. Id. at 22. 
421. See id. 
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That is not necessarily a telling criticism of utilitarianism, though. It 
merely amounts to saying that utilitarianism leaves some room for public 
debate and deliberation-in other words for politics as it is ordinarily 
conceived. We would, I think worry about any political theory that did not 
do that.... 
Furthermore, even where utilitarianism proves indeterminate, it sets the 
terms of that public debate. It tells us what sorts of considerations ought to 
weigh with us, often while allowing that how heavily each of them actually 
weighs is legitimately open to dispute.422 
This conception of utilitarian reasoning as a democratically structured 
discursive process may sound fashionably post-modem, but it is true to the 
origins of utilitarianism in an era of expanding political participation. At the 
dawn of democracy, political theorists and reformers confronted the 
questions of how to fit the people to the responsibilities of rule, and how to 
peacefully subject them to the rule of their equals. The utilitarians offered 
the same solution to both problems: a rational discourse of public policy, a 
discipline that would compel the people to debate the public interest, thereby 
ennobling, legitimizing, and ultimately settling disagreement. From the 
beginning, utility's proponents were inspired by its promise to civilize 
democracy by transforming political conflict into rational debate. The 
function of the utility standard was to guide public discussion, not individual 
action. Institutional utilitarianism addresses the public in its political 
capacity, not the individual in her ethical capacity. Hence it cannot direct the 
individual to pervert public discourse by bearing false witness. 
The traditional charge against utilitarian penology, that it requires 
framing the innocent, is false. That charge may apply against ethical 
utilitarianism, but utilitarian penology did not arise from and does not 
depend upon ethical utilitarianism. It arose from and depends upon the 
venerable tradition of institutional utilitarianism. And institutional 
utilitarianism does not require, entail, or presuppose any views on ethics 
whatsoever. 
D. The Boundariesof InstitutionalUtilitarianism 
In refraining utilitarian penology as an application of institutional rather 
than ethical utilitarianism, we have exonerated it of the traditional charge of 
422. Id. at 21. 
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framing the innocent. But we have not necessarily immunized it against all 
forms of the charge of punishing the innocent. Indeed, institutional 
utilitarianism may be more vulnerable to the charge of collective punishment 
than is ethical utilitarianism. This potential vulnerability to the charge of 
collective punishment arises from the positivism of institutional 
utilitarianism. Recall that Bentham's positivism encouraged him to prioritize 
realizing utility ahead of maximizing utility. From this positivist 
perspective, the value of "utility" cannot be maximized until it has been 
given concrete meaning by a reliably representative policy process. If it is 
more important to realize utility in institutions than to maximize it, difficult 
normative questions will arise at the boundaries of utilitarian institutions. 
What are the responsibilities of a utilitarian polity toward populations that 
are not represented in its policy process? What normative principles govern 
a utilitarian polity faced with external threats? The early utilitarians were 
highly skeptical of claims that states had international obligations because 
they were not convinced that international relations were governed by an 
effective legal system.423 
Should a utilitarian polity simply ignore the welfare of foreign 
populations, except in so far as those populations engage the sympathy of its 
own population?424 Should it rely on foreign governments to identify and 
represent the interests of foreign populations? What should a utilitarian 
polity do when the interests of its population conflict with the interests of a 
foreign population? What should it do when its political independence and 
survival are threatened by a foreign government? Should a utilitarian polity 
encourage or even force foreign governments to adopt utilitarian 
institutions? Should it seek to establish a global utilitarian policy process? 
Because institutional utilitarianism does not have obvious answers to 
these difficult questions, it is vulnerable to the charge that it permits 
utilitarian polities to exploit and mistreat foreign populations. One form this 
charge could take would be to point to the danger that "raison d'etat" could 
justify collective punishment of foreign populations in the context of 
international conflict.425 An obvious answer to this type of charge is that 
423. See JoHN AUSTIN, I LECrURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 187-88, 231-32, 264, 267 
(1869). 
424. Similar problems arise with respect to the treatment of at least two other classes 
of unrepresented sentient beings: animals and future generations. 
425. A related danger is the exercise of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in ways 
that discount the costs of crime and the costs of punishment borne by foreigners. For 
exploration of some of these issues, see Pablo De Greiff, Drugs, National Sovereignty and 
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absent effective institutions of global governance, the subject of 
international justice, like that of individual ethics, is simply outside the 
domain of utilitarian analysis. Yet this answer invites the rejoinder that if 
institutional utilitarianism is to remain a practical guide to policy, it must 
address the policy dilemmas confronting contemporary governments in an 
interdependent global environment in which the effects of governance are 
never strictly local. 426 
The charge that utilitarianism mandates framing the innocent became 
prevalent in mid-twentieth century England and America, and reflected that 
era's anxiety about foreign totalitarian states. Yet, this anxiety was 
misapplied to utilitarianism, which, as we have seen, presupposes the 
institutional protections of a liberal democratic state. Today, the real dangers 
of utilitarianism lie not in the threat it poses to our liberal democracy, but in 
the threat our liberal democracy may pose to those beyond its bounds. 
DemocraticLegitimacy, in DRUGS AND THE LIMIrS OF LIBERALISM 156 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 
1999). 
426. See generally DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE 
MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE (1995). 
